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LINCOLN, VALLANDIGHAM, AND ANTI-WAR SPEECH
IN THE CIVIL WAR
Michael Kent Curtis'
In the early morning hours of May 5, 1863, Union soldiers forcibly arrested
Clement L. Vallandigham, a prominent Democratic politician and former
congressman, for an anti-war speech which he had given a few days earlier in
Mount Vernon, Ohio. Vallandigham's arrest ignited debate about freedom ofspeech
in a democracy during a time of war and the First Amendment rights of critics of an
administration. This Article is one in a series by Professor Curtis which examines
episodes in the history offree speech before and during the Civil War.
In this Article, Professor Curtis explores the First Amendment's guarantee of
free speech and the contention that other constitutional values must supersede this
guarantee during a time of war. He discusses and evaluates theories that
Vallandigham's contemporaries advocated in support of protection for anti-war
speech, as well as theories supporting the suppression of anti-war speech. Curtis
concludes that even in a time of war, free speech is essential to the preservation of
a representative government and individuals' Constitutional right to discuss issues
crucial to their lives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Meaning of Vallandigham's Arrest
At 2:40 a.m. on May 5, 1863, one hundred and fifty Union soldiers from the
command of General Ambrose Burnside arrived at Clement L. Vallandigham's home
in Dayton, Ohio. The soldiers' mission was to arrest Vallandigham, a prominent
Democratic politician and former congressman, for an anti-war political speech he
had made a few days before. After Vallandigham refused to submit, the soldiers
attempted to break down his front door. Finally, soldiers forced their way in and
captured Vallandigham. They put him on a train bound for Cincinnati. Once there,
Vallandigham was to be tried before a military commission appointed, of course, by
the same General who had ordered his arrest. Vallandigham's efforts to secure a writ
of habeas corpus failed. After his conviction, President Lincoln changed
Vallandigham's sentence from imprisonment to banishment to the Confederacy.'
Within a month of Vallandigham's banishment, General Burnside suppressed
publication of the Chicago Times newspaper; but this time Lincoln countermanded
the order.2 Less than a year later, Republicans in Congress introduced a resolution
to expel a Democratic congressman for advocating peace and recognition of the
See The Circumstances of the Arrest ofC. L. Vallandigham, CIN. COM., May 6, 1863,
at 2; Frank L. Klement, Clement L. Vallandigham, in FOR THE UNION: OHIO LEADERS IN THE
CIVIL WAR 3, 37-42 (Kenneth W. Wheeler ed., 1968) [hereinafter Klement, Vallandigham,
in FOR THE UNION]. For other discussions of Vallandigham and his arrest, see for example,
FRANK L. KLEMENT, THE LIMITS OF DISSENT: CLEMENT L. VALLANDIGHAM & THE CIVIL WAR
157-58 (1970) [hereinafter KLEMENT, LIMITS OF DISSENT]. Klement, relying in part on
accounts many years later and on circumstantial evidence, suggested that Vallandigham
courted martyrdom as a means of gaining the Democratic nomination for governor. Id. at
154. See also Erving E. Beauregard, The Bingham- Vallandigham Feud, 15 BIOGRAPHY 29
(1992) (contrasting Vallandigham's education, political beliefs, and Congressional voting
record with those of Bingham, a fellow Ohio legislator and chief drafter of the Fourteenth
Amendment). For accounts of events reported here which are more sympathetic to the
position taken by Lincoln, see for example, ROBERT S. HARPER, LINCOLN AND THE PRESS
239-51 (1951); Harold M. Hyman's classic work, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF
THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION 124-40 (1973) (concluding
that the strength and swiftness of Lincoln's war-time efforts convinced Northern scholars,
Union legislators, Union soldiers, and some foreign observers that the Constitution was as
adequate in war as in peace). For an analysis that is critical of Republicans, see JEFFREY
ROGERS HUMMEL, EMANCIPATING SLAVES, ENSLAVING FREE MEN: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, chs. 8, 10 (1996). For a less critical analysis of the suppression of free
speech in the Vallandigham case, see CRAIG DAVIDSON TENNEY, MAJOR GENERAL A. E.
BURNSIDE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A CASE STUDY OF CIVIL WAR FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION, reprinted in UMI Dissertation Service, 1977.
2 See KLEMENT, LIMITS OF DISSENT, supra note 1, at 183.
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Confederacy in a speech he made on the floor of the House.3 Some cited the
Vallandigham case as precedent for the proposed expulsion.'
The most immediate response to the Vallandigham arrest was a riot in his home
town. A mob burned the local Republican newspaper building and cut telegraph
lines. Order was restored only when General Burnside declared martial law and sent
in troops.'
Vallandigham's arrest produced a tidal wave of criticism. The arrest focused
national attention on the meaning of free speech in time of war (especially civil war),
on the relation of free speech to democratic government, and on civil liberties for
critics of the Lincoln administration. Critics insisted that the arrest violated Bill of
Rights guarantees of free speech, free assembly, due process, and the rights to a trial
by jury and a grand jury indictment. Both Democrats and Republicans described
such rights as "privileges" or "immunities," as well as "rights" and "liberties."6 The
Vallandigham case raised basic civil liberties issues: the power of the military to try
civilians in areas where no combat raged and where civil courts were functioning; the
power to try and imprison such persons for anti-war speech; and generally, the scope
of the war power. What was the scope of military power during internal rebellion,
and to what extent did the First Amendment limit that power? This Article primarily
focuses on the free speech issue.
Before the Civil War, abolitionists and, later, Republicans had invoked protective
concepts of freedom of speech, press. assembly, and religion to defend against
attempts to suppress anti-slavery expression. They claimed the right to discuss
questions of public policy fully and freely on every inch of American soil "to which
the privileges and immunities of the Constitution extend," as Representative Lovejoy
said in 1860. "[T]hat Constitution," Lovejoy insisted, "guaranties me free speech."7
In response to an uproar over Republican endorsement of a searing anti-slavery book,
Republicans in the United States Senate supported the following resolution:
"freedom of speech and of the press, on [the morality and expediency of slavery] and
every other subject of domestic [state] and national policy, should be maintained
inviolate."8 Many Republicans and others described the rights to free speech and
press as constitutional privileges belonging to all American citizens and as rights
enjoyed by virtue of the Federal Constitution.9
' See infra notes 345-407 and accompanying text.
4 See id.
See, e.g., Mob at Dayton, DET. FREE PRESS, May 7, 1863, at 1.
6 E.g. Free Speech-Free Press, Immense Meeting at Chicago: Protest Against the
Order No. 84 of Gen. Burnside, CHI. TIMES, June 5, 1863, reprinted in DET. FREE PRESS,
June 6, 1863, at 1.
7 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., Ist Sess. 205 (1860).
8 Id. at 146.
9 See Michael Kent Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy by an Anti-Abolition
Mob: Free Speech, Mobs, Republican Government, and the Privileges ofAmerican Citizens,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1109, 1147-50 (1997) [hereinafter Curtis, The 1837 Killing]; Michael
Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper's Book, The Impending Crisis: Free
Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the"Fourteenth
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Both anti-slavery activists and Republicans implicitly repudiated the notion that
freedom of speech or press merely was a protection against prior restraints, but that
punishment after publication was permissible. Instead, they insisted that by
punishing anti-slavery speech and press, slave states refused to tolerate freedom of
speech. Similarly, they implicitly and, sometimes, explicitly rejected arguments that
the bad tendency of anti-slavery speech (a tendency that outraged Southerners and
their Northern allies insisted threatened slave revolts) justified suppression."° The
Republican Party slogan in 1856 was "Free Speech, Free Press, Free Men, Free
Labor, Free Territory."''
The Civil War raised the free speech and bad tendency issues again, though this
time critics of emancipation and the war invoked the protection of free speech and
free press. The Vallandigharn case reveals a broad and popular free speech tradition
at work and in conflict with other interests. The free speech tradition included core
ideas: that criticism of the actions of government officials and advocacy of peaceful
change in public policy were protected speech; that free speech was a basic human
right; that it was central to popular government; that infringements of free speech
violated the ultimate sovereignty of the people; and that free speech required broad
equality of treatment for opposing views. Broad belief in these core ideas prevented
Civil War repression of political speech from becoming more pervasive.
Supporters of Vallandigham's arrest martialed counter-ideas. They distinguished
between liberty and license and, in doing so, they made arguments similar to those
expressed in judicial cases and in a scholarly tradition that insisted that freedom of
speech and press did not encompass license. 2 In time of rebellion, they argued, free
Amendment, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1113, 1150-59 (1993) [hereinafter Curtis, The 1859
Crisis]; MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 34-56 (1986) [hereinafter CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE].
" See generally Curtis, The 1859 Crisis, supra note 9, at 1174-77 (suggesting that
Republican frustration with lack of First Amendment protections for anti-slavery speech in
the South was partly responsible for Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment).
I I RICHARD H. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM: ANTISLAVERY POLITICS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1837-1860, at 284 (1976).
12 See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1882 (1833)
("[Firee, but not licentious, discussion must be encouraged."), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 182, 184 (Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION]. Story reserved judgment on whether the national government
had the power of "not restraining the liberty of the press, but punishing the licentiousness of
the press." Id. § 1885, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra, at 185. But see 3 JAMES
BURGH, POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS 254 (Da Capo Press 1971) (1775).
No man ought to be hindered saying or writing what he pleases on the conduct
of those who undertake the management of national affairs, in which all are
concerned, and therefore have a right to inquire, and to publish their suspicions
concerning them. For if you punish the slanderer, you deter the fair inquirer.
Id. Cf ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, I :App. 298-99, 2:App. 12-25,
27-30 (1803), in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra, at 152-58 (stating that Congress
may not regulate the press, but that some remedy is available to "an individual" in a state
court for attacks on reputation). Cf. People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. 1804),
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speech rights are far more limited than in peacetime, even in states that are not in
rebellion and that are distant from military conflict. Supporters of Vallandigham 's
arrest insisted that, in time of rebellion or war, speech tending to produce bad results
in the long run should be suppressed.
They also might have invoked the Sedition Act and insisted that freedom of
speech was limited to protection against prior restraint. That they did not make such
arguments shows the extent to which the popular free speech tradition had repudiated
the claim that free press was only a protection against prior restraint.
Vallandigham's story illustrates the long existence of a vibrant and tough free
speech tradition--even in times of great national danger. The Vallandigham and
Chicago Times episodes show that a robust view of free speech was not, as is often
supposed, a twentieth-century development, but part of a much older tradition. The
history of this earlier robust free speech tradition is worthy of careful study,
particularly today when that tradition is under increased scholarly attack.
This Article is an installment in a series that examines episodes in the history of
free speech before and during the Civil War. One of these major episodes involved
the Sedition Act, under which the government jailed political critics of President
John Adams for "'false, scandalous and malicious""' 3 criticisms of the President and
his policies. (Critics of Adams's likely opponent-Vice President Thomas
Jefferson-were not covered by the Act.) The episodes also include an attempt to
ban anti-slavery publications from the mails; a ban on discussion of anti-slavery
petitions in the United States Congress; the use of the laws of Southern states to
suppress anti-slavery and, later, Republican speech; the attempt to pass similar laws
in the North; and the use of mob violence in an attempt to silence abolitionists. Each
of these episodes involved attempts to suppress political speech on major issues of
the time. The episodes involved major decisions about the nature and scope of free
speech in America.
When he presented the Bill of Rights in the first Congress, James Madison
suggested that courts ofjustice would "consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights" and would "be an impenetrable bulwark against every
assumption of power."' 4 In addition, he said that the Bill of Rights would help
reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra, at 158, 169.
The founders of our government were too wise and too just, ever to have
intended, by the freedom of the press, a right to circulate falsehood as well as
truth, or that the press should be the lawful vehicle of malicious defamation, or
an engine for evil and designing men, to cherish, for mischievous purposes,
sedition, irreligion, and impurity.
Id. Cf Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824), reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra, at 170, 175 (a blasphemy prosecution).
3 See JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 94-95 (1956) (quoting Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, § 2, Stat.
596).
"4 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1031 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971).
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cultivate public opinion in favor of the rights and so provide additional security for
the rights.'5
In these early episodes, public support for free speech loomed larger than judicial
protection. The courts were not the only decision makers and, sometimes, hardly
were involved at all. When the courts did become involved, they often ratified, rather
than checked, abuses of power. Devotion to popular conceptions of free speech was,
and remains, an important protection for free speech.' 6
The events examined in this Article involve common and recurring problems.
These include the conflict between free speech and other important interests such as
national unity in time of war and, more generally, the conflict between free speech
and the evils free speech is thought to engender. The Vallandigham controversy, like
earlier episodes, involved the conflict between the "bad tendency" of free speech to
cause serious harm in the long run and the interests of citizens in broad political
freedom. Like earlier episodes, the Vallandigham arrest involved the claim that other
constitutional values must supersede guarantees of free speech and free press.
B. The Democratic Party and Vallandigham's Politics
In the years before the Civil War, the Democratic Party had been an uneasy
coalition between, among others, Southern planters and Northern artisans. Slavery
was a wedge issue that threatened to split the Northern and Southern wings of the
party and to drive Democrats from power. Some Democrats had supported a law to
ban anti-slavery publications from the mails and had supported a gag law to prohibit
discussion of anti-slavery petitions in Congress. Other Democrats opposed the
expansion of slavery, the restrictions on free speech on the subject of slavery,
including a law banning abolitionist publications from the mails, and the gag rule.
These Democrats contributed crucial votes to defeat the proposed ban on mailing
abolitionist pamphlets to the South, and eventually, the gag rule. 7 But as the Civil
'5 See id. at 1030-32.
16 See Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery
Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835-1837, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 785 (1995) [hereinafter Curtis,
The Curious History]; Curtis, The 1837 Killing, supra note 9, at 1109; Curtis, The 1859
Crisis, supra note 9, at 1113. For examples of judicial ratification of the Sedition Act, see
for example, United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865); United
States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709); Lyon's Case, 15 F. Cas.
1183 (C.C.D. Vt. 1798) (No. 8,646).
17 See generally WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATTLE
IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS (1996) (discussing the gag rule-slavery debate of the 1830s
and early 1840s); LEONARD L. RICHARDS, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CONGRESSMAN JOHN
QUINCY ADAMS (1986) (discussing the activities of anti-abolitionists and the rise of an
organized anti-slavery movement in the North, and describing John Quincy Adams's
involvement in free speech struggles over slavery); GILBERT HOBBS BARNES, THE,
ANTISLAVERY IMPULSE: 1830-1844, at 109-45 (1933) (noting the significant role that religion
played in the abolitionist movement in the West and how this Western anti-slavery movement
of the 1830s spread to the North and culminated in a sectional crusade against slavery).
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War approached, leaders of the party increased their efforts to satisfy escalating
Southern demands to protect the institution of slavery. Ultimately, the effort to
satisfy the South failed and, in 1860, the Democratic Party, like the Union itself, split
into Northern and Southern parties. With secession, most Democrats supported the
war, but many opposed the Emancipation Proclamation. Vallandigham was a
member of the peace wing of the Democratic Party.
Vallandigham supported the primary Southern approach to the constitutional
crisis that led to the Civil War. By the 1850s, many Southerners demanded the right
to settle with their slaves in any of the national territories. This demand was
advanced dramatically when Congress passed the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act. That
Act repealed the Missouri Compromise which had prohibited slavery in territory
north of latitude 36'30 ' . The Kansas-Nebraska Act galvanized Northern sentiment
against the expansion of slavery, ignited a political firestorm, and led to the formation
of the Republican Party.'
In 1855, Vallandigham described the Kansas-Nebraska Act as "that most just,
most Constitutional, and most necessary measure."' 9 He explained that abolition was
the cause of the sectional crisis wracking the United States. With respect to the
formation of abolition societies, he said:
The object of attack was the South, the seat of war the North. Public
sentiment was to be stirred up here against slavery, because it was a moral
evil, and a sin in the sight of the Most High, for the continuance of which,
one day, the men of the North were accountable before heaven.
Slaveholders were to be made odious .. .as cruel tyrants and task-
masters, as kidnappers, murderers, and pirates, whose existence was a
reproach to the North, and whom it were just to hunt down and
exterminate.'°
Initially, when confronted by the abolitionists, according to Vallandigham:
even the North started back aghast .... [Abolition] was denounced as
treason and madness from the first. Its presses were destroyed, its
assemblies broken up, its publications burned, and it lecturers mobbed
everywhere, and more than one among them murdered in the midst of
popular tumult and indignation. The churches, the school-houses, the
court-houses, and the public halls were alike closed against them.'
IS See generally DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE 188-92 (1978)
(explaining that only seven of the 44 Northern Democrats who voted for the Kansas-
Nebraska Act won re-election following passage of the Act and attributing the formation of
the Republican Party to the "anti-Nebraska" movement of 1854).
'9 C. L. Vallandigham, History of the Abolition Movement, Speech Delivered at a
Democratic Meeting held in Dayton, Ohio, Oct. 29, 1855, in THE RECORD OF HON. C. L.
VALLANDIGHAM ON ABOLITION, THE UNION, AND THE CIVIL WAR 5, 38 (J. Walter & Co.
1863) [hereinafter VALLANDIGHAM RECORD].
20 Id. at 22.
21 Id. at 22.
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Gradually, Vallandigham said, abolition had established a "Free Soil" anti-slavery
party. It had "disguis[ed] its odious principles and its true purposes, under the false
pretence of No Extension of Slavery."22
Like many of his contemporaries, Vallandigham was a racist. "No negro
emigrant could be naturalized,"23 he declared in an 1858 speech in Congress. "[I]t
is not alone [the Negro's] descent from slaves ... that degrades him in the scale of
social and political being. It is his color and his blood. It is because he is the
descendant of a servile and degraded race."24 After the Civil War, most Democrats
initially opposed national protection for the rights of newly freed slaves.25
As a Democratic congressman from Ohio, Clement L. Vallandigham had been
one of the most persistent critics of the Lincoln administration's war policy. The
state legislature redrew Vallandigham's district and Republicans targeted him for
defeat. In 1862, Vallandigham lost his seat in Congress. By January 1863,
Vallandigham had decided to run for governor of Ohio.
26
In 1863, Vallandigham was a supporter of "the Union as it was" 27 -a
Constitution that recognized and supported slavery in a union of slave and free states.
In fact, the Union would not be exactly as it had been. Under a constitutional
amendment that Vallandigham proposed after the outbreak of the Civil War, no bill
could become a law without support from a majority of senators and representatives
from each of the nation's four sections (the South was one); and no one could be
elected president without a majority of the electoral college votes from each section. 8
The proposal promised long-term security for the institution of slavery because it
gave the South a veto on legislation and on the election of a president.
Vallandigham opposed the draft, but he told an 1862 mass meeting in his
congressional district that "[w]hoever should be drafted, should a draft be ordered
according to the Constitution and the law, is in duty bound.., to... go; he has no
right to resist, and none to run away."3°
In 1863, Vallandigham also openly opposed continuing the Civil War. "But
ought this war to continue?" Vallandigham asked in an 1863 speech.3' "I answer,
no-not a day, not an hour. What then? Shall we separate? Again I answer, no, no,
no!"3 He quickly dismissed concerns about slavery. "Neither will I be stopped by
22 Id. at 26.
23 Id. at 236.
24 Id.
25 See, e.g., CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 9, at 81.
26 See Klement, Vallandigham, in FOR TIlE UNION, supra note 1, at 36.
27 Id. at 29 (citing N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1862, quoted in DAYTON EMPIRE (Ohio: Daily),
Dec. 18, 1862).
's See id. at 8.
29 See id
30 Id. at 24.
31 C. L. Vallandigham, The Great Civil War in America, Speech Delivered in the House
of Representatives, Jan. 14, 1863, in VALLANDIGHAM RECORD, supra note 19, at 168, 183.
32 Id.
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that other cry of mingled fanaticism and hypocrisy, about the sin and barbarism of
African slavery."33 Vallandigham thought the horror of the war and the policy of the
administration required a change of policy. "Sir," he said, "I see more of barbarism
and sin, a thousand times, in the continuance of this war, the dissolution of the
Union, the breaking up of this Government, and the enslavement of the white race,
by debt and taxes and arbitrary power."34
Opposition to the war often was extreme. The Dayton Daily Empire, a
newspaper Vallandigham influenced heavily, described Ohio governor Dennison's
efforts to raise Union troops after Fort Sumter as a scheme to "butcher men, women,
and children" of the South."
Vallandigham hoped anti-slavery feeling was ebbing in the West. He thought
Westerners were beginning "to comprehend, that domestic slavery in the South is a
question, not of morals, or religion, or humanity, but a form of labor, perfectly
compatible with the dignity of free white labor in the same community, and with
national vigor, power, and prosperity, and especially with military strength." 6
Indeed, part of Vallandigham's solution for the Civil War was to end abolition
agitation: "In my judgment, you will never suppress the armed Secession Rebellion
till you have crushed under foot the pestilent Abolition Rebellion first. . . . It must
be met by reason and appeals to the people, through the press and in public
assemblages, and be put down at the ballot-box."37
In general, Vallandigham counseled obedience to the laws. But if Republicans
infringed the freedom of the ballot, he and other Democrats suggested revolt would
be appropriate. Vallandigham said:
No matter how distasteful constitutions and laws may be, they must be
obeyed. I am opposed to all mobs, and opposed also... to all violations
of [C]onstitution and law by men in authority-public servants. The
danger from usurpations and violations by them is fifty-fold greater than
from any other quarter, because these violations and usurpations come
clothed with false semblance of authority."
Before his arrest, Vallandigham also criticized the Lincoln administration for its
policy of military arrests of civilians and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, he suggested that if the President engaged in further arbitrary arrests, he
should be impeached.39
13 Id. at 189.
34 Id.
35 HARPER, supra note 1, at 195 (quoting DAYTON EMPIRE (Ohio: Daily), reprinted in
THE CRISIS (Columbus, Ohio), Apr. 18, 1861).
36 C. L. Vallandigham, The Great Civil War in America, Speech Delivered in the House
of Representatives, Jan. 14, 1863, in VALLANDIGHAM RECORD, supra note 19, at 168, 189.
31 C. L. Vallandigham, State of the Country, Speech Delivered at Dayton, Aug. 2, 1862,
in VALLANDIGHAM RECORD, supra note 19, at 135, 148.
" Id. at 137.
39 See Klement, Vallandigham, in FOR THE UNION, supra note 1, at 16.
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C. "Arbitrary Arrests"
Lincoln faced a huge rebellion, rebel sympathizers, and resistance and spies
throughout the nation. The loyalty of key states like Maryland, Missouri, and
Kentucky was doubtful. It was one of the most extreme threats in the nation's
history. The Lincoln administration responded with military arrests and suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus. Lincoln explained his policy in his 1861 Message to
Congress:
The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed were
being resisted, and failing of execution, in nearly one-third of the States.
Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been
perfectly clear, that by the use of the means necessary to their execution
some single law, made in such tenderness of the citizens's liberty, that
practically, it relieves more of the guilty, than of the innocent, should, to
a very limited extent, be violated? [A]re all the laws, but one, to go
unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be
violated? ... But it was not believed that any law was violated. The
provision of the Constitution that "The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, shall not be suspended unless when, the cases of rebellion or
invasion, the public safety may require it,"... is a provision ... that such
privilege may be suspended when, in cases of rebellion, or invasion, the
public safety does require it."
Military arrests of civilians not in the immediate theater of war and suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus disturbed friends, as well as critics, of the administration.
In his biography of Lincoln, David Donald reports that critics of the arrest policy
included both Conservative and Radical Republicans. For example, Lincoln's
conservative friend, Orville H. Browning, thought "arrests ordered by the Lincoln
administration 'were illegal and arbitrary, and did more harm than good."' 4 Radical
senator Lyman Trumbull from Illinois "agreed that 'all arbitrary arrests of citizens by
military authority.., are unwarrantable, and are doing much injury, and that if they
continue unchecked the civil tribunals will be completely subordinated to the
military, and the government overthrown.' 42
Many others, however, supported the administration and insisted that the
Constitution provided sweeping power to address the emergency. In time of civil
war, they said, the Constitution justified tough measures.43 They cited a landmark
1849 Supreme Court case, Luther v. Borden, to justify military arrests and trials of
40 Abraham Lincoln, Messages to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430 (ROY P. BASLER et al. eds., 1953)
[hereinafter LINCOLN].
41 DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 441 (1995).
42 Id.
41 See generally HYMAN, supra note 1, at 124-40 (referring to numerous
contemporaneous writings claiming that the Constitution was adequate in time of war).
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civilians." In Luther v. Borden, the Rhode Island legislature had declared martial
law because it had faced a military and political challenge from those seeking to
democratize the highly undemocratic government of the state.4" The Supreme Court
upheld the statewide imposition of martial law.46 The Court said that the question of
which government was legitimate was a political one, not appropriate for decision by
the Court.47 Rhode Island, the Court said, was in a "state of war" so it could act.
Accordingly:
And, unquestionably, a State may use its military power to put down an
armed insurrection, too strong to be controlled by the civil authority. The
power is essential to the existence of every government, essential to the
preservation of order and free institutions, and is as necessary to the States
of this Union as to any other government. The State itself must determine
what degree of force the crisis demands. And if the government of Rhode
Island deemed the armed opposition so formidable, and so ramified
throughout the State, as to require the use of its military force and the
declaration of martial law, we see no ground upon which this court can
question its authority. It was a state of war; and the established
government resorted to the rights and usages of war to maintain itself, and
to overcome the unlawful opposition. And in that state of things the
officers engaged in its military service might lawfully arrest anyone, who,
from the information before them, they had reasonable grounds to believe
was engaged in the insurrection; and might order a house to be forcibly
entered and searched, when there were reasonable grounds for supposing
he might be there concealed. Without the power to do this, martial law
and the military array of the government would be mere parade, and
rather encourage attack than repel it. No more force, however, can be
used than is necessary to accomplish the object. And if the power is
exercised for the purposes of oppression, or any injury willfully done to
person or property, the party by whom, or by whose order, it is committed
would undoubtedly be answerable."
Justice Levi Woodbury dissented. He distinguished martial law from law
intended for the governance of soldiers.49 Martial law, he argued, was only the rule
for the place of battle, the rule to be applied when civil courts were not functioning."
Woodbury explained:
[T]he "martial law" established here over the whole people of Rhode
Island, may be seen by adverting to its character for a moment, as
44 48 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1849).
4" See id.
46 See id.
41 See id. at 39-41.
48 Id. at 45-46.
49 See id. at 62 (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
" See id.
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described in judicial as well as political history. It exposed the whole
population, not only to be seized without warrant or oath, and their houses
broken open and rifled, and this where the municipal law and its officers
and courts remained undisturbed and able to punish all offenses, but to
send prisoners, thus summarily arrested in a civil strife, to all the harsh
pains and penalties of courts-martial or extraordinary commissions, and
for all kinds of supposed offenses. By it, every citizen, instead of
reposing under the shield of known and fixed laws as to his liberty,
property, and life, exists with a rope round his neck, subject to be hung
up by a military despot at the next lamp post, under the sentence of some
drum head court-martial.5
He noted that in this nation, in contrast to the British system, legislative power was
not supreme. So Woodbury doubted the legislature's or executive's power "to
suspend or abolish the whole securities of person and property at its pleasure" by
"establish[ing] in a whole country an unlimited reign of martial law over its whole
population."52 To do so was to make "the reign of the strongest, and ... mere
physical force the test of right. All our social usages and political education, as well
as our constitutional checks," he insisted, "are the other way."53 Though the Lincoln
administration cited Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Luther v. Borden to justify its
military arrests of civilians during the Civil War, the concerns of Justice Woodbury
resonated powerfully for many Americans. 4
II. THE VALLANDIGHAM ARREST, MILITARY TRIAL, AND
APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
A. The Immediate Context of Vallandigham's Arrest
On September 24, 1862, Abraham Lincoln issued the following proclamation:
Now, therefore, be it ordered, first, that during the existing
insurrection and as a necessary measure for suppressing the same,. . . all
persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or
guilty of any disloyal practice, affording aid and comfort to Rebels...
shall be subject to martial law and liable to trial and punishment by
Courts Martial or Military Commission:
Second. That the Writ of Habeas Corpus is suspended in respect to
all persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the rebellion
shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp.., or other place of confinement
5 Id.
52 Id. at 69 (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
53 id.
14 See George M. Dennison, Martial Law: The Development of a Theory of Emergency
Powers, 1776-1861, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 52, 78 (1974).
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by any military authority or by the sentence of any Court Martial or
Military Commission."
After this proclamation, as well as before it, the military arrested a number of
civilians. Congress was sufficiently concerned about such arrests to pass the Act of
March 3, 1863 (the "1863 Act"). 6 The 1863 Act both authorized and limited
presidential suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. It authorized "the President of
the United States... to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case
throughout the United States, or any part thereof."57 No officer was required to
produce the body of any person detained by the authority of the President, "but upon
the certificate, under oath, of the officer ... that such person is detained by him as
a prisoner under authority of the President, further proceedings under the writ of
habeas corpus shall be suspended. 58
But in the 1863 Act Congress tried to put limitations on executive power. It
required the secretaries of state and war to furnish the federal courts with
a list of the names of all persons, citizens of states in which the
administration of the laws has continued unimpaired in the said Federal
courts, who are now, or may hereafter be, held as prisoners of the United
States, by order or authority of the President ... as state or political
prisoners, or otherwise than as prisoners of war."
If "a grand jury having attended any of said courts having jurisdiction in the
premises, after the passage of this act, and after the furnishing of said list, as
aforesaid, has terminated its session without finding an indictment or presentment,
or other proceeding against any such person,"6 the Act required a federal judge to
bring such person before the court for discharge. Military commanders were required
to obey the order of the judge. No one, however, was to be discharged without first
taking an oath of allegiance.6
Lincoln did not issue another proclamation suspending the writ until after the
Vallandigham arrest. The effect of the 1863 Act on Lincoln's 1862 proclamation
was unclear. At the time of Vallandigham's arrest, many contemporaries doubted
that the writ was suspended in Ohio. If the 1863 Act implicitly superseded the prior
suspension, a new proclamation would be required. If the suspension of September
24, 1862 continued in effect, it would seem to apply to Vallandigham, but in that
" Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus (Sept. 24,
1862), in 5 LINCOLN, supra note 40, at 436, 437.
56 An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain
Cases, ch. 81, § 2, 12 Stat. 755 (1863).
57 Id.
5 Id. For discussions of the 1863 Act, see HYMAN, supra note 1, at 252-56; J. G.
RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 163-68 (rev. ed. 1951).
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case, the 1863 Act seemed to require either a civil trial at the end of the grand jury
term or a releese.
On March 16, 1863, Lincoln appointed General Ambrose Burnside, fresh from
an unsuccessful engagement at Fredricksburg, Virginia, as commanding general of
the Department of Ohio.62 On April 13, 1863, Burnside issued General Order No.
38 ("Order No. 38") which warned of death for those giving active physical aid to the
Confederacy-such as writers and carriers of secret letters.63 But Burnside's Order
No. 38 went further and specifically targeted speech: "The habit of declaring
sympathies for the enemy will not be allowed in this Department. Persons
committing such offenses will be at once arrested.... [T]reason, express or implied,
will not be tolerated in this Department."' When the order was issued, Union armies
had suffered a series of defeats in the East, anti-war sentiment was growing, and
morale in the army was low.
65
The Cincinnati Commercial reported that the General was serious about Order
No. 38, and that the order covered disloyal language as well as disloyal acts: "We
learn from reliable authority that General Burnside is determined to execute his Order
No. 38. This order extends not only to acts in favor of rebels, but to words or
expressions of sympathy in their behalf.' ' Many applauded Order No. 38. Colonel
Joseph Geiger told a Union mass meeting that he "thanked God that in the person of
General Burnside we have a man who will attend to [Northern traitors] with a strong
arm ... who, in enforcing his General Order No. 38, will squelch out the Northern
traitors here."'67 The problem, one writer explained, was the bad tendency of
criticism, however pure the motive behind it:
[T]o disaffect the people is to paralyze the Government. Therefore all
denunciation of the President, his measures and his motives, in so far as
it has any effect at all, being to destroy public confidence in the
Government and to disaffect the people, is, to that extent,.. . fatal in its
tendencies, and affords direct countenance, aid and comfort to treason and
traitors.68
Democrats feared that all political opposition to Lincoln administration war
policy, a key political issue, was under attack. They had serious reasons for concern.
For example, in Indiana, General Milo Hascall issued General Order No. 9 which
prohibited newspapers and public speakers from endeavoring "to bring the war policy
62 See Klement, Vallandigham, in FOR THE UNION, supra note 1, at 35.
63 See id. at 35-36.
64 THE TRIAL OF HON. CLEMENT L. VALLANDIGHAM BY A MILITARY CoMMIssIoN 7
(Cincinnati, Rickey & Carroll 1863) [hereinafter VALLANDIGHAM TRIAL] (citing the text of
General Order No. 38).
65 See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 586-
90 (1988).
66 Court-martial--Order No. 38-Warning, CIN. ENQUIRER, Apr. 28, 1863, reprinted in
CIN. COM., Apr. 29, 1863, at 1.
67 Union Mass Meeting in Fifth Street Market-Space, CIN. CoM, Apr. 21, 1863, at 2.
68 Kentucky Politics, CIN. COM., Apr. 23, 1863, at 1.
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of the Administration into disrepute."69 It warned against active opposition "to the
war policy of the administration., 70 Democratic congressman Joseph K. Edgerton
wrote to the General asking just what these phrases meant.71 General Hascall replied
in the press:
What I mean by the expression, "or endeavor to bring the war policy of
the Government into disrepute," is this: Certain measures have been
determined upon by the Congress ... and the Executive, such as the
Internal Revenue and Tax Bills, ... the Confiscation Act, the
Conscription Act, the act authorizing the Executive to use negroes in
every way possible to cripple the enemy and assist us, the Proclamation
of Emancipation..., and other measures having an immediate bearing on
the war; and these I call the war policy of the Government or
Administration. . . . The only practical effect, then, of allowing
newspapers and public speakers to inveigh against these measures, is to
divide and distract our own people, and thus give material "aid and
comfort" to our enemies....
It is a more serious thing than many are wont to suppose to divide and
distract our country and prolong the war.72
Criticism of measures such as those of General Hascall was not limited to politicians
and Democrats. Union General Halleck complained of Union officers who assumed
"powers which do not belong to them," whose conduct was "inciting party passions
and political animosities."" Meanwhile, Governor Morton of Indiana, faced with
rising outrage over Hascall's suppression of speech and press, demanded that Hascall
be replaced because he was harming the Union cause.74
Arrests included politicians and ordinary citizens.75 On April 23, 1863, the
Detroit Free Press, then a generally pro-war Democratic paper, complained about
"the recent arrest of citizens for wearing a copperhead of the Goddess of Liberty as
a badge."'76 The arrests, the paper said, "illustrate the strides of power in this country
under the rule of the party of 'free speech, free press, free homes, and free men.'
77
69 General Hascall on Order No. 9, INDIANAPOLIS J., May 5, 1863, reprinted in CIN.
COM., May 8, 1863, at 1.
70 Id. For a brief discussion of General Hascall and Order No. 9, see HARPER, supra note
1, at 251-54.
7' General Hascall on Order No. 9, INDIANAPOLIS J., May 5, 1863, reprinted in GIN.
COM., May 8, 1863, at 1.
72 Id.
7 TENNEY, supra note 1, at 186-87 (quoting Halleck to Burnside, O.R. Series II, Vol. 5,
664-65).
14 See id. at 188-89.
7 See, e.g., KLEMENT, LIMITS OF DISSENT, supra note 1, at 108-09.
76 War on the Goddess of Liberty, DET. FREE PRESS, Apr. 23, 1863, at 2.
77 Id
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If, the paper said, "suppressing the 'Goddess of Liberty'" was "a small piece of
business," still the principle involved was a basic one.78
Even pro-war Democrats saw attacks on allegedly disloyal sentiments as direct
attacks on the democratic process and on the sovereignty of the people. On April 14,
1863, the editors of the Detroit Free Press sounded a basic theme that would be
elaborated and repeated in coming months:
As a party [Democrats] have never declared against the war; but they have
a right to do so. As tax-payers, as men liable to the draft, and therefore
liable to be shot down, they have the right to say the struggle ought to
cease or ought to go on, or ought to be conducted upon this policy or that
policy, as their convictions dictate to them. The [C]onstitution and laws
accord them that right.79
B. The Arrests and Trials of Clement L. Vallandigham
The arrest of Clement L. Vallandigham seemed to confirm the Democrats' fear
that the administration was engaged in a pervasive attack on political speech.
General.Burnside knew that Vallandigham, an outspoken anti-war activist, was
scheduled to speak at a Knox County Democratic political rally in Mount Vernon,
Ohio on May 1, 1863. Military agents, in civilian clothes, monitored the speech.
Soldiers arrested Vallandigham in the early morning hours of May 5. His trial by a
military commission of seven officers began the next day. Vallandigham, an
experienced trial lawyer, represented himself. The prosecution was represented by
the Judge Advocate. By May 7, the court had finished hearing evidence and
arguments. It was a speedy trial indeed; Vallandigham was unable, in this very short
time, to subpoena one of his defense witnesses."0 Vallandigham was tried on the
charge of:
Publicly expressing, in violation of General Orders No. 38, from Head-
quarters Department of the Ohio, sympathy for those in arms against the
Government of the United States, and declaring disloyal sentiments and
opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the
Government in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebellion."'
The following specification supported the charge:
In this, that the said Clement L. Vallandigham, a citizen of the State of
Ohio, on or about the first day of May, 1863, at Mount Vernon, Knox
County, Ohio, did publicly address a large meeting of citizens, and did
utter sentiments in words, or in effect, as follows, declaring the present
war "a wicked, cruel, and unnecessary war;" "a war not being waged for
78 Id.
71 What Do They Mean?, DET. FREE PRESS, Apr. 14, 1863, at 2.
80 See KLEMENT, LIMITS OF DISSENT, supra note 1, at 166.
81 VALLANDIGHAM TRIAL, supra note 64, at 11.
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the preservation of the Union;" "a war for the purpose of crushing out
liberty and erecting a despotism;" "a war for the freedom of the blacks
and the enslavement of the whites;" stating "that if the Administration had
so wished, the war could have been honorably terminated months ago;"
that "peace might have been honorably obtained by listening to the
proposed intermediation of France;"... charging "that the Government
of the United States was about to appoint military marshals in every
district, to restrain the people of their liberties, to deprive them of their
rights and privileges;" characterizing General Orders No. 38, from Head-
quarters Department of the Ohio, "as a base usurpation of arbitrary
authority," inviting his hearers to resist the same, by saying, "the sooner
the people inform the minions of usurped power that they will not submit
to such restrictions upon their liberties, the better;"...
All of which opinions and sentiments he well knew did aid, comfort,
and encourage those in arms against the Government, and could but
induce in his hearers a distrust of their own Government, sympathy for
those in arms against it, and a disposition to resist the laws of the land. 2
General Burnside did not consult with the President before ordering Vallandigham's
arrest, 3 but the General acted in a context set by the President himself. At first,
Burnside seemed to have presidential support. On May 8, 1863, after learning of the
arrest from the newspapers, President Lincoln wired General Burnside: "'In your
determination to support the authority of the Government and suppress treason in
your Department, you may count on the firm support of the President.'
'8 4
At the military trial, Vallandigham's May I speech to the large Democratic
county political rally was the basis of the charge against him. In addition to
Vallandigham, other prominent Ohio Democrats were present at the rally, including
Congressmen George S. Pendleton and Samuel S. Cox. The editor of the Mount
Vernon Democratic Banner presided over the meeting. Vice presidents and
secretaries represented various townships in the county, and committees met during
the meeting to transact party business. Because the meeting was so large, there were
a number of speakers' stands. Vallandigham gave his speech from the main stand. 5
82 Id. at 1 1-12. See also WILLIAM HARLAN HALE, HORACE GREELEY: VOICE OF THE
PEOPLE 267-71 (1950) (discussing communication between Vallandigham and New York
Tribune editor Horace Greeley in which Vallandigham encouraged Greeley to join him in a
covert campaign for mediation by foreign powers).
83 See Abraham Lincoln, To Erastus Coming and Others (June 12, 1863), in ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 454, 462 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1989)
[hereinafter LINCOLN SPEECHES].
84 Craig D. Tenney, To Suppress or Not to Suppress: Abraham Lincoln and the Chicago
Times, 27 CIV. WAR HIST. 249, 250 n. 11 (1981) (quoting a letter written from Lincoln to
Burnside on May 8, 1863) [hereinafter Tenney, To Suppress]; see also TENNEY, supra note
1, at 150-51 (discussing Lincoln's likely support of Burnside's arrest of Vallandigham).
85 See KLEMENT, LIMITS OF DISSENT, supra note 1, at 153-54 (commenting that a full
transcript of Vallandigham's nearly two hour speech does not seem to exist).
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The Judge Advocate who prosecuted Vallandigham undoubtedly set out in the
specification and elicited from the testifying officers what he considered to be the
most damning passages from the speech.86 The following account of the speech
comes mainly from the testimony of agents sent to observe it.
Captain H. R. Hill testified that Vallandigham said the war was "wicked, cruel,
and unnecessary," and that peace could have been achieved on the basis of a plan that
Vallandigham had proposed. He quoted Vallandigham as saying that a Southern
paper had suggested that the Peace Democrats were a greater threat to the
Confederacy than "athousand Sewards."87 (Seward was Lincoln's secretary of state.)
According to Hill, Vallandigham attacked Order No. 38:
"[H]e was a freeman;" that he "did not ask David Tod [the governor of
Ohio], or Abraham Lincoln, or Ambrose E. Burnside for his right to
speak as he had done, and wasdoing. That his authority for so doing was
higher than General Orders No. 38-it was General Orders No. 1-the
Constitution. That General Orders No. 38 was a base usurpation of
arbitrary power; that he had the most supreme contempt for such power.
... That he was resolved never to submit to an order of a military dictator,
prohibiting the free discussion of either civil or military authority. "The
sooner that the people informed the minions of this usurped power that
they would not submit to such restrictions upon their liberties, the
better."88
Captain John A. Means, another witness for the prosecution, testified that
Vallandigham said that the war was an abolition war, rather than a war waged for the
preservation of the Union.89 In addition, Vallandigham purportedly said that he
would spit on Order No. 38 and trample it underfoot.9"
According to Captain Means, Vallandigham also said "he would not counsel
resistance to military or civil law; that was not needed."'" He referred to the
President as "King Lincoln" and urged his listeners to come together at the ballot box
and hurl the tyrant from his throne.9" Vallandigham asked Captain Means:
Did I not expressly counsel the people to obey the Constitution and all
laws, and to pay proper respect to men in authority, but to maintain their
political rights through the ballot-box, and to redress personal wrongs
through the judicial tribunals of the country, and in that way put down the
Administration and all usurpations of power?93
86 For Vallandigham's biographer's account of the speech, see id.
87 VALLANDIGHAM TRIAL, supra note 64, at 13-14.
88 Id. at 14-15.
89 See id. at21.
90 See id. at 24.
91 Id. at 22-23.
92 Id.
91 Id. at 23.
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Captain Means responded that he did not understand him "to counsel the people to
submit to the authorities at all times. 94
In fact, it seems quite likely that Vallandigham advocated only peaceful political
action. The Republican Cincinnati Commercial reported a Vallandigham speech
made shortly before his arrest. According to the Commercial, Vallandigham told his
followers that Abolitionists instigated the war to put down Democrats and bring
about Negro equality, and that the war was designed to free the Negro and enslave
the white man.95 But instead of counseling revolt, the paper reported that
Vallandigham "stopped short, and talked about 'obeying the laws' and 'peaceable
remedies."' 96 According to the correspondent, "a good many of the admirers of
Vallandigham lost confidence in him. He had fallen far short of their expectations." 97
If Vallandigham had advocated violence or law breaking, his arch foes at the
Cincinnati Commercial would have been eager to report the fact. The reported
speech sounds much like the one for which Vallandigham was arrested and is likely
to be representative of what he was saying at the time.
At trial, Samuel S. Cox, a Democratic congressman from Ohio, testified for the
defense. According to Cox, Vallandigham directed no epithet at General Burnside.
Vallandigham said nothing to advocate forcible resistance of either laws or military
orders:
He stated the sole remedy to be in the ballot-box, and in the courts. I
remember this distinctly, for I had been pursuing the same line of remark
at Chicago and Fort Wayne, and other places where I had been speaking,
and with the purpose of repressing any tendency toward violence among
our Democratic people. Mr. Vallandigham did not say a word about the
conscription."
After the evidence was presented, Vallandigham entered a protest. He said that
he had been "[a]rrested without due 'process of law,' without warrant from any
judicial officer," and had been "served with a 'charge and specifications,' as in a
Court-martial or Military Commission."" In addition, Vallandigham said:
I am not in either "the land or naval forces of the United States, nor in the
militia in the actual service of the United States," and therefore am not
triable for any cause, by any such Court, but am subject, by the express
terms of the Constitution, to arrest only by due process of law, judicial
warrant, regularly issued upon affidavit, and by some officer or Court of
competent jurisdiction for the trial of citizens, and am now entitled to be
tried on an indictment or presentment of a Grand Jury of such Court, to
94 Id.
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speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State of Ohio, to be
confronted with witnesses against me, to have compulsory process for
witnesses in my behalf, the assistance of counsel for my defense, and
evidence and argument according to the common laws and the ways of
Judicial Courts. And all these I here demand as my right as a citizen of
the United States, and under the Constitution of the United States. °10
Furthermore, Vallandigham said, his "alleged 'offense"' was "not known to the
Constitution of the United States" or in violation of any law:'
It is words spoken to the people of Ohio in an open and public political
meeting, lawfully and peaceably assembled, under the Constitution and
upon full notice. It is words of criticism of the public policy of the public
servants of the people, by which policy it was alleged that the welfare of
the country was not promoted. It was an appeal to the people to change
that policy, not by force, but by free elections and the ballot-box. It is not
pretended that I counseled disobedience to the Constitution, or resistance
to laws and lawful authority. I never have. Beyond this protest, I have
nothing further to submit.'0 2
Meanwhile, on May 9, 1863, after the evidence in the military trial had closed
but before, the verdict and sentence were announced, George Pugh, a leading
Democratic lawyer and former senator from Ohio, filed an application for a writ of
habeas corpus for Vallandigham in federal court. It was a direct challenge to the
military court's jurisdiction. The reasons Pugh gave to support granting the writ
followed those Vallandigham had expressed in his protest.0 3
Judge Humphrey H. Leavitt (who had been appointed to the bench by President
Andrew Jackson) ordered a hearing on May 11. General Burnside filed and signed
his personal response to the writ. He drew an analogy between the duties of a soldier
and those of a civilian:
We are in a state of civil war. One of the States of this Department is at
this moment invaded, and three others have been threatened .... If it is
my duty and the duty of the troops to avoid saying any thing that would
weaken the army, by preventing a single recruit from joining the ranks,
by bringing the laws of Congress into disrepute, or by causing
dissatisfaction in the ranks, it is equally the duty of every citizen in the
Department to avoid the same evil. If it is my duty to prevent the
propagation of this evil in the army, or in a portion of my Department, it
is equally my duty in all portions of it; and it is my duty to use all the
force in my power to stop it....
Io0 Id. at 29-30.
'0' Id. at 30.
102 Id.
'03 See id at 37-40.
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The press and public men, in a great emergency like the present,
should avoid the use of party epithets and bitter invectives, and
discourage the organization of secret political societies, which are always
undignified and disgraceful to a free people, but now they are absolutely
wrong and injurious; they create dissensions and discord, which just now
amount to treason....
... These citizens do not realize the effect upon the army of our
country, who are its defenders. They have never been in the field;...
and, besides, they have been in the habit of hearing their public men
speak, and, as a general thing, of approving of what they say.... They
must not use license and plead that they are exercising liberty. In this
Department it can not be done. 4
Burnside explained that his duty was to support the policy of the administration:
If the people do not approve that policy, they can change the
constitutional authorities of that Government, at the proper time and by
the proper method. Let them freely discuss the policy in a proper tone;
but my duty requires me to stop license and intemperate discussion, which
tends to weaken the authority of the Government and army: whilst the
latter is in the presence of the enemy, it is cowardly so to weaken it."5
Remarkably, neither George Pugh, counsel for Vallandigham, nor counsel for
General Burnside treated the March 3, 1863 Habeas Act as controlling. Pugh took
the position that President Lincoln had not suspended the writ in Ohio and the
attorney for Burnside really did not dispute the point. 106
At the hearing before Judge Leavitt, Pugh spoke for Vallandigham while
Cincinnati lawyer Benjamin F. Perry and District Attorney Flamen Ball, a former law
partner and political ally of Salmon Chase, appeared for the General." 7 George
Pugh's argument reviewed the writ of habeas corpus at English law, landmarks of
English constitutional history, and English and American decisions on the writ.'0 8
Pugh argued that Vallandigham was not a member of the land or naval forces of the
United States and, therefore, was not subject to military law."9
104 Id. at 41-42.
"I Id. at 42-43.
'06 After citing the Act, Pugh said that it did "not apply, in terms, to the present case"
because "the President of the United States, in whom (solely) the discretion of suspending
the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus now resides, has not found it necessary to adopt
a measure so unusual and extreme." Id. at 51. George Pugh had obvious tactical reasons to
claim that the writ had not been suspended and that, therefore, the statute of March 1863 did
not apply. If it did apply, his client would have remained in jail at least until the end of the
grand jury term. See id.
107 See id. at 39, 98.
10' See id. at 67-96.
109 See id. at 52.
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Pugh also cited the First Amendment. He noted that "General Burnside holds
an office created by act of Congress alone-an office which Congress may, at any
time, abolish." ' As a result, he "can make no 'law' which Congress could not
make. He can not abridge the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people to assemble and to consider of their grievances"''... Under congressionally
enacted Articles of War, soldiers in active service were subject to a different rule,
Pugh said. The Articles forbade them to criticize the President or Congress.",2 Pugh
argued that Vallandigham had exercised a basic right of American citizens.
Beyond the terms of exception thus defined by statute, and in obedience
to the Constitution of the United States, article first, section eighth,
clauses fifteenth and sixteenth, the right of the American people to
deliberate upon and freely to speak of what General Burnside calls the
"Policy of the Government" at all times-whether of peace or of war, of
safety or of peril, of ease or of difficulty-is a right supreme, and
absolute, and unquestionable. They can exhort each other to impeach the
President or any executive officer; to impeach any magistrate of judicial
authority; to condemn Congressmen and legislators of every description.
They can, at pleasure, indulge in criticism, by "wholesale" or otherwise,
not only upon "the policy" adopted or proposed by their servants, military
as well as civil, but upon the conduct of those servants in each and every
particular, upon their actions, their words, their probable motives, their
public characters. And, in speaking of such subjects, any citizen
addressing his fellow-citizens, by their consent, in a peaceable assembly,
may use invective, or sarcasm, or ridicule, or passionate apostrophe or
appeal, or-what is, ordinarily, much better-plain, solid, unostentatious
argument....
I have merely to say, therefore, that it [the charge against
Vallandigham] assumes, as indisputable, an authority at "Head-quarters
Department of the Ohio" to enact a LAW abridging the freedom of speech;
and this in palpable defiance of the Constitution of the United States." 3
Vallandigham had invited his listeners to resist Lincoln and his minions, but the
resistance Vallandigham suggested, Pugh said, was constitutionally protected
activity:
But Mr. Vallandigham invited his "hearers to resist the same." Ah!-and
how? By telling them to take up arms against it?-to fall into ranks for
the purpose of obstructing its execution?-by committing any act of
violence or disorder whatsoever? 0, no, sir!-but "by saying" that "the
sooner the people inform the minions of usurped power that they will not
submit to such restrictions upon their liberties the better." To give this
''o Id. at55.
Id.
12 See id. at 55-57.
3 Id. at 58, 63 (citation omitted).
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information by their resolutions in primary meetings, by the voices of
their favorite orators, by their votes in the ballot-box. Nothing else is
alleged; nothing else is pretended; nothing else could reasonably have
been imagined." 4
Finally, Pugh noted that Vallandigham's conduct did not meet the constitutional
definition of treason. "5 Basic constitutional guarantees, including the rights to ajury
trial and to a grand jury indictment, had been violated. 6 The privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus was a remedy, and one which the president could temporarily
suspend. But even suspension, Pugh insisted, did not justify the invasion of basic
constitutional rights.
The rights of the people, as enumerated in the several clauses of the
Constitution which I have read, can not be affected, in any degree, by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus. Harsh as that
suspension would be, and unnecessary (as I think) except in the States
where insurrection and rebellion prevail, it would not authorize any arrest
of a citizen by the military power while the ordinary course of justice
remains unobstructed, nor even, without a warrant, except in the cases I
have already specified, by a civil magistrate. It would not dispense with
the necessity of a trial byjury, and upon indictment: it would justify none
of the acts of General Burnside in this particular case." 7
Aaron Perry's argument for General Burnside was simple and direct. He relied
on the rebellion, the law of war, and war powers. These provided, he insisted, legal
justification for the arrest. Because the arrest was justified and legal, habeas corpus
should not be available.
There is on foot an organized insurrection, holding by military force a
large part of the United States ....
This insurrection has for impulse, feelings and opinions growing out
of the past civil history of the country. As a matter of course it can not be,
and as a matter of fact it is not, limited to places, or described by
geographical descriptions....
The power and wants of the insurrection are not all nor chiefly
military. [I]t needs hope and sympathy. . . . It needs argument to
represent its origin and claims to respect favorably before the world. ...
It needs help to paralyze and divide opinions among those who sustain the
government, and needs help to hinder and embarrass its councils. It needs
that troops should be withheld from government .... It needs that an
opinion should prevail in the world that the government is incapable of
success, and unworthy of sympathy. Who can help it in either particular
i ld. at 66.
"5 See id at 82.
116 See id at 86-88.
'" Id. at 93-94.
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I have named, can help it as effectually as by bearing arms for it....
Since all these helps combine to make up the strength of the insurrection,
war is necessarily made upon them all, when made upon the insurrection.
... All this is implied in war, and in this war with especial cogency."
8
Free speech is only one right among many, Perry insisted, and like other rights,
it could be limited to ensure the safety of all." 9 Because Vallandigham described the
purposes of the war as crushing out liberty and establishing despotism, he had aided"
the enemy directly and attempted to thwart the army. So the army could arrest and
try him. 2 °
Aaron F. Perry said he chose not to rely on suspension of the writ.' Instead, he
insisted that the arrest and trial were justified under the war power and the power of
the president as commander in chief. These powers simply existed along with and,
when necessary, superseded the civil law for the duration of the conflict. 22 Perry
stated that:
There is no inference to be drawn from the [March 1863 habeas] act of
Congress against that part of ... [Lincoln's 1862 proclamation] which
proclaims martial law; but in the view I am urging of the principles of
public law, such a proclamation can perform no office except to give
publicity to a fact before existing. To whatever extent the fact of war
brought into play the laws of war, those laws had their full force without
a proclamation.
123
In Vallandigham's habeas hearing, both Burnside's and Vallandigham's counsel
either assumed the President had not suspended the writ in Ohio or did not rely on
its suspension.'24
By avoiding reliance on suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
Perry also may have attempted to avoid the force of the 1863 Act and its apparent
"' Id. at 109-10.
"l9 See id. at 114.
120 See id. at 119-20.
21 See id. at 106..
122 See id.
The first section of the act of March 23, 1863 authorizes the President ... to
suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus. The learned counsel says he has not
suspended it. Undoubtedly, if he had suspended it, there would be an end of this
case. I do not claim that it is suspended. My whole argument proceeds on the
ground that it is not suspended, but in full force.
Id.
23 Id. at 107-08. With reference to the writ of habeas corpus, modern scholars have
assumed that Lincoln's September 1862 proclamation suspending habeas corpus covered
Vallandigham's case. Mark Neely, for example, said that a special proclamation of
suspension prepared by the Secretary of War specifically for Vallandigham's case-a paper
that Lincoln did not sign-was redundant. See MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY:
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 65-66 (1991); DONALD, supra note 41, at 420.
124 See VALLANDIGHAM TRIAL, supra note 64, at 51, 106.
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requirement for civil trial or release if no indictment was forthcoming by the end of
the grand jury session. Perry's approach was consistent with the position of Judge
Advocate General Holt, who construed the 1863 Act as inapplicable to civilians
arrested or tried by the military.'25
Judge Leavitt denied the application for habeas corpus. He relied on an
unpublished precedent that held the court would not issue a writ for an applicant in
military custody. Deference was due to a coordinate branch of government,
especially when the life of the nation was in peril. 26 Still, he went on to discuss the
merits of the case. Judge Leavitt conceded that if the criminal procedure guarantees
of the Bill of Rights were applicable, the arrest would have been illegal. However,
Leavitt pointed to other factors including "the present state of the country, and...
the [in] expediency of interfering with the exercise of the military power."'2 7 He said:
The Court can not shut its eyes to the grave fact that war exists[,]...
threatening the subversion and destruction of the Constitution itself. In
my judgment, when the life of the republic is imperiled, he mistakes his
duty and obligation as a patriot who is not willing to concede to the
Constitution such a capacity of adaptation to circumstances as may be
necessary to meet a great emergency, and save the nation from hopeless
ruin. Self-preservation is a paramount law. 2
The judge explained that the Constitution provided for suppression of
insurrection and rebellion, made the president commander in chief, and required him
to see that the laws were faithfully executed.'29 General Burnside was the
representative and agent of the President.'3° "In time of war," the judge explained,
"the President is not above the Constitution, but derives his power expressly from the
[commander in chief] provision of that instrument ...."3 Although "[t]he
Constitution does not specify the powers he may rightfully exercise in this character,"
these were "very high powers, which it is well known have been called into exercise
on various occasions during the present rebellion."' 32
Judge Leavitt then proceeded to review briefly the situation (or his
understanding of it) in which General Burnside had acted:
Formidable invasions have been attempted, and are now threatened. Four
of the States have a river border, and are in perpetual danger of invasion.
The enforcement of the late conscription law was foreseen as a positive
necessity. In Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, a class of mischievous
politicians had succeeded in poisoning the minds of a portion of the
25 See RANDALL, supra note 58, at 167.
126 See VALLANDIGHAM TRIAL, supra note 64, at 262.
127 Id. at 263.
128 Id. at 263-64.
29 See id. at 264.
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community with the rankest feelings of disloyalty. Artful men, disguising
their latent treason under hollow pretensions of devotion to the Union,
were striving to disseminate their pestilent heresies among the masses of
the people. The evil was one of alarming magnitude, and threatened
seriously to impede the military operations of the government, and greatly
to protract the suppression of the rebellion.'33
The judge's decision was forceful, but it was not technical. Leavitt cited almost
none of the mass of authority mustered by lawyers on each side of the case. He also
said he was concerned that if he issued the writ, it would be ignored-and, indeed,
that is probably what the Lincoln administration would have done. At any rate, the
judge was hostile to anti-war speech. He announced: "And here, without subjecting
myself to the charge of trenching upon the domain of political discussion, I may be
indulged in the remark, that there is too much of the pestilential leaven of disloyalty
in the community."'34 Judge Leavitt denied the writ and vindicated Vallandigham's
military trial.'35
Then, on May 16, 1863, the military commission found Vallandigham guilty as
charged for uttering most of the words alleged in the specification. The commission
sentenced Vallandigham to close confinement for the duration of the war. On May
19, 1863, President Lincoln changed Vallandigham's punishment to banishment to
the Confederacy and ordered that Vallandigham be put "beyond our military lines."'
' 36
Transcripts of the trial and habeas proceeding were published both in the press
and as a book. 37 As a result, the words for which Vallandigham was prosecuted and
arguments about them reached a large audience.
C. Events After Vallandigham's Banishment
Massive protests followed Vallandigham's May 5, 1863 arrest and subsequent
trial. The Democratic press was uniformly critical. Protest meetings were held in
many cities. Even many Republicans were critical. Burnside offered to resign;
Lincoln declined the offer. On May 29, 1863, however, Lincoln telegraphed
Burnside (in code): "All the cabinet regretted the necessity of arresting, for instance,
Vallandigham, some perhaps, doubting, that there was a real necessity for it-but,
being done, all were for seeing you through with it.'
138
1 Id. at 268.
'34 Id. at 270.
13' See id. at 259-72.
136 Id. at 34.
13" See, e.g., Finding and Sentence, CIN. COM., May 19, 1863, at I; The Trial of C. L.
Vallandigham-The Specifications and the Evidence, GIN. COM., May 9, 1863, at 2. A large
advertisement for the report of the military trial and habeas proceedings appears in The Book
Trade, Ready June Tenth, The Official Report of the Trial By Court Martial of Hon. C. L.
Vallandigham, CIN. COM., June 10, 1863, at 2.
38 Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Ambrose E. Burnside (May 29, 1863), in LINCOLN
SPEECHES, supra note 83, at 451. For a sampling of some protests, see The Vallandigham
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Judging by reports in the Cincinnati Commercial, Vallandigham's arrest was far
from the only arrest under Order No. 38 for the expression of disloyal sentiments.
The arrests included a Democratic newspaper editor, many people who expressed
otherwise unreported "disloyal language," a critic of Vallandigham's arrest, a man
who expressed hope for Confederate victory, and a man who allegedly advocated
shooting officers who captured deserters.'39 In addition, the military closed a number
of newspapers, at least temporarily, or threatened them with closure. 4 °
In early June, 1863, apparently unchastened by the Vallandigham experience,
General Burnside issued Order No. 84 suppressing publication of the Chicago Times
newspaper. (Illinois was also in the area under Burnside's command.) Wilbur
Storey, the editor of the Times, was a racist who had written of the "natural and
proper loathing ofthe negro."'14 ' After the Emancipation Proclamation, he denounced
the war as a "John Brown raid on an extended scale.' 42 Storey had protested the
Vallandigham arrest and banishment. The rights of free speech and press and
assembly, Storey insisted, "'existed before the Constitution, but lest they might be
invaded, the Constitution forbade ... any law circumscribing them."'" 43 Still,
President "Lincoln and... 'military satraps' had 'punished as crimes the exercise of
these constitutional privileges."",
14
This time the case came before ajudge less sympathetic to suppression. Around
midnight, Federal Judge Thomas Drummond issued a temporary order forbidding the
military suppression of the Times before a full hearing. News reports suggest that
Judge Drummond had telegraphed Supreme Court Justice David Davis, a close
Lincoln advisor who was critical of military arrests of civilians, asking Davis to join
him in hearing the case.' 45 On granting the temporary order, Judge Drummond made
this statement:
"I desire to give everyaid and assistance in my power to the Government,
and to the Administration, in restoring the Union; but I have always
wished to treat the Government as a government of law and a government
of the Constitution, and not as a government of mere physical force. I
Outrage: The Voice of the People, ATLAS & ARGUS (Albany, N.Y.: Daily), May 26, 1863,
at 2.
131 See, e.g., Letter from Abraham Lincoln to John M. Schofield (July 13, 1863), in 6
LINCOLN, supra note 40, at 326, 326; see also Arrests For Using Disloyal Language, CIN.
COM., June 15, 1863, at 2; Covington, CIN. COM., June 12, 1863, at 3; From Columbus, CIN.
COM., May 14, 1863, at 3; Newport, CIN. COM., May 12, 1863, at 2.
140 See, e.g., Suppression of Newspapers, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, May 13, 1863, at 3.
14' Garry Wills, The Colonel: The Life and Legend of Robert R. McCormick 1880-1995,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 25, 1997, at 32 (book review).
142 Id. The description here is abbreviated. For a detailed account, see Tenney, To
Suppress, supra note 84, at 248. See also HARPER, supra note 1, at 257-64 (describing
Lincoln's revocation of General Burnside's order to suppress the Chicago Times).
' TENNEY, supra note 1, at 168 (quoting CHI. TIMES, May 29, 1863, at 2).
144 Id
141 See The Chicago Times Establishment Taken Possession of by the Military
Authorities-Meeting of its Friends in the Evening, CHI. TRIB., June 4, 1863, at 4.
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personally have contended, and shall always contend, for the right of free
discussion, and the right of commenting, under law, and under the
Constitution, upon the acts of officers of the Government.'
146
At 3:30 a.m. on June 3, 1863, soldiers disregarded Judge Drummond's order, entered
the Times' office, and destroyed recently printed papers. As the New York Tribune
headline commented: "THE SUPPRESSION OF THE CHICAGO TIMES: The Writ
of the Court Disregarded.' 47 On the same day, General Burnside attempted to justify
his order to the public by returning to his theme of the civilian as soldier:
[The citizen] too, has sacrifices to make; but the country's demand upon
him is comparatively but small.... [I]t merely asks that he shall imitate
the loyal example of the soldiers in the field, so far as to abate somewhat
of that freedom of speech which they give up so entirely. The citizen
would be ... unfaithful to his country, if... he were unwilling to give up
a portion of a privilege which the soldier resigns altogether. That freedom
of discussion and criticism which is proper in the politician and the
journalist in time of peace, becomes rank treason when it tends to weaken
the confidence of the soldier in his officers and his Government. 4
In his diary, Gideon Welles, Lincoln's secretary of the navy, described the arrest
of Vallandigham and the suppression of the Chicago Times as "arbitrary and
injudicious" and an infringement on "the constitutional rights of the parties."' 49
Every member of the Cabinet, he wrote, "regrets what has been done"; 50 but the
Cabinet was divided as to what to do next. In war many things could be done,
Welles mused, that were not permitted in peacetime-the blockade of Southern ports,
interdiction of trade, seizure of property, etc. Though Welles thought Vallandigham
and the Chicago Times were aiding the rebellion and were traitors in their hearts,
still, he concluded by lamenting that military commanders should "without absolute
necessity disregard those great principles on which our government and institutions
rest.
Massive protest followed the seizure of the Chicago Times. There was a huge
public rally in Chicago, hostile press reaction, and a telegram from local leaders to
46 The Chicago Times Demonstration-No Disturbance Apprehended, CIN. COM., June
4, 1863, at 3 (quoting Judge Drummond's statement granting the restraining order).
The Suppression of the Chicago Times: The Writ of the Court Disregarded, N.Y.
DAILY TRIB., June 4, 1863, at 1.
"'48 General Burnside's Orders-The President Directs the Revocation of the Order
Suppressing the Circulation of the New York World and the Publication of the Chicago
Times, CIN. COM., June 5, 1863, at 1.
"49 f GIDEON WELLES, DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES 321-22 (1911).
150 Id.
'' Id. At the time, Republicans thought that Vallandigham secretly was involved with pro-
Confederate societies that were conspiring with rebel agents. James McPherson concluded
that while a lunatic fringe existed and engaged in such activities, Vallandigham and other
prominent Democrats probably took no active part. See MCPHERSON, supra note 65, at 783.
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President Lincoln that called for revocation of the order suspending the Chicago
Times.52
Congressman Isaac Arnold and Senator Lyman Trumbull (both Illinois
Republicans) telegraphed the President to urge him to give the requests to revoke the
order serious consideration. Yielding to intense political pressure, Arnold then sent
a second telegraph saying that the first was not intended to express an opinion on the
merits.153 The Illinois House of Representatives passed a resolution of protes.54 The
President also received an urgent telegram urging revocation from both Supreme
Court Justice David Davis and his law partner William Hemdon: "We deem it of the
highest importance that you revoke the order... suppressing the Chicago Times.' 55
Davis was Lincoln's close confidant, political advisor, 1860 campaign manager, and
appointee to the Supreme Court.
This time, President Lincoln promptly revoked the order and the Chicago Times
resumed publication. 5 6 Facing a strong backlash from some Illinois Republicans,
Arnold and Trumbull defended the revocation and made at least one public statement
which explained their telegram as simply seeking prompt attention for a request by
constituents. 157 Arnold said he approved of President Lincoln's revocation order
because "in my judgment the order of Gen[eral] Burnside was unwarranted by the
law and the Constitution." ''S
Lincoln had second thoughts about his order of revocation and, apparently,
wanted more time to see which way the political wind was blowing. He sent a later
dispatch to Burnside and told him if he had not yet revoked the order to let the matter
stand and to await further instructions. This presidential message arrived after
Burnside had revoked his order suppressing the Chicago Times. So, the revocation
stood. "'59
152 See, e.g., notes 159, 178-270 and accompanying text.
153 See Tenney, To Suppress, supra note 84, at 248, 254-55.
154 See Action of the Illinois Legislature on General Burnside's Recent Order, GIN. COM.,
June 4, 1863, at 3. See also The Revocation, CHI. TRIB., June 5, 1863, at I (noting the
public's surprise at the government's revocation of General Burnside's order);
Copperheadiana, CHI. TRIB., June 4, 1863, at 2 (reporting the enactment of the Illinois
resolution denouncing General Burnside's suppression of the Chicago Times); From
Chicago, DET. FREE PRESS, June 5, 1863, at 4 (reporting that the proprietors of the Chicago
Times received a telegram on June 4 indicating that Burnside's order was revoked); From
Illinois, DET. FREE PRESS, June 4, 1863, at 1 (reporting the passage of the Illinois resolution
against General Burnside's order).
155 Tenney, To Suppress, supra note 84, at 255 (quoting Telegram from Davis and
Herndon to Lincoln (June 2, 1863), in War Dept. Telegrams, Telegrams Addressed to the
President, roll 2, vol. 4, frame 72).
156 See The Revocation, CHI. TRIB., June 5, 1863, at 1.
'5 See Tenney, To Suppress, supra note 84, at 255-56.
'5 The Attempted Suppression of the Chicago Times: And Its Defeat, ATLAS & ARGUS
(Albany, N.Y.: Daily), June 13, 1863, at 2.
' See Tenney, To Suppress, supra note 84, at 256-57.
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After the large public meeting in Chicago to protest the suppression order and
after Lincoln's revocation, the Chicago Times engaged in some editorial crowing:
Wednesday was a day for Chicago to be proud of. By the voice of her
citizens she proclaimed to the world that the right of free speech has not
yet passed away; that immunity of thought and discussion are yet among
the inalienable privileges of men born to freedom.... Twenty thousand
bold men with one acclaim decreed that speech and press shall be
untrammeled, and that despotism shall not usurp the inborn rights of the
American citizen. 1
60
Meanwhile, to the great interest of the press, Clement L. Vallandigham, "The
Great Banished," as one Republican paper later referred to him,161 made his way to
Wilmington, North Carolina, boarded a blockade runner, and eventually arrived in
Canada. On June 11, 1863, the Democratic Party of Ohio nominated Vallandigham
for governor. From his rather remote Canadian base, he proceeded to campaign as
best he could for governor of Ohio. 162
To face Vallandigham, Republicans and War Democrats formed a Fusion Union
ticket and nominated John Brough, a pro-war Democrat. Union victories at
Gettysburg and Vicksburg in July of 1863 raised Northern hopes of attaining peace
through victory. During the campaign, Republicans got as much political mileage
as they could out of Vallandigham's conviction by the military tribunal.
163
Republican senator John Sherman referred to him as a "convicted traitor.' 1 64 In
another speech, Sherman asked, "Would you be willing to trust a known thief with
your property, even if he had been illegally arrested and convicted of felony?"'65
Brough overwhelmingly defeated Vallandigham for governor. According to the
Cincinnati Commercial, Brough received 288,136 votes to Vallandigham's
187,807.166 After the election, the Cincinnati Commercial, which had strongly
supported the military trial of Vallandigham, decided that he should be allowed to
return to the United States. The Commercial announced that "[t]here is no occasion
that the impotent reptile be kept waiting and watching over the border any longer.
If it is desirable that he should spend the remainder of his days in exile, let him come
160 Free Speech-Free Press, Immense Meeting at Chicago: Protest Against the Order
No. 84 of Gen. Burnside, CHI. TIMES, June 5, 1863, reprinted in DET. FREE PRESS, June 6,
1863, at I (emphasis added). The words "privileges" and "immunities" are used regularly by
both supporters and critics of suppression of anti-war speech to describe the rights of free
speech, free press, and assembly. This fact is significant because drafters of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment used the words in this way to describe Bill of Rights liberties. Their
usage was common at the time.
16 1 From Niagara Falls, CHI. TRIB., July 24, 1863, at 2.
162 See Klement, Vallandigham, in FOR THE UNION, supra note 1, at 44.
163 See id
'6' Id. at 48.
165 Union Meeting at Hillsboro, CIN. COM., Aug. 13, 1863, at 1.
166 See The Full Vote of Ohio on Governor, Including the Soldiers' Vote by Counties, CIN.
COM., Nov. 24, 1863, at 3.
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to Ohio., 167 In Ohio, "waters of oblivion will soonest swallow forever his poor
remains."
161
On February 15, 1864, the Supreme Court dismissed Vallandigham's petition to
review his military conviction. 69 The Court said it was certain that it lacked the
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a military commission: "[w]hatever may be the
force of Vallandigham's protest that he was not triable by a court of military
commission." 170 No review, apparently, had been sought from the Federal Court's
denial of Vallandigham's habeas petition.
Finally, in June of 1864, Vallandigham returned to Ohio, 171 unmolested by the
administration. He attended the 1864 Democratic National Convention, where he
helped write the peace plank into the party platform. The peace plank called for
immediate efforts to end hostilities "with a view to an ultimate convention of all the
States."''
72
III. REACTION TO THE VALLANDIGHAM ARREST AND THE CHICAGO TIMES CASE:
THE FREE SPEECH TRADITION CONFRONTS THE WAR POWER
A. Support for the Arrest
The nation's press widely reported Vallandigham's arrest. Some Republican
papers greeted the arrest as long overdue: "The arrest of this individual by order of
Gen[eral] Burnside," the editors of the Cincinnati Commercial noted with apparent
satisfaction, "is an act that will convince the most heedless that Order No. 3 8 will be
enforced, and the lines definitely drawn between traitors and patriots."' 173 The writer
said he did not know "[u]pon what specific charge the arrest.., has been made," but,
nonetheless, he was pleased with the arrest: "Those who are not the friends of the
Government are its enemies. Mr. Vallandigham is one of its enemies.' 174
167 The Late Mr. Vallandigham, CIN. COM., Oct. 15, 1863, at 2.
168 id.
169 See Exparte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243 (1864).
170 Id. at 251. If Vallandigham had sought review from denial of his habeas petition he
might have fared better, at least if the matter had not reached the Court until after the war.
See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (holding that in a state not under martial law, a
military tribunal may not try a private citizen in denial of the citizen's right to trial by jury,
and so, the federal court should have issued a writ of habeas corpus). See also LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 59 (2d ed. 1988) ("Until 1983, Congress had never
granted the Supreme Court 'appellate jurisdiction to supervise the administration of criminal
justice in the military."').
'7' See From Cincinnati, Vallandigham Returned, CHI. TRIB., June 16, 1864, at 1.
72 Klement, Vallandigham, in FOR THE UNION, supra note 1, at 59 (quoting the peace
plank).
'7' The Case of C. L. Vallandigham, CIN. COM., May 6, 1863, at 2.
' ld. In looking for reaction to the arrest, I examined a number of major newspapers from
the Mid-west and the East. I reviewed both Republican and Democratic papers, and one anti-
slavery paper. The papers I examined were the New York Tribune, the Cincinnati
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A few days later, the Commercial returned to its defense of Order No. 38:
"[T]here is nothing in the celebrated Order 38 which should disturb the feelings of
any loyal man. It is not designed to abridge the liberty of the individual, where that
liberty is not used to the detriment of the Government."' 75 While "temperate"
discussion would be permitted, the editors noted that "violent and incendiary
language and . . . arguments" that would lead to "violent opposition to the
enforcement of the laws" would not be tolerated.'76 Most Ohio Republican papers
and politicians endorsed the arrest.'
To justify the action against Vallandigham, the Commercial cited the most
provocative rhetoric used by critics of the arrest. It quoted the Dayton Empire, a pro-
Vallandigham paper, as announcing immediately after Vallandigham's arrest:
If the spirit of the men who purchased our freedom through the fiery
ordeal of the revolution, still lives in the hearts of the people, as we
believe it does, then all will yet be well, for it will hurl defiance to
military despotism, and rescue, through blood and carnage, if it must be,
our now endangered liberties. 7
B. The Free Speech-Popular Sovereignty Response
For many Democrats, the Vallandigham arrest was not an isolated event, but part
of a larger attack on political freedom. For that reason, many Democrats who
rejected Vallandigham's peace proposals rallied to his defense. Some criticisms of
the arrest were general.' 79 Others focused particularly on free speech values.' Many
noted that Vallandigham was not accused of violating any specific statute.
1. General Condemnation
The Atlas & Argus, published in Albany, New York, denounced the arrest as a
"crime against the Constitution"; 8' and the Detroit Free Press lamented that "[t]he
Commercial, the Cincinnati Enquirer, the Detroit Free Press, the Atlas & Argus, the
Chicago Tribune, the National Intelligencer, and the Anti-Slavery Standard. Because many
newspapers typically and extensively reprinted views from other papers and often reported
political speeches in detail, the limited number of papers examined provides a somewhat
more comprehensive view than it might seem. I did not attempt to survey all the papers or
even all the major ones. Rather, I attempted to find representative papers. Examination of
more sources would, of course, increase our understanding. The findings here, like all
findings, are partial and tentative.
171 Order Thirty-Eight, CIN. COM., May 15, 1863, at 2.
176 Id.
"' See KLEMENT, LIMITS OF DISSENT, supra note 1, at 164.
178 DAYTON EMPIRE (Ohio: Daily), reprinted in CIN. COM., May 7, 1863, at 2.
7 See infra notes 181-91 and accompanying text.
o See infra notes 195-226 and accompanying text.
181 The Arrest of Vallandigham, ATLAS & ARGUS (Albany, N.Y.: Daily), May 8, 1863,
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arrest of Mr. Vallandigham, and his hasty trial before a secret military court, is an
event which arouses the indignation of all lovers of the [C]onstitution and laws." ' 2
After Judge Leavitt's decision, the Detroit Free Press wrote, "With a deep sense of
the responsibility of every word we put upon the printed page, we solemnly declare
our conviction that the Republic is in the deepest peril which ever menaced her."
18 3
The paper insisted that "[t]he right to speak, to give intelligent utterance to our wants,
passions, desires, impulses, the Heaven giving privileges of man over the brute, must
be exercised untrammeled by fear, unmolested by power, or there is nothing worth
living for left to American citizens."'" In an earlier editorial, the same paper said:
We have never been champions of Mr. Vallandigham. In many
particulars we have disagreed with him in opinion; but we have seen
nothing in his course which he was not permitted by the [C]onstitution
and laws to do; but even if he is guilty of any offense, he is entitled to a
trial by ajury of his country and by the law of the land. If, in his case, a
military court-the most offensive of tribunals to a free people-is
allowed to usurp the office and functions of these, we will be justified in
asserting that the worst apprehensions of the designs of the administration
are fulfilled, and that American liberty is so dead, that even its forms are
no longer observed.'85
The Detroit Free Press recited the charge against Vallandigham. The charge did
not allege that Vallandigham had "violated any law of the United States," ' 6 but
simply an order issued by a General. "There is no pretence that he transcended the
privileges guaranteed to him by the [C]onstitution and laws."' 87 Indeed, there was
no proof offered that he "has ever persuaded one man not to enlist, one to desert his
flag, one to falter in his duty to the Union." ' In essence, the Vallandigham case was
an announcement that no man, in these free and loyal States, shall utter
a sentiment which the hero of Fredericksburg disapproves of.... [I]t is
monstrous to hold that men who may be taxed or drafted, shall not
advocate peace whenever and wherever they please; provided they do it
in accordance with the [C]onstitution and the laws.8 9
New York Democratic governor Horatio Seymour sent a letter to a protest
meeting held in Albany, New York. He wrote that the Vallandigham arrest "involved
a series of offenses against our most sacred rights. It interfered with the freedom of
speech; it molested our rights to be secure in our homes against unreasonable
at2.
82 The Arrest of Vallandigham, DET. FREE PRESS, May 8, 1863, at 2.
183 A Public Meeting, DET. FREE PRESS, May 21, 1863, at 2.
184 Id.
"85 The Arrest of Vallandigham, DET. FREE PRESS, May 8, 1863, at 2.
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searches and seizures; it pronounced sentence without trial, save one which was a
mockery, which insulted as well as wronged."'
' 90
Criticism by the Democratic Cincinnati Enquirer was muted. Burnside had
visited the editors on the day of Vallandigham's arrest and warned them that they too
could be imprisoned. '
2. Advocacy of a Political Response to Suppression
After the arrest and after the suppression of the Chicago Times, many
Democratic speakers and papers counseled against violent action-at least unless the
administration made direct efforts to interfere with the ballot. Francis Kernan was
a highly regarded lawyer and Democratic member of Congress who had first attained
prominence as a brilliant orator for the anti-slavery Free Soil Party.'92 Kernan spoke
to an "immense meeting" at the state capitol in Albany called to protest the
Vallandigham arrest. 3 He expressed a common Democratic theme, obedience to
law:
We will allow none to lead us into violence, but by our firmness and calm
determination to stand by our rights, we will force our opponents into
respect for them. We have one remedy in the ballot box. If those in
authority do not observe our rights, we can turn them out, through the
ballot box. We have another remedy, if we believe the laws of our law
makers unconstitutional, in the courts. And we have still another, which
is quite as good and efficacious, and that is in the voice of the people,
uttered from assemblages such as this, where we are discussing our rights,
peacefully but manfully-a voice terrible to those who are delinquent in
their trusts.
94
190 Letter from Governor Seymour, Executive Dep't (May 16, 1863), in
Vallandigham:-Immense Meeting in Albany, DET. FREE PRESS, May 20, 1863, at I
(referring to an entire report of the meeting's events in The Vallandigham Outrage: Immense
Meeting at the Capitol, ATLAS & ARGUs (Albany, N.Y.: Daily), May 18, 1863, at 2).
9' See KLEMENT, LIMITS OF DISSENT, supra note 1, at 163.
192 See 5 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 356 (Dumas Malone ed., 1932, 1933).
193 Speech of Hon. Francis Kernan, in The Vallandigham Outrage: Immense Meeting at
the Capitol, ATLAS & ARGUS (Albany, N.Y.: Daily), May 18, 1863, at 2.
"' Id. See also Speech of Judge Parker at the Brooklyn Meeting, in ATLAS & ARGUs
(Albany, N.Y.: Daily), June 15, 1863, at 2 (arguing that acts of government should be
resisted by open discussion rather than by force); Hon. C. L. Vallandigham, CIN. ENQUIRER,
May 19, 1863, at 2 (quoting Vallandigham as advocating "no revolution, except through the
ballot box").
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3. Free Speech and Representative Democracy: A Tough Central
Core-Rejection of "License" as a Justification for Suppression
Other protest meetings were held throughout the North.'95 George V. N.
Lothrop, a scholarly leader of the bar and former Michigan attorney general,'96 spoke
to a protest meeting held at the Detroit City Hall.'9 7 Lothrop was a Democrat who
opposed Vallandigham's views and who, by his own account, had "unreservedly"
supported the government "against the insurrection."' 98
Nonetheless, Lothrop insisted on a broad and tough definition of freedom of
speech. He said that soldiers had arrested Vallandigham for allegedly "expressing
sympathy for rebels, declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions with a view to
weaken the power of the government."' 99 "[W]ithout inquiring whether the words
[Vallandigham] used will fairly bear this construction," Lothrop rejected the claim
that they did or could state a legal offense.2 °° "I dwell not on the uncertainty of what
is disloyal; but the point I make is whether a man can be arrested for any quality of
opinions on public affairs?" ' ' Lothrop said it was a postulate that "without free
discussion there can be no free government.... Hence we can readily see at what
price we must lay down this right."2
For Lothrop, the right to free speech had a tough central core, impervious to
government invasion: "What is free speech under the [C]onstitution? Clearly the
right to canvass and discuss without reserve public measures and acts. Anything
short of this is inadequate. ' As a result, "Mr. Vallandigham had the full right to
"I See KLEMENT, LIMITS OF DISSENT, supra note 1, at 179-80 (reporting that citizens of
nearly every Northern city held a protest meeting).
196 See 6 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 192, at 424.
117 See Speech of Hon. Geo. V. N. Lothrop, Delivered at the City Hall, Detroit (May 25,





202 Id. See also EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 282-84 (1988) (noting that popular sovereignty
is a legal fiction; this fact creates the need for a Bill of Rights to protect people from the
oppression of their government's "agents" exceeding their powers); Michael Kent Curtis,
Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising The Slaughter House Cases
Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L.
REV. 1,9-10 (1996) (discussing the belief of the Levellers that popular governments need
bills of rights to guard against the corruption of those granted authority); Steven D. Smith,
Radically Subversive Speech and the Authority of Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 348, 351-52, 360,
362, 365-67, 369 (1995) (discussing the political fiction that the people rule and the sense
in which it is true and false); Speech of Judge Parker at the Brooklyn Meeting, ATLAS &
ARGUS (Albany, N.Y.: Daily), June 15, 1863, at 2 (discussing the importance of freedom of
speech to democratic government).
203 Speech of Hon. Geo. V. N. Lothrop, Delivered at the City Hall, Detroit (May 25,
1863), in DET. FREE PRESS, June 7, 1863, at 2.
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approve, criticise or denounce the war and all acts and measures of the administration
at his pleasure. As a citizen he might form any opinion on these subjects and freely
express them."2" All agreed on the right to "approve and applaud" administration
policy.20 5' But while Vallandigham's accusers considered approval meritorious, "they
object when he condemns and denounces."206
Lothrop responded to a friend who claimed that freedom of speech did not
protect "license":
He meant that the expression of opinions regarded as unsound,
unpatriotic, or of evil tendency, should be deemed not a true freedom, but
a license to be restrained. But this obviously destroys all free discussion.
... It makes, if I apply the rule, all opinions that I reject contraband to all
other persons. But the very fact of a guaranty of freedom of speech
implies that men will honestly differ, and that the privilege of expression
is to be equal to all. The right of expression shall not depend upon.., the
quality of the opinions in the judgment of another. The guaranty means
this or it means nothing.2 7
The "constitutional guaranty," Lothrop insisted, was "framed.., to protect what you
call license[.]" 2 8 After all, it was "the unpopular opinion of to-daythat needs these
guaranties[.]" 2" The idea of limiting free speech to ideas that were popular would
mean that free speech principles would be applied only when not needed. "The man
who runs with the majority needs no guaranty. He is never disloyal."21
"[A]buses and licenses," the Republican Evening Post admitted "of course
adhere to this unlimited freedom of public criticism; but these are apparently
inseparable from the use, and without the abuse we should scarcely have the use."21'
Who, the Post asked, should draw such lines outside of the courts? The question
might suggest that, so long as the courts drew the line, punishment for expression
was permissible. The Evening Post's comments and its general editorial policy
suggest that the editors did not believe that anyone should be permitted to treat
peaceful political criticism of government policy as abuse.21 2
A mass meeting was held in Albany to protest Vallandigham's arrest. The
resolutions adopted at the meeting insisted on protection for political speech and









212 See The Voice of Reason, N.Y. EVENING POST, reprinted in NAT'L INTELLIGENCER,
May 16, 1863, at 3.
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"It is the ancient and undoubted prerogative of this people to canvass
public measures and the merits of public men. It is a 'home bred right,'
a fireside privilege. It had been enjoyed in every house, cottage, #nd
cabin in the nation. It is as undoubted as the right of breathing the air or
walking on the earth.... ""
With increasing emphasis, critics noted the threat to popular government posed
by actions of the administration. Free speech was essential to democracy. "If
freedom of speech is surrendered," the Detroit Free Press noted, "it will no longer
be pretended, we presume, that the ballot-box can represent the views and wishes of
the majority of the people .... Without freedom of speech, the ballot box is a
farce ... ."" If the President could use the war power to stifle speech, he could
make elections meaningless, for elections without free speech are a mockery. By the
same war power logic, the President simply could dispense with elections. As the
Detroit Free Press glumly observed:
[I]t is plain that if meetings may be [dispersed], speakers banished, and
journals suppressed because they are opposed to the war or the conduct
of it, the polIs may be closed, or voters excluded from them, for the same
reason. If it is disloyal to make a speech against the war, it is doubly
disloyal to vote for men who are opposed to it.
... If the president may suspend the habeas corpus, suppress the
courts, and put the lives, liberty and property of the citizens of loyal and
peaceable States into the keeping of military tribunals, we cannot see why
he cannot suppress the ballot box and declare it a "military necessity" to
continue the Presidency in himself.., so long as he has an army to back
him.21
5
The nexus between free speech and democracy was a theme at many Democratic
conventions, including the Ohio convention that nominated Vallandigham. There,
the delegates resolved:
First, that the will of the people is the foundation of all free government:
that to give effect to this will, free thought, free speech and a free press
are absolutely indispensable. Without free discussion there is no certainty
of sound judgment[;] without sound judgment there can be no wise
government[.] That it is an important and constitutional right of the
people to discuss all measures of their Government, and to approve or
disapprove, as to their best judgment seems right; that they have a like
right to propose and advocate that policy which, in their judgment, is best,
i3 The Vallandigham Outrage: Immense Meeting at the Capitol, ATLAS & ARGUS
(Albany, N.Y.: Daily), May 18, 1863, at 2 (quoting Daniel Webster).
214 Will The People Be Allowed To Vote?, DET. FREE PRESS, June 5, 1863, at 2; see also
Hon. Geo. E. Pugh's Speech, in CIN. ENQUIRER, Aug. 7, 1863, at 2 (discussing the relation
of free speech to popular government).
2'5 The Military Discretion, DET. FREE PRESS, June 10, 1863, at 2.
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and to argue and vote against whatever policy seems to them to violate the
Constitution, to impair their liberties, or be detrimental to their welfare;
that these and all other rights guarantied to them by their Constitution are
their rights in time of war as well as in times of peace, and of far more
value and necessity in war than in peace, for in peace, liberty, security,
and property are seldom endangered, in war, they are ever in peril."1 6
In addition, the resolutions condemned the Emancipation Proclamation.2"7
George Pugh, the former United States senator who served as Vallandigham's
habeas corpus lawyer, was the Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor. In his
speech to the Convention, he explained, "The question of prosecuting the war, or
concluding a peace, can not be intelligently decided till we hear both sides, and all
sides. Any idea of discussing such questions, under fear of military dictation, or the
Order 38, [is] shame and mockery. '218
4. The Principal-Agent Metaphor and the Sedition Act Analogy
The right of free speech followed from the principal-agent relation between the
people and elected officials-from the basic idea of representative government. The
Ohio Democratic convention resolved that administrations and government officials
were merely the agents of the people "subject to their approval or condemnation,
according to the merit or demerit of their acts." '219 The Detroit Free Press argued that
the claim that opposition to the war amounted to disloyalty was "heretical and
wicked. It is only another form of saying that the people have ceased to be sovereign,
and must sustain every act of their agents, right or wrong. ' 2 0 The Free Press said
that whether a war should be supported depended on a number of factors: was it a
just war?; could it be terminated by an honorable adjustment?; was there a reasonable
hope of success?; and was it practicable, constitutional, and consistent with public
liberty?22' As the Free Press wrote:
In a free country at least, the men who are liable to fight, and who must
be taxed to support the war, can never surrender the right to ask these
questions, and to answer them according to the convictions which their
consciences entertain. And no one can legally accuse them of disloyalty
because he does not agree with their answer.222
216 Ohio Democratic State Convention, Vallandigham Nominated For Governor, George
E. Pugh's Speech, CIN. CoM., June 12, 1863, at 2.
217 See id
218 Id
219 Id; see also Maine Democratic State Convention: An Immense Gathering, ATLAS &
ARGUS (Albany, N.Y.: Daily), Aug. 12, 1863, at 2 (quoting a resolution from the Maine
Democratic State Convention using similar language).
220 Loyalty-Disloyalty, DET. FREE PRESS, June 26, 1863, at 2.
221 See id.
222 Id.; see also Speech of Judge Parker at the Brooklyn Meeting, in ATLAS & ARGUS
(Albany, N.Y.: Daily), June 15, 1863, at 2 (discussing the status of governmental officials
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Some Democrats suggested that the Lincoln administration was reviving the
tyranny of the Sedition Act used by the John Adams administration against its
political opponents.223 In Vallandigham's case, however, Congress had not even
passed a law purporting to authorize the arrests.224 Congressman Daniel Voorhees
from Indiana said the Republicans were the ideological heirs of the Federalists who
enacted the Sedition Act-
a law by which, if Mr. Vallandigham, or myself, or anybody else, made
a speech that the President didn't like, he would be taken up, and
confined, and put inprison as a seditious person. Now a days, without
any such law, they take a man up, keep him in prison as long as they like,
and turn him out whenever they get tired of him, without making
explanation or apology to him.
.... I, upon the other hand, dare to trust the people, and clothe them
with power to regulate their own affairs. I stand by the literal meaning of
the Constitution, that Congress shall pass no law abridging the freedom
of speech or of the press.225
One writer for Harper's Weekly suggested that the administration's error was its
distrust of the people: "Arresting seditious talkers implies a fear that the people have
not sense or strength of mind enough to resist the appeal of sedition ... 226
5. Political Speech and "Treason"
Critics of the administration further insisted that calling criticism "treason" did
not dissolve the principles of free and equal speech. Democrats regularly highlighted
the Constitution's limited definition of treason and the historical and functional
reasons for the limit. As former Democratic congressman David Seymour explained
at a meeting in Troy, New York, in America "no such offence as implied treason"
as agents of the people).
223 See History Repeating Itself-Persecution of Democrats Under the Old Sedition Law,
DAYTON EMPIRE (Ohio: Daily), reprinted in DET. FREE PRESS, Aug. 27, 1863, at 2
(discussing the history of the Sedition Act during the John Adams administration and relating
it to the acts of the Lincoln administration).
224 See id.
225 Speech of Daniel W. Voorhees at Bucyrus, Crawford County, O[hio] (Sept. 15, 1863),
in CIN. COM., Sept. 17, 1863, at 1. On its face, at least, the scope of the Sedition Act of 1798
only reached malicious falsehoods, while the action against Vallandigham reached opinions.
As it was used, however, the Sedition Act reached and punished political opinions and
perhaps, for that reason, Voorhees did not point out the Sedition Act required falsity. See,
e.g., Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, §3, 1 Stat. 596 (1798); U.S. v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631
(C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865) (trying a pampleteer for criticizing the president's actions
regarding the raising of an army and navy amid escalating tension with France); Lyon's Case,
15 F. Cas. 1183 (C.C.D. Vt. 1798) (No. 8,646) (trying a citizen for publishing criticisms of
the president for pursuing pomp and adulation and for using religion for political purposes).
226 The Arrest of Vallandigham, 7 HARPER'S WEEKLY, May 30, 1863, at 338.
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existed.227 The use of bold and even severe free speech about government policy "is
not and cannot be held to be 'adhering' to our enemies, 'giving them aid and
comfort.' Any different construction of this constitutional definition," he explained,
"would confound all right of free speech." '228
6. Republican Critics of Suppression
Opposition to the Vallandigham arrest and the suppression of the Chicago Times
was not limited to Democrats. The New York Evening Post, a pro-Republican and
pro-emancipation paper, was strongly critical. The Evening Post refuted General
Burnside's assertion that because soldiers could not criticize the war policy of the
administration, neither could civilians: "But he forgets that persons 'in the military
and naval service of the United States' are subject to military law, while the ordinary
citizen is subject exclusively to civil law." '229 General Burnside's theory was
subversive of democratic government:
[N]o governments and no authorities are to be held as above criticism, or
even denunciation. We know of no other way of correcting their faults,
spurring on their sluggishness, or restraining their tyrannies, than by open
and bold discussion. How can a popular Government, most of all, know
the popular will, and guide its course in the interests of the community,
unless it be told from time to time what the popular convictions and
wishes are?230
The New York Daily Tribune, a strongly anti-slavery Republican paper, doubted
that any good would come from the episode and hoped-that the President would free
Vallandigham. The Tribune wrote that:
227 Speech of Hon. David L. Seymour at the Mass Meeting on Saturday Evening, in
Arbitrary Arrests: Meeting in Troy, ATLAS & ARGUS (Albany, N.Y.: Daily), May 28, 1863,
at 4.
228 Id. Article III, section 3 of the Constitution provides: "Treason against the United
States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving
them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of
two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court." U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 3, ci. 1. See also William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom
of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984) (discussing the treason clause as a guarantee
of free speech); Alexander H. Shapiro, Political Theory and the Growth of Defensive
Safeguards in Criminal Procedure: The Origins of the Treason Trials Act of 1696, 11 LAW
& HIST. REV. 215 (1993) (discussing treason under English law and the background of
American guarantees under the Constitution).
229 The Voice of Reason, N.Y. EVENING POST, reprinted in NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, May
16, 1863, at 3.
230 Id. See also Letter From Ex-Governor Washington Hunt (May 16, 1863), in The
Vallandigham Case, ATLAS & ARGUS (Albany, N.Y.: Daily), May 22, 1863, at 2 (stating that
criticism of government policies is protected free speech).
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Vallandigham [was] a Pro-Slavery Democrat of an exceedingly coppery
hue.... [I]f there were penalties for holding irrational, unpatriotic and
inhuman views with regard to political questions, he would be one of the
most flagrant offenders. But our Federal and State Constitutions do not
recognize perverse opinions, nor unpatriotic speeches, as grounds of
infliction .... 23
A few days later the Tribune returned to the subject of Vallandigham's arrest.
It suggested that Vallandigham unintentionally helped the government, and it noted
the free speech problems with the arrest. "We reverence Freedom of Discussion-by
which we mean Freedom to uphold perverse and evil theories, since nobody ever
doubted the right to uphold the other sort." '232
A German anti-slavery paper expressed shock when it learned that
Vallandigham's only crime was "a public speech." '233 It denounced the sentence as
despotism because "Mr. Vallandigham ... was sentenced simply for making use of
the freedom of speech guaranteed by the [C]onstitution. . . [W]e do not
acknowledge any misuse of free speech, as was invented by the European police." '234
The paper's prescription for the "so-called misuse of the freedom of speech" was that
it "be neutralized by the counteracting better use of the same." '235 The Bedford
Standard, another Republican paper, also criticized the arrest:
[A]t a time when we see the opinions we have so long advocated in the
face of many who would gladly have silenced us, so rapidly gaining favor
among the people, we think there is no need of attempting to shut the
mouths of such men as Vallandigham. If we are successful all his tirades
will fall unheeded. If we are unsuccessful, and continually so, no power
on earth can prevent the formation of such a public opinion as will
compel a change of policy on the part of the administration, or lead to the
election of a new one. Let us have faith in the power of truth, and oppose
those we believe to be in error with the weapon of truth. 6
231 Vallandigham, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., May 15, 1863, at 4.
232 Sympathy for Vallandigham's Treason in Albany: Gov. Seymour Exciting Citizens
Against the Government, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., May 18, 1863, at 5. Curiously, the New York
Daily Tribune rejected the claim that Vallandigham could not be amenable to military
authority. Id.




236 BEDFORD (REP.) STANDARD, reprinted in Abolition "Sentiment" on Vallandigham,
DET. FREE PRESS, May 27, 1863, at 2.
[Vol. 7:1
ANTI-WAR SPEECH IN THE CIVIL WAR
Colonel A. S. Diven spoke to a Republican meeting at Albany, New York.237
Diven was a strongly anti-slavery lawyer, soldier, and railroad promoter. 3 He had
been a Free Soil candidate for governor of New York in 1859 and served in Congress
from 1861 to 1863, during which time he had supported emancipation in the District
of Columbia and authored the first bill authorizing the use of black troops. 9
According to Albany's Atlas & Argus, Diven said that "[h]e was opposed to the
abridgement of discussion. He maintained the right of the people to discuss and
criticise the action of the government, whether in peace or in war, to the fullest
extent!"240
The extent of the condemnation of the Vallandigham arrest is difficult to
determine. The Detroit Free Press suggested that opposition to the arrest was quite
general and it "was not ... confined to any one party."24
This is shown conclusively, by the extracts we have published from the
leading editorials of such republican papers as the New York Tribune,
The New York Evening Post, the New York Commercial Advertiser, the
Albany Statesman, the Boston Advertiser, the Boston Traveller, the
Springfield Republican, backed as the New York Evening Post truly says,
by at least three-fourths of the republican party itself. But the republican
press and party among those who voted for Lincoln do not stand alone,
for the anti-slavery press are unanimous in condemning the course of the
administration.242
In fact, abolitionists were split. Ezra Heywood, a radical who had left the ministry
to become a lecturer for the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society, introduced a
resolution at the Society's 1863 meeting supporting free speech and criticizing the
prosecution of Vallandigham. The resolution was met with the argument that it
should not be passed by an anti-slavery organization because the resolution helped
the South, and it was tabled.243
In contrast to the Detroit Free Press, the Democratic Atlas & Argus complained
that most Republican journals had failed to support free speech.2 " Certainly,
Republican papers like the Cincinnati Commercial and the Chicago Tribune, and
237 See Remarks of Col. A. S. Diven at the Republican Meeting at the Capitol (May 20,
1863), in ATLAS & ARGUS (Albany, N.Y.: Daily), May 22, 1863, at 2.
238 See 3 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 192, at 322.
239 See id
240 Remarks of Col. A. S. Diven at the Republican Meeting at the Capitol (May 20, 1863),
in ATLAS & ARGUS (Albany, N.Y.: Daily), May 22, 1863, at 2.
241 The Vindication of the Right of Free Speech, DET. FREE PRESS, May 28, 1863, at 2.
242 Id.
243 See DAVID RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 32-33 (1997) (citing
MARTIN HENRY BLATr, FREE LOVE AND ANARCHISM: THE BIOGRAPHY OF EZRA HEYWOOD
29-31 (1989)).
244 See Wanted-Free Speech!, ATLAS & ARGUS (Albany, N.Y.: Daily), May 20, 1863, at
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many Republican orators, fully supported Burnside's suppression of critical speech.
For example, the editors of the Chicago Tribune, mixing metaphors, lamented that
Vallandigham, the "Queen Bee of the Copperhead hive," only had been sent South
"instead of being hung, as he deserved. 245
Still, there was substantial Republican opposition to General Burnside's
suppressions of speech and press. A large crowd assembled to protest the General's
suppression of the Chicago Times. "A full half of the crowd that got together in the
Court house Square last evening," the Chicago Tribune complained, "was, we are
sorry to say, made up of Republicans .... ,,24' These the Tribune found "out of
place" in an "assemblage" pretending to defend free speech. In fact, the Tribune
insisted, the crowd "met to assail the Government and weaken its power. "247
Republican senator Lyman Trumbull addressed a crowd that included a number of
Republicans who were unhappy about his telegram urging President Lincoln to give
immediate consideration to the request to overrule General Burnside .1 8 "Has it come
to this," Trumbull asked
that you will deny in the free city of Chicago the right of a citizen to
discuss the acts of the President? [Cries of"We won't allow it" . . .] Is
there a man in this audience who has not expressed today his
dissatisfaction with some act of the President? [Cries of "Yes," "Yes,"
"We have none of us expressed any dissatisfaction."] Ah! do all of you,
then, think the President's revocation of Gen[eral] Burnside's order
suppressing the Chicago Times was right? [Cries of"No!" "No!" "It was
wrong!"...] Then you all deserve to be taken in hand by the military
power and sent beyond the lines.249
Trumbull insisted that the Republican Party should not surrender its position as
the advocate of liberty and free speech. He thought that incidents like the
suppression of the Chicago Times were damaging the administration and the war
effort. Such acts allowed critics to charge that
we are opposed to the freedom of speech and opinion, to the freedom of
the press; in favor of curtailing personal liberty, and in favor of a
despotism. Now we should not allow these things. We have been the
advocate of free speech for the last forty years, and should not allow the
party which during the whole time has been using the gag to usurp our
place. We are fighting for the restoration of the Union, and the
preservation of the Constitution, and all the liberties it guarantees to every
citizen.250
245 The Mask Off, CHI. TRIB., May 30, 1863, at 2.
246 That Crowd, CHI. TRIB., reprinted in CIN. COM., June 5, 1863, at 2.
247 Id.
248 See The Limitations of Criticism, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, June 10, 1863, at 3.
249 Id.
250 Senator Trumbull's Chicago Speech, in CIN. COM., June 11, 1863, at 2.
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C. The Nature of Free Speech
1. Tough Protection for Core Speech
For many there was a central core of protected expression which the government
could not suppress, regardless of how impressive its interest in doing so appeared.
This core included expression of opinion on public policy-such as the wisdom of
pursuing the war and the legality, tyranny, or wisdom of General Burnside's
suppression of expression. For many others, the very grossness of the
suppression-an arrest or prior restraint based on the edict of a general issued outside
the immediate area of military conflict, unsupported by a law passed by Congress,
and unreviewed by a court-meant that detailed discussion of the limits of free
speech was unnecessary.
2. Free Speech and Equal Free Speech Rights
For many critics of the suppression, free speech was a basic principle that
involved equal rights for the critics as well as supporters of governmental
policy-including the war policy. As George Lothrop said, "the very fact of a
guaranty of freedom of speech implies that men will honestly differ, and that the
privilege of expression is to be equal to all."2"' To deny expression to those with
contrary views risked weakening the basic framework that supported liberty for all.
"We freely concede," said the Bedford Standard, "to any one the same right to
criticise the administration which we claim for ourselves. If we disapprove of a pro-
slavery policy, we expect to say so without molestation. Let those who disapprove
of an anti-slavery policy do the same." '252 Former Democratic congressman David
Seymour spoke at a Democratic rally in Troy, New York, and insisted that the
Constitution broadly protected free expression of ideas.2"3 Seymour argued that
protection for diverse views is implicit in a broad right of free speech:
No gag law on the press; no swords nor bayonets, nor chains, nor prisons,
nor exile, can, under our Constitution, legally restrain or repress them.
This is true in morals, in social life and in religion. It is true of the atheist,
the mormon and the abolitionist. Even the abolitionists-the Phillipses,
the Sumners, the Wades, the Garrisons, and their whole tribe-have a
right to preach heretical doctrines. 4
251 Speech of Hon. Geo. V. N. Lothrop, Delivered at the City Hall, Detroit (May 25,
1863), in DET. FREE PRESS, June 7, 1863, at 2.
252 BEDFORD (REP.) STANDARD, reprinted in Abolition "Sentiment" on Vallandigham,
DET. FREE PRESS, May 27, 1863, at 2.
253 See Speech of Hon. David L. Seymour at the Mass Meeting on Saturday Evening, in
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At a mass meeting in Erie County, Sandford Church exclaimed, "Let Vallandigham
talk! Let Anna Dickinson talk! Let all the host of radical declaimers in petticoats or
breeches talk!,
255
Because of the broad principle of liberty, those who disagreed with
Vallandigham felt free to come to his defense. "The views of Mr. Vallandigham
have nothing to do with the question," the Detroit Free Press explained 6.25 "The
same feeling would have been aroused if Mr. Greeley [editor of the New York
Tribune] or [abolitionist orator] Wendell Phillips had been arrested and thrown into
prison for exercising the rights guaranteed to them under the [C]onstitution. ' '217
A number of speakers warned Republicans against. establishing a principle that
later could be turned against them. Wirt Dexter, a leading Republican lawyer in
Chicago,258 spoke to the crowd which gathered to protest the suppression of the
Chicago Times: "I don't wish to see this kind of treatment turned upon the party of
which I am a member; and I say to republicans to-night, gentlemen, be careful how
you approach this abyss that opens before us. 259 Senator Trumbull made the same
point, applying it to executive and military suppression of a newspaper. "Did it ever
occur to you," Trumbull asked, "that the next election may put an entirely different
face upon affairs? ... The same chalice you hold to the lips of your adversaries
today, to-morrow may be returned to your lips. '26 The editors of the New York
Journal of Commerce explained the "distinction between discussion or counsel and
'treason"':
261
"The most ardent partizan can see it by reversing circumstances and
imagining an administration in power which should attempt to pursue a
policy contrary to his views. In such a case he would readily perceive his
own right of discussing the policy, and... to endeavor by argument, by
reason, by publication.., to influence the votes of his fellow-citizens at
coming elections. '"262
255 Mass Meeting of the Citizens of Erie County, BUFFALO DAILY COURIER, reprinted in
ATLAS & ARGUS (Albany, N.Y.: Daily), June 5, 1863, at 2.
256 The Vindication of the Right of Free Speech, DET. FREE PRESS, May 28, 1863, at 2.
257 Id. See also Speech of Hon. David L. Seymour at the Mass Meeting on Saturday
Evening, in Arbitrary Arrests: Meeting in Troy, ATLAS & ARGUS (Albany, N.Y.: Daily), May
28, 1863, at 4.
258 See 3 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 192, at 283.
259 Free Speech-Free Press. Immense Meeting at Chicago, CHI. TIMES, June 5, 1863,
reprinted in DET. FREE PRESS, June 6, 1863, at 1.
260 Senator Trumbull's Chicago Speech, in CIN. COM., June 11, 1863, at 2.
26' Free Speech, DET. FREE PRESS, May 26, 1863, at 2 (quoting the N.Y. J. COM.).
262 Id.
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The Boston Pioneer emphasized the point by demanding "a right for all."'263
Otherwise, those who approved of Vallandigham's sentence could not complain if
they were packed off to prison in Florida for criticizing the administration.2"
Several papers claimed that the rule of suppression was selective. According to
them, Vallandigham said that the war aim had changed from preserving the Union
to freeing the slaves.265 His statements were part of the basis for his conviction.
Meanwhile, Wendell Phillips, the fiery abolitionist orator, had said that the war had
become a war for abolition and had advocated disunion rather than union with slave
states. No one suggested prosecuting him.26 The National Intelligencer suggested
that proposed distinctions between the cases would not wash, and drew the following
conclusion:
We know it will be said'that the difference between Mr. Vallandigham
and Mr. Phillips is this: ... [Vallandigham's] purpose is to weaken the
Government, while the purpose of [Mr. Phillips] ... is rather to
strengthen the Government in its struggle with the rebellion. But who
does not see that such a representation assumes that very point in dispute?
At the same time it ascribes to Mr. Vallandigham a disunion purpose
which he constantly disclaims, while Mr. Phillips has expressly
announced that he will accept disunion on the condition of emancipation
being secured. We believe that the Government might better afford to let
Mr. Vallandigham and Mr. Phillips enjoy the privilege of "free speech"
according to their respective notions of propriety, than to proceed against
either of them for words spoken in public discussion.267
3. A Rare Narrow View: Free Speech as Limited to Freedom from Prior Restraint
One critic of the suppression took a narrow view of free speech. James F. Joy,
a Republican lawyer who announced that he despised his clients' politics, represented
the owners of the Chicago Times. Joy assumed that freedom of speech was limited
to protection against prior restraint, and he argued that Congress could declare what
speech to allow and what to proscribe:
It is fully competent for Congress to enact a law punishing licentiousness
of the press,-punishing libels upon the government, or upon public
officers, or any other form of publication calculated to injure the
government and bring it into disrepute, or to throw obstacles in the way
263 The Traitor Vallandigham, BOSTON PIONEER, reprinted in DET. FREE PRESS, May 27,
1863, at 2.
264 See id.
265 See Declaring Disloyal Sentiments, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, May 14, 1863, at 3.
266 See id; see also An Irrepressible in Freedom of Speech, CIN. ENQuIRER, June 4, 1863,
at 2 (quoting Wendell Phillips' statement to the Boston Post).
267 Declaring Disloyal Sentiments, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, May 14, 1863, at 3.
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of its measures, or tending to sedition and disturbance of the public
peace.268
In fact, Madison, Jefferson, many Framers of the Constitution, and many members
of Congress, at the time of the Sedition Act and during the mid- 1830s, believed that
Congress had no such power.269 But, Joy suggested, Congress dared not pass such
statutes because of the popular view that they would infringe freedom of speech and
of the press."'
Many recognized limitations upon protected speech. Senator Trumbull
suggested that if the editors of the Chicago Times had encouraged resistance to the
draft, they could have been arrested, tried in federal court, and thrown into prison.27
Unlike Joy, Trumbull did not suggest that Congress could make false criticisms of
the government a crime. By emphasizing that he did not advocate disobedience to
the law, however, Vallandigham and many of his supporters recognized that such
advocacy was problematic.
D. The Defense of the Lincoln Administration
1. The Hypocrisy Defense
Defenders of the Lincoln administration took several tacks. First, they pointed
out that criticism of the suppression of free speech came with poor grace from a party
many of whose members had supported suppression of anti-slavery speech. "[S]ince
the arrest of the treason-shrieker, Vallandigham," the Chicago Tribune noted, "his
disciples fill the air with cries about the Constitutional right of 'free speech.' [W]e
wish to ask those Copperhead defenders of free speech how much of this
Constitutional and sacred privilege did their party allow to be exercised in the South
before the war broke out?" '272 The paper asked: "How much 'free speech' was
268 Argument of Hon. James F. Joy: On the Preliminary Application of the Chicago Times
for an Injunction in the United States Court, DET. FREE PRESS, June 9, 1863, at 2.
269 See, e.g., Curtis, The Curious History, supra note 16, at 794-96, 817-36; see also
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 36 (1998)
(discussing views of the Framers and Ratifiers of the original Constitution).
270 See Argument of Hon. James F. Joy: On the Preliminary Application of the Chicago
Times for an Injunction in the United States Court, in DET. FREE PRESS, June 9, 1863, at 2.
271 The Limitations of Criticism, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, June 10, 1863, at 3; see also Mass
Meeting of the Citizens of Erie County, BUFFALO DAILY COURIER, reprinted in ATLAS &
ARGUS (Albany, N.Y.: Daily), June 5, 1863, at 2. Mr. Ganson, a speaker at a protest meeting
in Erie County, New York said that "[tihe right [of free speech] contended for by us is as
clear now in the loyal States as in times of peace. If it is abused, the offender can be punished
under the civil laws." Id. Sanford Church, another speaker at the meeting, asked "[w]here is
our boasted free speech," if it is left to any man as to say what may and what may not be
spoken?" Id.
272 Free Speech, CHI. TRIB., June 1, 1863,, at 2 (emphasis added).
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tolerated in Secessia during the twenty years before the war?" '273 Opponents of
slavery were
arrested, imprisoned, fined, tar and feathered, rode on a rail, whipped,
ducked, and even hung, for daring to exercise [their] "Constitutional right
of free speech[.]" "Ah, but," replies a Copperhead, "that abridgment of
free speech was made to prevent any discussion of the 'divine
institution;' Very true; but is slavery above the Constitution? ... If
Southern Democrats may, by mob violence, backed by Southern courts,
stifle free speech in defiance of the Constitution, on the plea that slavery
must not be discussed, with what consistency do Northern Democrats
complain of the Generals of the army, in time of war and national peril,
who forbid violent and seditious assaults upon the Government, the
intention and effect of which is, to strengthen the enemy and weaken the
Union?274
John Brough was the Union candidate for governor of Ohio who ran against
Vallandigham. Brough noted that George Pugh, the Democratic candidate for
lieutenant governor, had supported a bill for the Kansas territory that contained the
following section: "'if any man shall print, publish, indite or give form or shape to
published matter, tending to stir up a rebellion of slaves in Kansas, he shall be
punished in a fine of $500, and with imprisonment for six months." 75 Pugh had
said he regretted the section, but he had defended it as necessary where slavery
existed: "The difference between us," Brough announced to the delight of his
audience, "seems only to be that we recognize a 'military necessity,' and he [Pugh]
a 'negro necessity."'276  The paper reported the audience responded with
"[I]aughter. '277
The pro-Republican New York Daily Tribune softened its criticism of
suppression by noting the effort to silence abolitionists through legal actions and
violence in the 1830s. These efforts, the paper suggested, enjoyed considerable
Democratic support.
Politicians, lawyers, bankers, merchants-all who considered themselves
anybody or aspired to be somebody-held meetings to denounce and
silence [abolitionists]; "respectable" halls and churches were sternly
refused them; ... vicious boys and rowdies rotten-egged them,.., while
Mayors, Congressmen and dry goods jobbers wrote letters to the South,




275 Great Speech of the Hon. John Brough, Immense Union Mass-Meeting in Fifth Street
Market-Space (July 27, 1863), in CIN. COM., July 28, 1863, at 2.
276 Id.
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278 Free Speech, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., May 20, 1863, at 4.
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The Tribune noted with satisfaction (and barely repressed glee) the conversion of
many Democrats to a strong view of free speech:
The times have bravely altered since then, and altered, we rejoice to say,
for the better. The right of free discussion-which means the right to
proclaim and defend unpopular views, since the other sort have no need
of protection-is now affirmed and upheld by those who for a quarter of
a century persistently scouted and trampled on it.279
Indeed, the paper said, in the midst of civil war, with the nation on the brink of
destruction, Democrats held meetings during which "determination to resist the draft,
to repudiate the public debt, and to embarrass and cripple in every way the National
authorities, is proclaimed amid thunders of applause. '20 The Tribune concluded that
free speech has limits, "[b]ut, truth is truth, though the devil utter it, and Free Speech
is one of the most precious of the Rights of Man. 21
There were charges of inconsistency on all sides. Republicans, after all, had
campaigned in 1856 and 1860 as the free speech party. The National Intelligencer
acknowledged that some advocates of free speech were recent converts, but
concluded that fact should not obscure the merits of the case. The paper urged its
readers "to separate a good cause from the infirmities of the men into whose hands
it is suffered to fall. 282 It was a mistake to judge the free speech principle solely by
the consistency of its advocates.
2. Liberty versus License
Those who supported suppression of Vallandigham and the Chicago Times
insisted that free speech did not protect the license indulged in by Vallandigham and
the Times. Politicians and citizens, General Burnside announced, "must not use
license and plead that they are exercising liberty." '283 After all, the nation was at war.
"[I]n times of peace," a writer in the Chicago Tribune announced, free speech could
be tolerated "as a harmless right."2 4 But things were quite different "in times of war
and revolution. 285 Ordinarily, "even the licentiousness of speech is better than a too
rigid restriction of it; but we can't afford to be quite so generous," the writer noted,




282 Respect for Law, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, May 27, 1863, at 3.
283 The Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus for the Release of Hon. C. L.
Vallandigham-General Burnside's Statement to the Court, Cincinnati, Ohio, May 11, 1863,
in DET. FREE PRESS, May 14, 1863, at 2 (reporting the statement of Flamen Ball, Esq.).
284 Civil and Military Law, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 1863, at 2.
285 Id.
286 Id. The Tribune published two additional and lengthy installments supporting the
actions of the administration. See Military Law and Civil Law-No. 3, CHI. TRIB., June 18,
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Republican congressman Jehu Baker of Illinois said: "The advocates of treason
talk of liberty of speech and the press, without once thinking of the distinction
between the liberty of a man and the license of a beast . . . . Suppose," the
Congressman asked, a man should gather young people together and "tell them that
the principles of the Decalogue are all bosh; ... that a graven image is as good a God
as any .... Incomparably worse are the fruits of the teaching of treason against ajust
and excellent government."2"7 Baker invoked the metaphor of fire to emphasize the
danger.28
3. Denial of Repression Based upon Unpunished and Extreme
Anti-Administration Speech
In addition to distinguishing liberty from license, and noting the inconsistency
of their opponents, supporters of the Lincoln administration pointed to examples of
extreme anti-administration rhetoric which had not resulted in arrest. Certainly this
fact shows that the Lincoln administration was not consistent or relentless in its effort
to stamp out anti-war or anti-administration speech. The administration, rather, was
concerned primarily with the negative effects of anti-war speech on the war effort.
At least initially, Lincoln remained relatively passive and left the matter to the
discretion of subordinates whom he tended to support. Lincoln's reply to New York
critics suggested that the commander in the field was the best judge of necessity of
suppressing of speech. 89
The public outrage over the Vallandigham episode and Chicago Times case made
Lincoln more cautious. His acute political sensitivity led him quietly to restrain
subordinates.29° "The moral of the event would be lost[,]" the Detroit Free Press
noted after the revocation of the order suppressing the Chicago Times,
if we did not emphasise the force of public opinion-the fear of
consequences which prompted it. Every one knows that Burnside's crazy
acts, the arrest of Vallandigham and his illegal trial, his turgid, incendiary
order, and his suppression of newspapers had heated the popular mind to
an ominous extent.29'
The Detroit Free Press hoped for a repudiation of the policy that led to
Vallandigham's arrest and the closure of the Chicago Times. "What public opinion
1863, at 3; Military Law and Civil Law-No. 2, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 1863, at 2.
287 Suspension of the Habeas Corpus and Arbitrary Arrests: Extracts from the Speech of
Jehu Baker, Delivered in the Hall of the House of Representatives (Feb. 4, 1863), in CHI.
TRIB., June 19, 1863, at 3.
288 See id.
289 See DONALD, supra note 41, at 419-20; see also Abraham Lincoln, To Erastus Coming
and Others (June 12, 1863), in LINCOLN SPEECHES, supra note 83, at 454, 462.
290 See William G. Carleton, Civil War Dissidence in the North: The Perspective of a
Century, 65 S. ATL. Q. 390, 400-01 (1966).
291 What Will He Do With It?, DET. FREE PRESS, June 9, 1863, at 2.
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demands from [President Lincoln,]" the paper said, "is an express disclaimer of the
power to do such things in the future." '292
In private, Lincoln reined in his generals. "I regret to learn of the arrest of the
Democrat editor," Lincoln wrote General John Schofield in July of 1863, shortly
after the Vallandigham and Chicago Times affairs.293 He continued: "I fear this loses
you the middle position I desired you to occupy.... Please spare me the trouble this
is likely to bring." '294 In October of the same year, Lincoln again wrote General
Schofield who, in an effort to root out rebels, had required all the inhabitants of a
county to leave their homes. Lincoln specifically addressed the suppression of
speech and press, and urged restraint:
"Under your recent order, which I have approved, you will only arrest
individuals, and suppress assemblies, or newspapers, when they may be
working palpable injury to the Military in your charge; and, in no other
case will you interfere with the expression of opinion in any form, or
allow it to be interfered with violently by others. In this, you have a
discretion to exercise with great caution, calmness, and forbearance.""29
On the day General Burnside issued his order suppressing the Chicago Times,
Secretary of War Stanton, wrote General Burnside to advise him that President
Lincoln disapproved of General Hascall's interference with newspapers in Indiana.
Stanton added:
Since writing the above letter the President has been informed that you
have suppressed the publication or circulation of the Chicago [sic] Times
in your department. He directs me to say that in his judgment it would be
better for you to take an early occasion to revoke that order. The irritation
produced by such acts is in his opinion likely to do more harm than the
publication would do.... But while military movements are left to your
judgment, upon administrative questions such as the arrest of civilians
and the suppression of newspapers not requiring immediate action the
President desires to be previously consulted.296
So, perhaps Lincoln finally decided that suppression of political speech outside the
war zone was really too important a matter to be left to his generals.
292 Id. Craig D. Tenney, in his account of the case, also concludes that press and public
criticism was the main determinant of Lincoln's change of course. See Tenney, To Suppress,
supra note 84, at 259.
293 Abraham Lincoln, Telegram from Abraham Lincoln to General J. M. Schofield (July
13, 1863), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 355, 355-56 (Arthur Brooks Lapsley
ed., 1923).
294 Id. at 3 56.
29' NEELY, supra note 123, at 48 (quoting President Lincoln's letter to General John M.
Schofield which gave advice concerning "notorious" General Order No. 11).
296 RANDALL, supra note 58, at 495 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 7:1
ANTI-WAR SPEECH IN THE CIVIL WAR
4. The Argument from Necessity and National Survival
The claim that when the survival of the nation was at stake, all other
considerations became secondary was a powerful war power argument for
suppression. The Constitution provided for the war power,297 the power of the
President as commander in chief,9 ' and that habeas corpus could be suspended in a
time of rebellion or invasion.2 As a result, supporters of the administration argued,
the war power, the law of war, and the law of necessity trumped everything,
including free speech. Administration lawyers expressed these arguments and so did
Northern intellectuals who supported the administration. Constitutional justifications
of the President's power were sweeping. As a writer for the Chicago Tribune
explained, "[t]he warpower is limited only by the laws and usages of nations. This
power is tremendous: it is strictly constitutional; but it breaks down every barrier so
anxiously erectedfor the protection of liberty, ofprosperity and oflife.""0° The same
writer noted that "[o]ne of the great evils of the war, is that it requires for its
prosecution such a concentration of power in the hands of the executive, that there
is a very great danger of abuse in its exercise."' ' But a perfect choice was not
available: "[W]e must never forget that in this unhappy condition of things our choice
is reduced to a choice of evils. Shall we submit to a temporary despotism now, in
order that we may be saved from one ten-fold more fearful in the future?"3 2 William
Whiting, solicitor for the War Department, explained that while the war power was
constitutional, it was not limited. "Nothing in the Constitution or laws can define the
possible extent of any military danger. Nothing therefore in either of them can fix
or define the extent of power necessary to meet the emergency .. ."303 As a result,
Whiting broadly justified military power to arrest civilians far from the scene of
battle:
Military crimes, or crimes of war, include all acts of hostility to the
country, to the government, or to any department or officer thereof...
provided that such acts of hostility have the effect of opposing,
embarrassing, defeating, or even of interfering with, our military or naval
operations in carrying on the war, or of aiding, encouraging, or supporting
the enemy.
297 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
298 See id art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
299 See id. art. I, § 9, ci. 2.
300 Military Law and Civil Law, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 1863, at 2.
301 Military Law and Civil Law-No. 3, CHI. TRIB., June 18, 1863, at 3.
302 id.
303 WILLIAM WHITING, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:
MILITARY ARRESTS, RECONSTRUCTION, AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT 169 (Leonard W. Levy
ed., Da Capo Press 1972) (1871); see also HYMAN, supra note 1, at 132 (explaining the
views of prominent Pennsylvania judge Daniel Agnew).
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... [M]ilitary arrests may be made for the punishment or prevention of
military crimes. 4
"Soldiers and sailors give up much of their personal liberty," Whiting noted. 5
Similarly, in civil war, every citizen "must... be curtailed of some of his accustomed
privileges," including civil, municipal, and constitutional rights.3"
Some critics were blunt. "The President of the United States has, in effect, been
created Dictator," with power over liberty comparable to that of the Russian Czar,
wrote George William Curtis in Harper's Weekly." 7 "But," he concluded, "it is
well" for the power of the President was necessary for success.30 8 Ralph Waldo
Emerson concluded that "absolute powers of a Dictator" were necessary during the
war.
309
President Lincoln crafted two politically potent defenses of his policy. The first
came in response to a letter from a New York group critical of the Vallandigham
arrest; the second responded to the Ohio Democrats' demand for Vallandigham's
release. Because Lincoln's responses need to be read in connection with the criticism
he faced, the next section will first review the critique of Lincoln's actions.
5. The Arguments Lincoln Answered
The New Yorkers objected to Vallandigham's military arrest and trial because
it took place in an area where the civilian courts were functioning; because it
deprived Vallandigham of constitutional guarantees such as jury trial and a grand
jury indictment; and because the arrest was based on a political speech.' A major
subject of dispute was the war power of the president. If the president, as
Commander in Chief, can dispense with civil courts and constitutional guarantees for
civilians in areas that are not part of the theater of war, then the president can
suspend freedom of speech in war time. Indeed, the government advocated
something like that position in the Vallandigham habeas case."'
Critics of the war power argument rejected unlimited presidential power. They
insisted that application of military law must be limited to the theater of war and to
members of the armed services. Senator Trumbull, for example, took this position
in his Chicago speech about the suppression of the Chicago Times:
304 WHITING, supra note 303, at 188.
305 Id. at 162.
306 Id.
307 Lorraine A. Williams, Northern Intellectual Reaction to Military Rule During the Civil
War, 27 THE HISTORIAN 334, 347 (1965) (citing 7 HARPERS'S WEEKLY, May 30, 1863, at
162).
308 Id
309 Id at 346-47 (citing Ralph Waldo Emerson, American Civilization, 9 ATL. MONTHLY
508-09 (1862)).
30 See Union Pamphlets: Letter of the Committee, reprinted in 2 UNION PAMPHLETS OF
THE CIVIL WAR 741-42 (Frank Freidel ed., 1967).
" See VALLANDIGHAM TRIAL, supra note 64, at 159-68.
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In certain districts the military law is supreme. Gen[eral] Grant is in
command of an army in the State of Mississippi, which is in revolt. Will
any one deny his right to make arrests, his right to suppress newspapers
... ? No.... The great difficulty is in these districts, where rightful civil
Government is in operation, where the judicial tribunals are open and the
law respected-the laws which afford a remedy for every wrong. As a
rule, we must remember that the civil law is superior to the military law,
and the cases are rare, very rare, where the rule can be reversed. It here
resolves itself into the plain naked question of whether the President and
his Generals, by the simple clicking of the telegraph can cause the
imprisonment of A, B, or C. If one General can do it, another can do it,
and where is the end? ... [Great sensation and murmurs.] Do you
propose to interfere with the ballot-box? [Cries of "No! No!" "Never!
Never!" . . .] I am glad to hear you say that, and glad you are so
unanimous. Did it every occur to you that the next election may put an
entirely different face upon affairs?3"2
The Evening Post made a similar analysis and rejected General Burnside's claim
that the duty of civilians could be based on the rule for the military. "But he forgets,"
the Evening Post insisted, "that persons 'in the military and naval service of the
United States' are subject to military law, while the ordinary citizen is subject
exclusively to civil law." '313 Vallandigham was not a soldier nor was he in a place
where combat raged. Martial law had not "been proclaimed to exist in the
department of the Ohio," the Post continued."' But even had it "been proclaimed,
we doubt whether any authority under it can be exercised against persons who are not
immediately within the scope of active military operations." '15
A reasonable reading of the Act of Congress authorizing the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus is that Congress used the theater of war distinction. The Act
denied the immediate benefit of the privilege of habeas corpus to political prisoners
arrested by authority of the President. But in areas where the civil courts were
functioning, Congress required either indictment before the end of the term of the
grand jury or release for those who were seized.316
The National Intelligencer printed a long, detailed, and scholarly article on the
subject. It insisted that the March 1863 Habeas Act rendered Vallandigham's
military trial improper. He should have been turned over to civil authorities for trial
or release. The newspaper bolstered this conclusion by asserting that Congress had
312 Senator Trumbull's Chicago Speech, in CIN. COM., June 11, 1863, at 2.
313 The Voice of Reason, N.Y. EVENING POST, reprinted in NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, May
16, 1863, at 3.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 See An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain
Cases, ch. 81, § 2, 12 Stat. 755 (1863); The Law in the Case, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, May
20, 1863, reprinted in ATLAS & ARGUS (Albany, N.Y.: Daily), May 23, 1863, at 2.
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made the charges against Vallandigham an offense subject to jurisdiction in the
federal courts.317
In his 1951 study, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln, Professor Randall
also takes the view that the 1863 Act should have applied to cases like that of
Vallandigham. He says: "Had this law been complied with, the effect would have
been to restore the supremacy of the civil power."3 ' According to Professor Randall,
"the way was laid by congressional action for the speedy release of all citizens
against whom no violation of Federal law could be charged."3 9 He reports, however,
that the Act rarely was complied with and that Judge Advocate General Holt
construed the Act not to apply to citizens, like Vallandigham, who were arrested or
tried by the military.320
6. President Lincoln's Responses to His Critics
President Lincoln made telling use of the necessity argument in reply to his
critics. One irony is that the arrest of Vallandigham, based on supposed military
necessity, produced extensive and vehement criticism of the Lincoln administration
and open discussion of the possibility that armed resistance might become necessary.
These critics generally were not arrested.
Lincoln rejected the'claim that Vallandigham, a person who was neither in the
military nor in a theater of war, was entitled to the criminal procedure guarantees of
the Bill of Rights.32 ' Lincoln noted that the civil war was a case of rebellion and, in
such a case, the Constitution authorized the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
when public safety required it.322 Arrests by ordinary civil process and those required
in cases of rebellion were different. In the case of rebellion, "arrests are made, not
so much for what has been done, as for what probably would be done. The latter is
more for the preventive and less for the vindictive than the former. '323 In rebellions,
therefore, basic Bill of Rights guarantees did not apply because it was necessary to
restrain people who were guilty of no crime. "The man who stands by and says
nothing when the peril of his Government is discussed, cannot be misunderstood,"
Lincoln announced. "If not hindered, he is sure to help the enemy; much more, if he
317 See id See, e.g., Speech of Hon. Geo. V. N. Lothrop, Delivered at the City Hall,
Detroit (May 25, 1863), in DET. FREE PRESS, June 7, 1863, at 2 (stating that the 1863 Act
requiredthat any civilian placed under "military arrest" should receive a civil trial); Remarks
of Col. A. S. Diven at the Republican Meeting at the Capitol (May 20, 1863), in ATLAS &
ARGUS (Albany, N.Y.: Daily), May 22, 1863, at 2 (asserting that the laws established by
Congress were not applied in Vallandigham's arrest).
318 RANDALL, supra note 58, at 164.
319 Id. at 165.
320 See id. at 167.
311 See Abraham Lincoln, To Erastus Coming and Others (June 12, 1863), in LINCOLN
SPEECHES, supra note 83, at 454, 460.
322 See id. at 457.
323 See id. at 458.
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talks ambiguously-talks for his country with 'buts' and 'ifs' and 'ands."' 324 The
New Yorkers had insisted that no military arrests should be made "'outside of the
lines of necessary military occupation, and the scenes of insurrection."' 25 Lincoln
rejected the distinction: "Inasmuch, however, as the Constitution itself makes no such
distinction, I am unable to believe that there is any such constitutional distinction." '326
Lincoln denied that Vallandigham was arrested for criticism of administration
policy and of General Burnside's edict:
It is asserted, in substance, that Mr. Vallandigham was, by a military
commander, seized and tried "for no other reason than words addressed
to a public meeting, in criticism of the course of the Administration, and
in condemnation of the Military orders of the General." Now, if there be
no mistake about this; if this assertion is the truth and the whole truth; if
there was no other reason for the arrest, then I concede that the arrest was
wrong. But the arrest, as I understand, was made for a very different
reason. Mr. Vallandigham avows his hostility to the War on the part of
the Union; and his arrest was made because he was laboring, with some
effect, to prevent the raising of troops; to encourage desertions from the
army; and to leave the Rebellion without an adequate military force to
suppress it."'
In his later reply to the Ohio Democrats who demanded Vallandigham's return,
Lincoln admitted, "I certainly do not know that Mr. V. has specifically, and by direct
language, advised against enlistments, and in favor of desertion, and resistance to
drafting," but that was the effect of his words.32 "[T]his hindrance, of the military,"
Lincoln said, "including maiming and murder, is due to the course in which Mr. V.
has been engaged, in a greater degree than to any other cause; and" to Vallandigham
personally "in a greater degree than to any other one man.
Only military force could suppress the rebellion, Lincoln continued, and military
force required armies.331 "Long experience has shown," Lincoln noted, "that armies
cannot be maintained unless desertions shall be punished by the severe penalty of
death.... Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not
touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert?" 33' It was a powerful point.
Butjudging by Vallandigham's case, it applied to anti-war political speech that even
tendedto cause desertion or draft resistance-as inevitably would be true in some
cases. After all, Vallandigham repeatedly had counseled obedience of the law and
324 Id.
325 Id. at 459.
326 Id.
327 Id.
32 Abraham Lincoln, Reply to Ohio Democrats (June 29, 1863), in LINCOLN SPEECHES,
supra note 83, at 465, 468.
329 Id. at 469.
330 See Abraham Lincoln, To Erastus Coming and Others (June 12, 1863), in LINCOLN
SPEECHES, supra note 83, at 454, 460.
331 Id.
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use of the ballot box to effect change.332 Acceptance of Lincoln's bad tendency
principle, in short, seems to outlaw anti-war political speech and to put the
democratic process in abeyance for the duration of the war.
Finally, Lincoln denied that his acts would prove to be a precedent for repression
in time of peace:
I can no more be persuaded that the Government can constitutionally take
no strong measures in time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the
same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be
persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man,
because it can be shown not to be good food for a well one.333
E. The Rejoinder to the Lincoln Defense
The Democratic press promptly challenged Lincoln's defense of Vallandigham's
banishment. The Detroit Free Press debunked the claim that the military courts tried
and punished Vallandigham for encouraging desertions. "To say that [President
Lincoln] is disingenuous," the paper commented tartly, "would be to use a very mild
expression for a very strong fact." '334 In fact, the paper said, Vallandigham was tried
and convicted for violating Order No. 38 because he declared disloyal sentiments
with the object of weakening the government in its effort to suppress the rebellion.335
"Not one word," the Free Press insisted,
can be found in it accusing him of encouraging desertions. That would
be an offen[s]e against the laws for which Congress have [sic] provided
adequate punishment through the medium of the civil courts, and for
which, if he was guilty of it, he was only amenable in the loyal and
peaceable State of Ohio to those courts.336
If Vallandigham's offense was encouraging desertions, the Free Press demanded,
why was he not charged with that offense? 37
As to the President's claim that the rebellion in other states allowed military trials
in Ohio, the Free Press's response was equally acid:
In a word, Mr. Lincoln claims that he possesses absolute power where
there is no rebellion, simply because it may be necessary to exercise it
where there is-that whenever his opinion of public welfare justifies it,
332 See VALLANDIGHAM TRIAL, supra note 64, at 22-23.
333 Abraham Lincoln, To Erastus Coming and Others (June 12, 1863), in LINCOLN
SPEECHES, supra note 83, at 454, 460.
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he may strike down the laws passed by Congress in any given case, and
substitute some general order 38 in their stead.338
The New York Committee's response to the President was also printed in much
of the press and circulated as a pamphlet. New Yorkers denied that the power to
suspend habeas corpus in time of invasion or rebellion meant that Lincoln rightfully
could suspend all constitutional guarantees of liberty:
Inasmuch as this process may be suspended in time of war, you seem to
think that every remedy for a false and unlawful imprisoment [sic] is
abrogated; and from this postulate you reach, at a simple bound, the
conclusion that there is no liberty under the [C]onstitution which does not
depend on the gracious indulgence of the Executive only. This great
heresy once established, and by this mode of deduction there springs at
once into existence a brood of crimes or offenses undefined by any rule,
and hitherto unknown to the laws of the country; and this is followed by
indiscriminate arrests, midnight seizures, military commissions, unheard
of modes of trial and punishment, and all the machinery of terror and
despotism.339
The New York committee indignantly rejected the idea that such arrests were
justified because they were based on conduct or threats of injury not forbidden by the
criminal law. It quoted Lincoln's assertions that the "'arrests are made not so much
for what has been done, as for what probably would be done,"' and his claim that the
dangerousness of the man who "'says nothing when the peril of his government is
discussed,"'justified arrest.34° They highlighted Lincoln's acknowledgment that the
arrests were not for the constitutional crime of treason or "'for any capital or
otherwise infamous crimes,'' and his assertion that the arrests were not .'. in any
constitutional or legal sense criminal prosecutions. '341
These statements by the President, the committee insisted, proved just how
dangerous the claimed power was:
The very ground, then, of yourjustification is, that the victims of arbitrary
arrest were obedient to every law, were guiltless of any known or defined
offense, and therefore were without the protection of the [C]onstitution.
The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus instead of being intended to
prevent the enlargement of arrested criminals, until a legal trial and
conviction can be had, is designed, according to your doctrine, to subject
innocent men to your supreme will and pleasure. Silence itself is
punishable, according to this extraordinary theory, and still more so the
expression of opinions, however loyal, if attended with criticism upon the
338 Id.
131 President Lincoln Answered: Reply of the Albany Democracy to the President's Letter
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policy of the government. We must respectfully refuse our assent to this
theory of constitutional law. We think that men may be rightfully silent
if they choose.342
Finally, the Committee explicitly rejected the idea that the power to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus also suspended the effect of constitutional guarantees of liberty.
Arrests without warrant that violated constitutional guarantees could not "become in
any sense rightful, by reason of a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus."'343 The
"suspension of a single and peculiar remedy for such wrongs" did not "bring[] into
existence new and unknown classes of offenses, or new causes for depriving men of
their liberty." '344
IV. THE APRIL 1864 MOVE TO EXPEL AN ANTI-WAR CONGRESSMAN
Almost a year after Vallandigham's arrest, the issue of anti-war speech re-
emerged in an effort to expel a congressman for an anti-war speech made on the floor
of Congress.345 The case raised again the question of whether anti-war speech that
had the tendency to discourage the troops should be permitted. Those favoring
expulsion cited the Vallandigham case as precedent. But in the 1864 effort to expel,
two constitutional guarantees were involved: the free speech guarantee and the
guarantee that protected debate in Congress from being questioned in "any other
place." '346
Ohio representative Alexander Long concluded that the Civil War could not be
won without exterminating the people of the South. The cost of the war, in terms of
lives and suffering, fie said, was not worth the effort.347 On April 8, 1864, he
expressed these views in the House of Representatives and advocated ending the war
and recognizing the Confederacy.34 Schuyler Colfax, the Speaker of the House,
promptly made a motion to expel Representative Long for his speech.349 The
Constitution provides: "Each house may ... punish its Members for disorderly
Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member."35 A debate
on the motion to expel ensued. Eventually, Republican representative John Broomall
of Pennsylvania amended the motion to expel to one of severe censure; and the




311 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1499 et seq. (1864).
346 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (stating that "for any Speech or Debate in either House,
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349 See id at 1505-06.
350 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
311 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong. 1st Sess. 1593 (1864).
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Republicans generally spoke in favor of expulsion. Congressman Garfield of
Ohio, a former general, denounced Long as "a Benedict Arnold" who "proposes to
surrender us... to the accursed traitors."3"3 Garfield later admitted that "at the first
view of the case the right of free speech would seem to be decisive." '354 But times
and circumstances change. "What might have been said with propriety ... three
years ago [could not] be said with propriety and loyalty to-day." '355 For today,
"[e]very citizen.., is in some sense a soldier." '356
Speaker Colfax explained, "I believe in the freedom of speech," but Long had
"declared .. . in favor of the recognition of this so-called confederacy." '357 For
Representative Orth, the matter was simple enough: "A man is free to speak so long
as he speaksfor the nation," but he should not be permitted to speak "against the
nation ... on this floor."3 Failure to expel would "lead to demoralization in our
Army. . . and riots all over the land." '359
Long's case, said Representative Spaulding, was like that of Vallandigham.
Vallandigham was "'waiting and watching over the border' because he indulged in
too much license of speech. And so it must be... in Congress and out of Congress.
No citizen can be permitted to utter sentiments, in time of war, that shall distract and
dishearten our own soldiers .... "36o Earlier, on February 29, 1864, the House of
Representatives had rejected, by a party line vote, a resolution denouncing
Vallandigham's arrest and banishment. 6 ' Democrats often repudiated
Vallandigham's views and those of Long. But, New Jersey Democrat Andrew
Jackson Rogers nonetheless insisted that the Vallandigham arrest and banishment had
"struck a deadly blow at the rights of the free people of America. "362
Critics of the motion to expel insisted the issues were free speech, democracy,
and representative government. For Representative Charles Eldridge of Wisconsin,
the question "involve[d] the sacred right of free speech in general, and the right of
free parliamentary debate. 3 63 Representative Kernan, a Democrat from New York,
saw the issue as "our free system of government, and that free discussion among the
people, and free debate in our legislative bodies, without which our institutions and
3 Id. at 1503.
354 Id. at 1514.
355 Id.
356 Id. See also id. at 1539 (declaring that "[e]very man ... is... a citizen soldier" and
that soldiers were not allowed to suggest that the war could not or should not be won. This
statement was made by Representative Schenck who was a former Union general who had
defeated Vallandigham in his bid for Congress.).
357 Id. at 1506.
358 Id. at 1546.
319 Id. at 1547.
360 Id. at 1581.
361 See id at 879 (reporting that all 47 democrats voted "yea" and 76 republicans and
unionists voted "nay").
362 Id at 1621.
363 Id. at 1577.
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liberties cannot long be maintained."3" The issue of war or peace was one for
Congress and the people. Long's "erroneous views should be controverted by
arguments," '365 Kernan said, not silenced by expulsion. Kernan warned that under the
proposed course, in times of excitement, the representative who advocated unpopular
views "will be expelled and thus silenced. You will have no debate except that
which runs in the one groove." '366
Keman and others relied on the Constitution's protection for free speech. The
Constitution, he noted, provides that "'Congress shall make no law abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press."' Kernan said: "If [Long's opinions] can be
expressed or discussed anywhere in the country, they certainly may be here.... This
is the body to decide upon questions of peace or war:..." 367 New Jersey Democrat
Andrew Jackson Rogers insisted Long could not "be expelled for the exercise of any
right guarantied by the Constitution.""36 The speech would not be unlawful, in the
constitutional sense, outside of Congress, Rogers argued, because of the guarantees
of the First Amendment.369
"Are we to be told," demanded Representative William Finck of Ohio, "that the
grave questions of peace and war cannot be discussed here? What questions.., are
of greater importance to the people than questions of peace and war?"37 Finck, and
others, suggested partisan motivation was at work. Republicans were ordering
hundreds of copies of Long's offending speech, obviously planning to circulate it.37
"If that speech gives aid and comfort to the enemy," Finck asked, "why do gentlemen
on the other side of the House give so much aid and comfort to the speech?" '372 Finck
pointed out that, in 1863, Representative Conway, a Republican from Kansas, had
made the same proposal as Representative Long, but no one had demanded that he
be expelled or censured.373 Finck cited Daniel Webster's 1834 speech on the "high
constitutional privilege" of free speech.374 Representative Eldridge also cited
Webster on the "ancient and undoubted prerogative of this people to canvass public
measures" (a "fireside privilege"); and he cited Thomas Jefferson on the danger of
political intolerance and on "the safety with which enor of opinion may be tolerated
where reason is left free to combat it." 375
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Representatives on both sides did not limit themselves to the precise issue under
consideration. Eldridge, for example, warned of Republican plans for agrarian
reform and complained about the Emancipation Proclamation.376
Representative George H. Pendleton of Ohio, said that "it is not within the
constitutional power of the House to expel a member for the expression of any
opinion upon any political question, when ... pertinent to the measure before it."377
Opinions were for "constituents" who "were to decide whether they were wise and
sound.",17' To expel their representative was to "disfranchise them" and to "enact
again the farce of the British House of Commons in the case of Wilkes."" 9
Pendleton relied on the Speech and Debate Clause:
A member shall not be called in question for a libel uttered upon this
floor, nor for any offense against private rights. He is not to be
intimidated by fear of the law, whether invoked in the criminal or civil
courts... ; and, 6tfortiori, he is not to be called in question here by the
House itself for the free expression of opinion in fair debate.38 °
The power to expel, Pendleton insisted, was limited to disorderly conduct.3"' In the
1830s and 1840s, John Quincy Adams waged a long struggle to vindicate the right
to present anti-slavery petitions. 382 Pendleton recalled the attempt to censure Adams
for presenting a petition from citizens in favor of dissolution of the Union:
[Adams] rose in his place all trembling with excitement, and in one of
those historic speeches which will live as long as the history of the
English language shall remain, vindicated the right of the people to
petition for a redress of their grievances, and the right of Representatives
to present their petitions .... And he argued the question against all
comers ... until, ashamed of the efforts they had made to repress this
freedom of debate in the American Congress, the majority ... at last laid
the resolution on the table. 3
3
Several Republicans cited, as precedent for the action against Long, the censure
of Joshua R. Giddings by a Democratic Congress. Giddings had introduced a
resolution that justified the right of slaves on the high seas to rebel against their
376 See id. at 1579-80.
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captivity.384 Andrew Jackson Rogers, a Democrat from New Jersey, said that the
Giddings precedent was a bad one that he would "not justify." '385
As amended, the motion to censure did not refer explicitly to Long's speech in
the House. It cited "his open declarations in the national Capitol and publications in
the city of New York [apparently of the speech in Congress] . . . in favor of a
recognition of the so-called confederacy . "..."386 It declared him unworthy of
membership in the House.387 In the end, the motion to censure carried by a vote of
eighty to sixty-nine with Republicans generally voting "yes" and Democrats, along
with a number of Union representatives, voting "no."388
One factor leading Republicans to amend the expulsion resolution to one of
censure may have been the strongly negative reaction from the press, including many
Republican papers. (Republican representative Broomall, however, explained the
change as one motivated by the impossibility of getting a two-thirds vote.3" 9) At any
rate, press comment on the proposed expulsion was quite negative. The National
Intelligencer wrote:
We are ... glad ... that the leading organs of the Republican party...
while condemning the opinions and views of Mr. Long, propose to
answer them by the force of argument and rational appeal ... and not by
the violent proceeding of parliamentary expulsion-thereby sacrificing in
the person of Mr. Long the right of free discussion which pertains to him
as a Representative of the People ... _"
Press criticism of Republican treatment of Long, like criticism in Congress, invoked
freedom of speech as well as freedom of debate in Congress.
The New York Evening Post insisted that "Mr. Long's speech was a perfectly
legitimate expression of opinion. He thinks that the rebels must be allowed to go in
peace or be extirpated; and he stated his thought calmly and respectfully, in proper
words."39' The Post strongly disagreed with him, but it was "not, however, unwilling
that those who have come to other conclusions should have the full liberty to express
them, whether in the newspapers or on the floors of Congress." '392 Congressmen who
"controvert argument by argument," and who "present only logic, eloquence, appeal,
in favor of their views," were simply "exercising the rights which belong to all
freemen." '393 The New York Evening Post argued, rather optimistically, that truth
384 See id. at 1600. For a discussion of Gidding's censure, see MILLER, supra, note 1, at
444-54.
385 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1620 (1864).
386 Id. at 1593.
387 See id.
388 See id at 1634.
389 See id at 1593.
390 The Parliamentary Issue, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 14, 1864, at 3.
31' The Freedom of Debate, N.Y. EVENING POST, Apr. 11, 1864, reprinted in Republican
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would conquer falsehood:394 "Our laws assume the intelligence and good sense of the
people, and allow every man to be heard. They are not afraid of discussion. They
demand, indeed, the fullest and freest ventilation of every subject, that the good and
evil of it may be known.... "' Those who chose the side of "foul wrongs" could
be left safely "to the contempt of contemporaries, and to the execration of
posterity. '396
The Constitution provides that members of Congress may not be questioned "in
any other place" for speeches and debates on the floor of Congress. 97 It allows
expulsion, but does not discuss specifically expulsion of a member of Congress by
the House or Senate for political opinion expressed incongressional debate.3 98
Critics in the press looked at the spirit of the speech and debate guarantee. An
editorial in the New York Times, a strongly pro-administration paper, made explicit
what was at least implicit in many press comments:
The Constitution takes care to secure the utmost freedom of debate in
Congress by making special provision that "for any speech or debate in
either House, members shall not be questioned in any other place." What
could have been the object of this unlimited immunity but the recognized
necessity that every Representative should be in a position to do
completest justice to his own sentiments and those of his constituents?
That is a principle which lies at the foundation of every representative
Government. But why is it not as much a violation of this principle for
men in the Capitol to deter a Representative from speaking his sentiments
as for men outside the Capitol? It is the intimidation that is the evil, and
it [does not] matter a particle whence the intimidation proceeds. For any
power in Congress or out of Congress to exercise it is to violate one of the
most sacred principles of the Constitution.399
"It is the duty," the Times insisted, "of every honest legislator, when great public
concerns are at stake, to declare his honest convictions."4 0 The duty was greater "if
these convictions are opposed to the dominant sentiment. It is the weakest side that
has the strongest need of argument; for it is their only power."4 '' The claim that
Congressman Long's speech was treasonous was "preposterous.""4 2 "It is not
394 See id.
'9' Votes of Censure, N.Y. EVENING POST, Apr. 12, 1864, reprinted in Republican
Opinion, in NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 14, 1864, at 3.
396 Id.
311 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
398 See id. ("[F]or any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any
other place."). For the provision providing the power to expel a member by a two-thirds vote,
see id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
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treasonable to advocate, or question, or gainsay any construction of the Constitution.
It is not treasonable to look at the gigantic proportions of the rebellion and draw the
conclusion that it cannot be put down."4 3 In another editorial, the Times told "these
men in Washington that passion is making them mad." ' How, the Times asked, "is
it possible for true men so to misunderstand the American people as to suppose they
will submit quietly to this destruction of free debate in the council halls of the
nation?"4 5 Other papers reached similar conclusions. 6
The rejection by leading Republican papers, like the New York Times, of the
attempt to expel Long implicitly rejected the Vallandigham arrest as well. The
sentiments in each case were similar; only the location was different. If the war
power or necessity supersedes all other constitutional guarantees, or if arguing for
peace is intolerable, then it is hard to understand why Representative Long's
colleagues should have spared him. Indeed, such rationales justified Long's censure.
If the claim that necessity and war time trump constitutional rights is false, it is hard
to see why Vallandigham should have been exiled.
Of course, the speech and debate clause explicitly protects speech in Congress,
but it does not explicitly protect it from actions by Congress itself. The First
Amendment protects speech outside of Congress and, critics argued, also within
Congress.40 7 In one sense, speeches made in Congress had more potential for
mischief. Speeches made in Congress were reported in the press and often circulated
throughout the nation, while Vallandigham's May I speech reached a comparatively
small audience-at least, until his arrest. Free speech in the nation at large is
essential for representative government. So is free speech in Congress.
V. WHERE ARE THEY Now? THE CIVIL WAR RATIONALES TODAY
This section briefly looks at current legal understanding of some doctrines
involved in the cases of Vallandigham and the Chicago Times. The discussion is not
exhaustive or definitive, nor does it suggest that the issues finally have been settled.
Instead, this section simply considers some comparatively recent and relevant
decisions. The free speech tradition is ongoing. The degree of public understanding
of and support for the tradition is a crucial determinant of just how much protection
freedom of speech will have in the future. Final, definitive answers do not exist. The
law is a river, living, moving, and sometimes changing its shape.40 8
403 Id.
4' How the Rebellion is Abetted, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1864, reprinted in Republican
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A. The Bad Tendency Approach
How (in Vallandigham's case,) should the law have answered Lincoln's
powerful rhetorical question about the simple soldier boy and the wily agitator? The
problem with Lincoln's bad tendency approach-if advocacy of peaceful action to
change war policy makes one a wily agitator-is that it puts advocacy of ending a
war off limits for political debate. If one applies the rationale outside the context of
war, it is a powerful vehicle for punishing dissident speech. As Justice Brandeis
recognized, all criticism of existing law increases the likelihood of its violation.4 °9
If the tendency to cause a violation of the law or to cause other harm is enough to
suppress speech, then the circle of protected speech and the sphere of popular
government will be reduced dramatically. To cite just one example, Southerners
justified the suppression of anti-slavery speech because of its bad tendency to cause
slave revolts and disunion.10
Lincoln insisted that key constitutional values beyond free speech and the right
to a jury trial were at stake-these values included the survival of the Constitution
and of a united nation.41" ' He denied that free speech and other constitutional rights
should trump these constitutional values.4 2 He saw his role as resolving the tension
between competing claims; and for Lincoln, the proper resolution justified some
suppression of free speech.413 Throughout much of our history, courts have allowed
other values-protection of republican government from advocacy of violent
revolution and protection of impartial trials by banning newspaper criticism of
judges while cases are pending-to trump free speech claims.414 This approach to
the problem has not often been used in recent cases, but there have been powerful
calls for its revival.4"5 Under a more speech-protective analysis, the right to speak
409 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
410 See Curtis, The Curious History, supra note 16, at 802-04.
411 See Abraham Lincoln, Messages to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4
LINCOLN, supra note 40, at 421, 430; Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation Suspending the Writ
of Habeas Corpus (Sept. 24, 1862), in 5 LINCOLN, supra note 40, at 436, 437.
412 See id.
413 See id.
414 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Constitutional Tension Method, 3 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 223, 225-27 (1996).
415 For a discussion of the issue, see generally id at 223-41 (describing situations in which
free speech was forgone in favor of competing constitutional values); see also Mark A.
Graber, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Constitutional Status of Unconstitutional Speech, 48
VAND. L. REV. 349, 366-72 (1995) (discussing cases in history that used this approach);
Michael Kent Curtis, The Critics of "Free Speech" and the Uses of the Past, 12 CONST.
COMMENTARY 29 (1995) (exploring arguments in support of a radical revision of current free
speech doctrine in order to permit more extensive suppression of some forms of speech
including hate speech and pornography). For examples of what Professor Volokh calls the
"constitutional tension method," see Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 282 (1941)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating that the value of impartial judicial decisions justifies
contempt conviction of a newspaper and labor leader for criticism related to a pending case);
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freely on issues of peace and war on one hand, and the power to wage war on the
other, are respectively a constitutional privilege or immunity and a governmental
power. Allowing free speech on issues of war and peace can make pursuit of war
more difficult; but free speech does not encroach directly on the war power. Neither
should the war power be permitted to encroach on the right to use the democratic
process to discuss alternative courses of action-including abandoning the war.4 16
The Cincinnati Enquirer attempted to address the bad tendency issue. It was
quite difficult, the paper said, to identify "what sentiments have a plain or any other
tendency to stir up war in society; or to discriminate between those that have and
those that have not such tendency. Every man probably believes his own opinions
not only innocent of danger, but right and wholesome ... ."417 Remarkably, and
quite optimistically, the paper insisted that the "idea of danger as applied to sentiment
is erroneous."4 8 Like gun powder, the paper argued, sentiments were dangerous only
when confined.419
Justice Brandeis has shaped much current free speech doctrine. Brandeis wrote
in the context of suppression of political speech during and after World War I. He
suggested that the ordinary remedy must be punishment for any crime the listener
committed, not punishment of the political speaker.420 "Among free men," Justice
Brandeis said, concurring in Whitney v. California, "the deterrents ordinarily to be
applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not
abridgement of the rights of free speech and assembly."42' He also suggested that
"the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones." '422 "[E]ven advocacy of [law
breaking] ... ," he wrote, "is not a justification for denying free speech where the
advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy
would be immediately acted on." '423
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596-600 (1940) (explaining the need
for national unity as a key constitutional value that justified the expulsion of a Jehovah's
Witness child from school for refusal to salute the flag); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666-68 (1925) (asserting that the value of representative government justifies suppression
of the advocating of violence as a means of political change). Cf Patterson v. Colorado, 205
U.S. 454 (1907) (upholding a contempt citation of Patterson for newspaper criticism made
while a petition for re-hearing was pending; the criticized decision involved a truly
extraordinary abuse of power by the state supreme court). In Patterson, the Court assumed
that the First Amendment was limited to protection against prior restraint. For a lively and
important account of the facts in Patterson, see LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE
AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 1-7 (1991).
416 See Volokh, supra note 414, at 234-35.
4" Human Liberty--The Right of Speech and the Origin of Government, CIN. ENQUIRER,
Aug. 15, 1863, at 2.
418 Id.
419 See id.
420 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
421 Id. 
422 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
423 Id. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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The modern free speech doctrine is similar to the rule suggested by Justice
Brandeis. Government may not punish political speech except when it is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is clearly likely to incite or
produce such action.424 In short, at least for an anti-war speaker who does not
'directly incite imminent draft resistance, the fact that the speaker argues that a war
is unwise or evil and that some listeners may agree and later desert as a consequence
is not a sufficient basis for punishing the speaker. According to this rationale, if
anyone should be punished, it must be the soldier who deserts, not the politician who
publicly questions, even vigorously, the wisdom of a war. Otherwise, the
government could proscribe all political criticism in wartime.425 Still, the Supreme
Court has not expressly overruled some earlier and less protective decisions.426 In
times of war, civil liberty often shrinks.427
In Bond v. Floyd,428 decided during the Vietnam War, the Court held that the
Georgia legislature could not refuse to seat a recently elected member of the state
legislature who endorsed statements encouraging resistance to the draft. Bond
endorsed a Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee statement. It suggested the
war in Vietnam was "a hypocritical mask behind which [the United States] squashes
liberation movements;" that the United States was murdering the Vietnamese people;
and it expressed "support" for young men "unwilling to respond to the military
draft., 429 In his endorsement, Bond emphasized legal alternatives to military service.
In that context, the Court found that Bond had not incited violation of the draft law.
It rejected the state's argument that a higher standard of loyalty was required from
legislators than from other citizens.4 ° During the Vietnam War, of course, the threat
424 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 278 (1941) (applying a strong version of the test to convictions for
contempt of court for criticism directed at judicial action). The strong version of the clear and
present danger principle, however, did not survive when the threat of Communism seemed
great. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (redefining the principle for
purposes of prosecuting leaders of the Communist party so that the new test was the gravity
of the evil discounted by its improbability).
425 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409 (holding a statute forbidding flag burning
unconstitutional as applied to political speech); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-26
(1971) (holding the slogan "Fuck the Draft" on a jacket protected under certain
circumstances); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
426 See, e.g., Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (holding the gravity of the evil of a communist
revolution in the United States discounted by its improbability justified punishing advocacy
of revolution).
427 See, e.g., id; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding executive
order for incarceration of West Coast Japanese Americans). For antecedents of the current
approach, see Whitney, 274 U.S. at 378 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Cf Masses Pub. Co. v.
Patten, 244 F. 535 (1917) (granting a preliminary injunction against a postmaster who had
refused to deliver plaintiffs publication voicing opposition to World War I).
428 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
429 Id at 120.
430 See id. at 133-35.
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to the nation (if there ever was a truly significant one) was much more remote. In
addition, at the time of the Vietnam War, the free speech tradition had stronger
support in the Supreme Court and in the nation than in Vallandigham's time.
B. Prior Restraint
By our current understanding of the First Amendment, an order suppressing an
entire newspaper, as opposed to prosecution for a particular violation of the law,
would be highly suspect. In the Pentagon Papers case, the Court refused to enjoin
the publication of the classified papers that discussed the origins of the Vietnam
War.43' Closure of an entire newspaper for publishing offending articles goes well
beyond the suppression of the few articles that the government unsuccessfully sought
in the Pentagon Papers case. Closing a newspaper was an affront even to the
narrowest reading of the First Amendment.
C. Trials by Military Commission
After the Civil War ended, the Supreme Court decided Exparte Milligan. 32 It
held that trials by military commissions of persons who were not residents of
rebellious states, prisoners of war, or in the military, were not constitutionally
permissible in states that had not been invaded, that were not in rebellion, and where
the civil courts were functioning. The Court insisted that martial law must be
confined to the location of actual war and it doubted that Indiana (where Milligan
was arrested) was in the theater of war.433 While the government had the physical
power to arrest, and the Constitution permitted it to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus, the Court concluded that a jury trial and a grand jury indictment were
required before conviction.
In the emergency of the times, an immediate public investigation
according to law may not be possible; and yet, the peril to the country
may be too imminent to suffer such persons to go at large.
Unquestionably, there is then an exigency which demands that the
government, if it should see fit in the exercise of a proper discretion to
make arrests, should not be required to produce the persons arrested in
answer to a writ of habeas corpus. The Constitution goes no further. It
does not say after a writ of habeas corpus is denied a citizen, that he shall
be tried otherwise than by the course of the common law; if it had
intended this result, it was easy by the use of direct words to have
43" New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
432 71 U.S. 2 (1866). For a careful discussion of Ex parte Milligan, see STANLEY I.
KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 90-95 (1968).
433 See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 123-27. Four justices concurred and found that Milligan was
entitled to discharge under the 1863 Act authorizing and regulating habeas suspension. The
concurring justices denied that Congress lacked the constitutional power to authorize trials
by military commission in these circumstances. Id. at 132, 136.
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accomplished it. The illustrious men who framed that instrument were
guarding the foundations of civil liberty against the abuses of unlimited
power; they were full of wisdom, and the lessons of history informed
them that a trial by an established court, assisted by an impartial jury, was
the only sure way of protecting the citizen against oppression and wrong.
Knowing this, they limited the suspension to one great right, and left the
rest to remain forever inviolable.434
It was the "birthright of every American citizen when charged with crime, to be tried
and punished according to law.... By the protection of the law human rights are
secured; withdraw that protection, and they are at the mercy of wicked rulers, or the
clamor of an excited people. '435 The Court also interpreted the Habeas Corpus Act
of 1863436 to require release of civilians, like Milligan, whom the military had
arrested if the grand jury had not indicted them by the end of its term.437
During World War II, however, in another time of deep crisis, President Franklin
Roosevelt, also relying on a general, ordered the evacuation and incarceration of
Americans of Japanese descent who lived on the west coast. The Supreme Court
upheld the relocation order.4 38 During the Korean War, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. V. Sawyer,439 however, the Supreme Court held that the power of the president
as commander in chief did not permit him to seize the steel mills. The Court did not
consider American steel mills to be part of the theater of the Korean War.4 One
explanation for the disparity may be that the threat seemed far greater in World War
II than in the Korean War. In the Korean War, the President had an alternative to
seizure in the Taft-Hartley Act.
44
'
D. The Crime of Silence
In his reply to the New Yorkers' protest against Vallandigham's arrest, President
Lincoln said: "The man who stands by and says nothing when the peril of his
government is discussed, cannot be misunderstood. If not hindered, he is sure to help
the enemy; much more if he talks ambiguously-talks for his country with 'buts' and
'ifs' and 'ands. ' ' 44 1 In this passage, Lincoln seemed to suggest that a person who
hears, for example, the remarks for which Vallandigham was convicted and who does
414 Id. at 125-26.
415 Id. at 119.
436 An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain
Cases, ch. 81, § 2, 12 Stat. 755 (1863).
431 See id. at 136.
438 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
439 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
440 See id. at 587. See generally TRIBE, supra note 170, at 239-40 (discussing the decision
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.).
441 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (West 1988).
442 Abraham Lincoln, To Erastus Coming and Others (June 12, 1863), in LINCOLN
SPEECHES, supra note 83, at 454, 458.
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not dissent, should be arrested. Still, Lincoln seems not to have acted on this
principle.
On the eve of World War II, public schools expelled Jehovah's Witness children
for refusing to salute the flag." 3 At first, the Supreme Court upheld the expulsions
in Minersville School District v. Gobitis."4 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court,
explained that the state reasonably could conclude that the flag salute promoted
national unity, and that national unity was necessary for national survival. a"5 Indeed,
Justice Frankfurter quoted Lincoln. The Minersville case, he explained, was an
illustration of Lincoln's profound dilemma: "Must a government of necessity be too
strong for the liberties of its people, or too weak to maintain its won existence?"
4 46
Frankfurter used this idea to justify expelling young children from public school
when their religious convictions taught them it was wrong to salute the flag.
In the midst of World War II, the Court reconsidered its decision. In West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,"' the Court held that the expulsion
for refusal to salute the flag violated the First Amendment right against being
compelled to speak. "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation," the
Court said,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens
to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us."
8
To the extent that the Court adheres to Barnette and its progeny, the crime of failure
to dissent from "disloyal" political opinions would be unconstitutional.449
E. Expulsion of a Congressman for Political Opinions
In Bond v. Floyd, the Court held that the Georgia legislature's refusal to seat
Julian Bond violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.5 ' The Court said that
state power could not "be utilized to restrict the right of legislators to dissent from
national or state policy or that of a majority of their colleagues under the guise of
judging their loyalty to the Constitution." '451 It was beyond question that "the First
Amendment protects expressions in opposition to national foreign policy in Vietnam
... See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599-600 (1940).
444 See id.
441 See id. at 595-96.
446 Id. at 596.
447 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
448 Id. at 642.
441 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding that "the right of
freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment... includes.., the right to refrain
from speaking at all").
450 See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 132-33 (1966).
411 Id. at 132.
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and to the Selective Service system."452 The Court rejected the state's argument that
a statement like Bond's might be protected for a private citizen by the First
Amendment, but that the legislature could apply a stricter standard to its members.453
To the extent that the Court adheres to the rationale in Bond v. Floyd and applies it
to Congress (a co-equal branch of government), an expulsion like that the Congress
attempted to apply to Representative Long would be unconstitutional. Though the
Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to expel, the Supreme Court
should hold that an expulsion for political advocacy in debate violates the express
limits of the First Amendment and the basic structure of republican government just
as other congressional powers are subject to constitutional limitations.454 Of course,
the Court might find instead that the question is committed solely to the discretion
of Congress and, therefore, is a political question beyond the power of the Court.45
Such an approach would permit a majority to expel members of the minority simply
because of their political philosophies.
VI. REFLECTIONS
A. Democracy and the War Power
The Vallandigham and Chicago Times cases pitted free speech against the power
of the President as commander in chief. The most powerful argument for free speech
during war came from the nature of the United States government-from democracy.
This free speech argument insisted that democracy entailed the right of the people
who will be affected by government policy to attempt to persuade other citizens to
change it. Because the right was a continuing one, government policy must always
be open to criticism and revision. The agency metaphor captured at least part of this
idea.456 In that metaphor, the people were the principal, government officials were
the agents, and free speech, free press, and free assembly were the only means the
principal could use to communicate their wishes and decide to replace governmental
452 Id.
453 See id.
414 For cases citing Bond see, for example, Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1302
(1997) (holding that mandatory drug tests for state legislators violated the Fourth
Amendment); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387-91 (1987) (finding that termination
of an employee who "serves no confidential, policymaking, or public contact role," cannot
be based on the fact that the employee's speech may be interpreted as contrary to the
employer's "mission"); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (citing Bond, 385
U.S. at 134). Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969) (finding that refusal to
seat congressmen for misbehavior-as opposed to seeking expulsion-is a violation of
Article I).
418 See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (finding that textual
commitment of the sole power of impeachment to the Senate and other factors precluded
judicial review of the mode of trial of impeachment of a federal judge).
456 See supra notes 219-26 and accompanying text; see also infra note 457 and
accompanying text.
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agents. Government policy cannot legitimately foreclose free speech because that
foreclosure would rob the people of their collective right to determine their fate and
their individual right to try to persuade others to change course. By this
understanding, individuals retain a personal right to speak even though the majority
may decide it has heard enough and wants to shut them up. Though popular
sovereignty is a metaphor and, therefore, highlights one aspect of the truth while
hiding others, the aspect it highlights is powerful and important.
In setting out these principles, critics of suppression of speech were correct. In
representative government, people have a right to seek to control their fate both by
deciding who should represent them and by keeping their representatives informed
of their needs and desires. People liable to be conscripted, shot, maimed, or killed,
and people who are likely to have these things happen to friends and loved ones,
should have a continuing right to consider the wisdom of the war in which the
government demands such sacrifices. The alternative is to turn the lives of the many
over to the unchecked and unscrutinized power of a few. Free speech is essential to
preserving the structure of representative government under the Constitution, and it
reflects the basic right of individuals to talk about crucial issues that shape their lives.
At first blush, the idea that democracy precludes majority suppression of
minority arguments may seem paradoxical. But, a people deprived of a continuing
right to evaluate alternatives, is a people deprived of their right to chart their own
course. As Friedrich Von Hayek has noted, one should not confuse what the law is
with what the law ought to be:
If democracy is to function, it is as important that [what the law is] can
always be ascertained as that [what the law ought to be] can always be
questioned. Majority decisions tell us what people want at the moment,
but not what it would be in their interest to want if they were better
informed; and, unless [majority decisions] could be changed by
persuasion, they would be of no value. The argument for democracy
presupposes that any minority opinion may become a majority one.457
Daniel Voorhees, a Democratic member of the House of Representatives from
Indiana during the Civil War, insisted that the question involved in cases like that of
Vallandigham was an old one:
It involves the old struggle for power between the governors and the
governed-the rulers and those who are ruled.
In a Government of kings, the theory is that all power comes from
him and is derived from him. But the theory of this Government is quite
different from that. It is that all power is derived from the people, and
that the people are the only source of power.45
'57 FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 109 (1960). See also
American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Free speech has been
on balance an ally of those seeking change.").
458 Speech of Daniel W. Voorhees at Bucyrus, Crawford County, O[hio] (Sept. 15, 1863),
in CIN. COM., Sept. 17, 1863, at 1.
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The problem, of course, was the Unionists' fear that it was difficult and
dangerous to adhere to free speech and popular sovereignty norms in time of war.
This was especially so in a civil war, a "rebellion," in which the Constitution
permitted suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The proponents
of free speech attempted to address this dilemma by distinguishing, first, between
soldiers and civilians and, second, between areas where military operations were
ongoing and areas where civil courts and other civil institutions continued to
function. For free speech advocates, free speech was a fundamental right to be
preserved, if at all possible. Free speech was also described as a limited area where
the government lacked power.
Lincoln's critics insisted that the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus-to suspend one remedy for unlawful arrest-should not be taken as
broadly supporting the right to suspend free speech. A second argument was that
suspension could be justified only in the theater of war when the civil courts are not
in operation. Conversely, the suspension was not justified outside the area of
immediate conflict where the courts could function. This reading narrowly construes
the justification for suspension---"shall not be suspended, unless when, in Cases of
Rebellion ... the public Safety may require it" 459 --and limits the cases in which
necessity can be found. The response, of course, is that the language of the Habeas
Clause referred to cases of rebellion when the public safety required suspension and
did not explicitly refer to whether the courts could function or whether the speech
occurred in the theater of war. Lincoln insisted that the military could act
preventively in the interest of public safety.46°
A clear tension exists between Lincoln's reading of the Habeas Clause and the
structural idea of representative government with guarantees of freedom of speech,
press, petition, and assembly. The amendments in the Bill of Rights came after the
Constitution's Habeas Clause; and the Fifth Amendment provision for grand jury
indictment expressly excepted cases "arising in the land or naval forces ... when in
actual service, in time of War, or public danger. '461' No express exception was made
for trial of civilians in wartime or time of public danger. Nor was an exception made
to free speech guarantees. Because of the centrality of free speech to individual
freedom and democratic decision making, those who rejected the government's broad
claim of power to suppress free speech even during civil war were correct.
Suppose Lincoln were correct about the power to suspend the writ. Suppose he
could constitutionally use the suspension to arrest civilians outside areas of conflict
for political speech advocating peaceful change. Still, that fact would not justify the
course the Lincoln administration pursued. The power to detain without trial should
not justify convicting and banishing people after a military trial by a stacked court.
That is particularly so because of the stigma that a conviction for disloyalty entails.
In addition, the argument justifying the Vallandigham arrest because of the power to
459 U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2.
460 See Abraham Lincoln, To Erastus Coming and Others (June 12, 1863), in LINCOLN
SPEECHES, supra note 83, at 458.
461 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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suspend the writ is weakened by the fact that the attorney for the government and the
trial judge in Vallandigham's case did not rely on the Habeas Clause to justify the
arrest, trial, and conviction. 62 Instead, they relied on the war power.463 Furthermore,
there is a powerful argument that the power to suspend is, at least, one shared by the
president and Congress. If that is so, then Congress can limit the power.4" It is hard
to see why the congressional statute limiting suspension of the privilege by providing
for indictment or release at the end of the grand jury term should not control.
Many critics expressed faith that truth would conquer error.465 The critics'
rhetoric about truth conquering error was overstated. Truth does not always conquer
error, and many exposed to false doctrine may never be exposed to counter-speech.
There is, however, reason to believe that better decisions are more likely to come
from debate and counter-speech than from an enforced orthodoxy that uses
punishment to silence dissenters. As Justice Brandeis suggested, counter-speech is
the fitting remedy for error, even though it is far from perfect.466
Free speech advocates confronted the powerful argument that national survival
was at stake and that necessity was the highest law.467 According to this view, the
war power trumped all other rights for the duration of the war or rebellion.46
President Lincoln argued along these lines, although he relied on the fact of rebellion
and the constitutional provision allowing suspension of the privilege of habeas
corpus.469 Indeed, Lincoln saw the Civil War as a war against democracy, a war
launched by a minority that refused to accept the verdict of the people. "It continues
to develop," Lincoln told Congress in 1861, "that the insurrection is largely... a war
upon the first principle of popular government.""47
He was convinced that, in cases of rebellion, the Constitution permitted strong
but temporary measures to save democracy. He could no more believe that military
arrests in time of rebellion would lead to the loss of "[p]ublic [d]iscussion, the
[l]iberty of [s]peech and the [p]ress" in the peaceful future, than he could "believe
that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness
as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life."47'
The limits of Lincoln's compelling metaphor appeared in the arrests of critics of
World War I.472 Then, arrests were based on statutes and enforced by civil courts.
42 See VALLANDIGHAM TRIAL, supra note 64, at 105-06, 259-72.
463 Id at 105-06.
464 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
465 See supra text accompanying notes 236, 375.
466 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
467 See supra text accompanying notes 300, 303.
468 See id
469 See supra text accompanying note 40.
470 Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1861), in LINCOLN SPEECHES,
supra note 83, at 279, 295.
47' Abraham Lincoln, To Erastus Coming and Others (June 12, 1863), in LINCOLN
SPEECHES, supra note 83, at 454, 460-61.
472 For a conservative historian's comparison of World War I and Civil War "disloyalty"
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In World War I, the Court used a war-time-is-different analysis and misplaced
metaphors about shouting fire in a crowded theater tojustify suppression of speech.7 3
There was no rebellion or invasion. The danger was far less than it had been during
the Civil War. Nonetheless, the nation returned to the strong medicine of
suppressing political criticism for a much less acute illness.
Still, Lincoln was unwilling to carry his rebellion-war power logic to its ultimate
conclusion which would have justified suspending elections. On October 19, 1864,
Lincoln responded to those who had suggested that, even if the Democrats should
win, he would not accept electoral defeat. 474 "I am struggling," Lincoln said, "to
maintain government, not to overthrow it."4 7 Therefore, he would serve until the end
of his term and no longer unless he was re-elected:
This is due to the people both on principle, and under the [C]onstitution.
Their will, constitutionally expressed, is the ultimate law for all. If they
should deliberately resolve to have immediate peace even at the loss of
their country, and their liberty, I know not the power or the right to resist
them. It is their own business, and they must do as they please with their
own. I believe, however, they are still resolved to preserve their country
and their liberty; and in this, in office or out of it, I am resolved to stand
by them.476
On November 10, 1864, Lincoln elaborated his conclusion.477 An election in the
midst of a great civil war was dangerous because it divided a nation that needed all
of its strength to put down the rebellion.478 In spite of the danger, Lincoln said "the
election was a necessity. '479 He continued: "[w]e can not have free government
without elections; and if the rebellion could force us to forego, or postpone a national
election, it might fairly claim to have already conquered and ruined us.
480
It is equally true that we cannot have free elections without free speech.
Ultimately, the legitimacy of the government depends on the theory of popular
sovereignty which requires free elections and free speech. Lincoln was right about
elections and wrong about anti-war speech. His justification of Vallandigham's
arrest was a serious departure from a fundamental principle that he otherwise
acknowledged.
When Vallandigham was nominated for governor, the tension between his arrest
and democracy became acute. The mayor of Cincinnati gave a speech to the police,
issues, see William A. Dunning, Disloyalty in Two Wars, 24 AM. HIST. REV. 625 (1919).
' See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
47' Abraham Lincoln, Response to Serenade (Washington, D.C.) (Oct. 19, 1864), in
LINCOLN SPEECHES, supra note 83, at 635, 635.
475 Id.
476 Id. at 635-36.
171 See Abraham Lincoln, Response to a Serenade (Washington, D.C.) (Nov. 10, 1864),
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insisting on equality of treatment for members of both political parties. The police
must not, he warned, "permit personal feeling or prejudice to move you to arrest the
members of one political party rather than those of another."4"' He elaborated: "[i]n
other words, you must not arrest a man for huzzaing for Vallandigham any more than
you would if he did so for Brough [the Union candidate]. It is no offense for a
citizen to give utterance to his preference for any candidate ... . If
Vallandigham's speech could be punished, however, why were voters free to cheer
for him and his ideas or to vote for him? If, as Lincoln suggested, silence in the face
of disloyal sentiments justified arrest, why was cheering protected?
Lincoln failed to come to grips with the extent to which arrests like
Vallandigham's threatened the value of popular rule that he cherished. Basically, he
accepted the idea that the bad tendency of speeches like Vallandigham's and the
importance of other constitutional values justified suppression. That, read in the
context of the Vallandigham case, was the meaning of his powerful question: "Must
I shoot a simple soldier boy who deserts but not touch one hair on the head of the
wily agitator who induces him to desert? '" 48
3
Acceptance and full implementation of Lincoln's principle would outlaw anti-
war political speech and put the democratic process in abeyance for the duration of
the war. That is so because a strong criticism of war will, as advocates of suppression
insist, increase the number of those who are unwilling to risk their lives for the cause.
Silencing the anti-war politician rather than disciplining the deserter, however, ends
democracy in wartime. The threat to democracy and to the strong negative reaction
it produced, may be why such suppression never became more pervasive during the
Civil War.
Suppression poses dangers because it threatens the function of free speech as a
framework for democracy. Free speech, like democracy, is a process, not a result.
Broad rules to ensure that people will pick only wise leaders or that they will select
only wise ideas cannot be achieved without weakening the framework of democracy.
The logic of repression calls for more repression. After the original speaker is
silenced, what about those who denounce the silencer as a despot? Once one side
treats elections or political speech as subject to suspension, there is a danger that,
when circumstances change, the other side will respond in kind-destroying the
democratic process. Departures from the principle of faith in the people to choose
most often occur in the transition from autocratic to democratic government, and for
a limited time. Disfranchisement also has occurred after civil wars, including that of
the United States. In short, departure from the free speech tradition has serious long-
term risks.
Vallandigham's speech was made at a political rally. He counseled obedience
to the laws. It was a far cry from a situation such as a mob outside a jail when a
speaker cries, "break down the doors and lynch him." In that situation, immediate
481 Address of the Mayor to the Police, in CIN. COM., Aug. 20, 1863, at 2.
482 Id.
483 Abraham Lincoln, To Erastus Coming and Others (June 12, 1863), in LINCOLN
SPEECHES, supra note 83, at 454, 460.
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harm is likely to occur, and there is no real chance for counter-speech. It is true,
however, that some may never hear pro-war counter-speech and that some may
decide to resist the draft.
B. Necessity Revisited
Even in the great crisis of the Civil War when the argument of necessity was the
most compelling, leaders seem to have exaggerated, for public consumption at least,
the necessity of suppressing Vallandigham's anti-war speech. 4 Furthermore, the
Constitution, as read by Lincoln, only justified Vallandigham's arrest if "public
safety" required it. Ultimately, someone must judge; and Lincoln insisted that he was
the judge. Still, it is hard to distinguish the Vallandigham case from that of the
Chicago Times; and it is important to note the significant doubt in the Cabinet about
necessity in either case. The editors of the New York Tribune admitted they could not
"harmonize the decision of the Executive in this [Chicago Times] case with
[Lincoln's] action in regard to Vallandigham. '' 485 The writer concluded, however,
that it was better to be inconsistently right than consistently wrong. 6 While there
are legal differences between the two cases, the New York Tribune was largely
correct.
The approach taken in the two cases was not consistent. Vallandigham made a
speech at a political rally. The Chicago Times and other newspapers reached at least
as many people. People hearing an anti-war speech in Ohio or in the congressional
galleries, or reading an anti-war newspaper article or a report of an anti-war speech
in Congress were probably all equally likely to conclude that the war was not worth
the risk to their lives and to refuse to serve.
The administration was not limited to either suppressing Vallandigham's anti-
war speech or doing nothing. It could sanction unlawful acts and incitement highly
likely to lead to immediate lawlessness.
After the Vallandigham episode, Lincoln sometimes acted to restrain generals
like Burnside from interfering with free speech and free press; and officers similarly
restrained their troops. These restraints may have been pragmatic; but they may also
have involved a recognition by Lincoln of the relation between free speech and
democratic government. Lincoln's restraint, except in the case of the Chicago Times,
was often done in private; but his validation of the Vallandigham arrest and
conviction was highly public.
Lincoln's response to his New York critics concerning Vallandigham's arrest
was a great political success.487 Lincoln biographer David Donald estimates that
484 For a thoughtful and somewhat more sympathetic appraisal, see Don E. Fehrenbacher,
The Paradoxes of Freedom, in LINCOLN IN TEXT AND CONTEXT: COLLECTED ESSAYS 129-42
(1987).
485 Burnside-The President-The True Course, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., June 6, 1863, at 4.
486 See id.
48'7 Lincoln's response was published by the New York Tribune and other papers, and at
least 500,000 pamphlet copies were printed. See DONALD, supra note 41, at 444.
1998],
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
10,000,000 people read it.4 8 The President's defense even impressed some skeptics.
The New York Tribune found the President's defense of his constitutional power
complete and satisfactory; yet, the paper insisted that exercising the power was
unwise.489 By his politically potentjustification of suppression and by tolerating (for
a time) significant suppression of speech and press, Lincoln injured the free speech
tradition.
C. The Power of the Free Speech Tradition
The high public regard.for freedom of speech and concern for the relation of free
speech to popular government kept the repression from becoming more extensive.
The Detroit Free Press probably was right in attributing Lincoln's decision to revoke
the suppression of the Chicago Times, at least in part, to the "force of public
opinion-the fear of consequences. '49° The strong negative reaction to the
Vallandigham case probably led Lincoln to restrain General Burnside in the case of
the Chicago Times. Americans' support for, and use of, free speech checked and
limited the administration. A strong, popular free speech tradition, therefore, can be
important in checking the tendency to suppress.
Important concepts in the free speech tradition were a broad and general right to
free speech that entailed equality of rights and specific protection for speech that was
thought to be evil, wrong, or dangerous. As a result, many Republicans and
opponents of slavery stood up to protect the rights of Vallandigham and the Chicago
Times, believing that assaults on their rights ultimately threatened the liberty of all.
The Washington correspondent of the National Anti-Slavery Standard warned that
administration policy imperiled the idea of free speech:
Let the Democrats ... obtain power and make a compromise with the
rebels upon the basis of a pro-slavery government, it would instantly be
claimed that the good of the country required that all agitation of the
question of slavery must cease .... It is the good of the country which
now justifies the suppression of Copperhead journals. Necessity is the
plea.4
91
Wirt Dexter, the Republican lawyer who spoke against the suppression of the
Chicago Times, made the point directly: "[W]ithout any remarkable foresight, I can
see that this thing may return to plague the inventors of it.... I don't wish to see this
kind of treatment turned upon the party of which I am a member., 492 Republican
senator Lyman Trumbull asked in a speech defending his opposition to the
488 See id.
489 See The President's Letter, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., June 16, 1863, at 4.
490 What Will He Do With It?, DET. FREE PRESS, June 9, 1863, at 2.
411 Our Washington Correspondence, NAT'L ANTI-SLAVERY STAND., June 13, 1863, at 3
(suggesting that there should be no interference with the press except by law and through the
courts).
492 Free Speech-Free Press: Immense Meeting at Chicago, CHI. TIMES, June 5, 1863,
reprinted in DET. FREE PRESS, June 6, 1863, at I.
[Vol. 7:1
ANTI-WAR SPEECH IN THE CIVIL WAR
suppression of the Chicago Times: "Did it every occur to you that the next election
may put an entirely different face upon affairs?" '493 In reference to the same case,
Congressman Arnold explained that he did not want to
"aid in the establishment of [a] precedent which will limit my freedom of
speech, nor prevent my declaring what I believe, that the cursed spirit of
Human Slavery is the cause of all our troubles, and that we shall never
have permanent peace and union until it has been destroyed. 494
Under this view, free speech, like an election, is a framework for political choice, not
a result. Suppression of political freedom of speech threatened the framework in a
very basic way.
There is, of course, another way to read the evidence. One could see arguments
about free speech as strategic political rhetoric employed by partisans when
handy-as a weapon for political advantage, not a principle to be followed.
Professor Stanley Fish suggests that general free speech principles do not exist. Free
speech instead is "the name we give to verbal behavior that serves the substantive
agendas we wish to advance." 491 "[C]ontest the[] relevance" of free speech principles
fashioned by your enemy, Professor Fish advises, "but if you manage to refashion
them in line with your purposes, urge them with a vengeance. 496
A cynic could read the battle over anti-slavery and anti-war speech from Fish's
point of view. The Vallandigham case reveals some remarkable inconsistencies. The
Republican Party came to power as the party of free speech. It protested state and
national attempts to suppress anti-slavery speech. Southerners and some Democrats
invoked the bad tendency test, constitutional protections provided for slavery, the
need to protect the feelings and reputations of slaveholders, and the danger of slave
revolts and civil war to justify suppression of anti-slavery literature. In the
Vallandigham case, Democrats demanded free speech for critics of the war policy of
the administration, and Republicans (to justify suppression) pointed out its dangers
and bad tendencies, and invoked the power to suppress rebellion.
As these bad tendency arguments show, speech, including protected speech, can
and does threaten harm. To confine freedom of speech to certifiably harmless
speech, however, is to reduce the scope and benefit of free speech and the scope of
the democratic process. Enforced silence also threatens great harm.
In the 1830s, many Democrats were advocating expulsion or censure of anti-
slavery congressmen for speeches made in Congress. 497 In 1864, the shoe was on the
other foot-Republicans were attempting to expel a Democrat for anti-war speeches
'9' Senator Trumbull's Chicago Speech, in CIN. COM., June 11, 1863, at 2.
144 The Chicago Times Case, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., June 16, 1863, at 4 (quoting Congressman
Arnold's public address asking the President to give serious consideration to the revocation
of the suppression of the Chicago Times).
411 STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING As FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING
Too 102 (1994).
496 Id. at 114.
497 See supra text accompanying notes 383-84.
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and citing the censure of an anti-slavery congressman as a precedent.49 In 1863 and
1864, both parties gleefully pointed out the inconsistencies of their adversaries.4 99
In his reply to the New York Democrats, Lincoln pointed to the case of General
Andrew Jackson. 0 Jackson had continued martial law in New Orleans after the
peace treaty of 1814." An editor had criticized him, and Jackson arrested the
editor." 2 A judge issued a writ of habeas corpus, and Jackson arrested the judge. He
did pay the $1,000 fine the judge later imposed on him.03 Nearly thirty years later,
Stephen A. Douglas, another Democratic saint, induced Congress to remit the fine.5"
Clearly, Democratic sensitivity to civil liberty had increased during the Civil War.
The National Intelligencer noted the inconsistencies and took a thoughtful view:
It is easy to perceive that many who now raise their voice in vehement
championship of "free speech" are seeking rather to subserve the interests
of party than to promote the ends ofjustice and patriotism. It is from the
midst of such mingled motives that truth nearly always emerges, for it is
difficult to separate a good cause from the infirmities of the men into
whose hands it is suffered to fall. But if the Administration will not do
homage to the law it must be content to see its opponents profit by such
suicidal recreancy.0 5
In both the Vallandigham episode and in earlier controversy over anti-slavery
speech, however, a number of people invoked free speech principles despite
inconsistency with their general political agendas. In the 1830s, dissident Northern
Democrats and border state Whigs had refused to vote for a law banning anti-slavery
publications from the mails."° Anti-abolition newspapers (as the New York Evening
Post then was) and a number of Democrats stood up for free speech for
abolitionists.0 7 Many Republicans and Republican newspapers rejected the
Vallandigham arrest and the suppression of the Chicago Times. Republican attorney,
Wirt Dexter, spoke against the military suppression of the Chicago Times. "[A] man
who refuses to act in a crisis like this," he said "because in so doing he may
incidentally rescue his political opponent, is a demagogue and unworthy [of] the
name of citizen." ' 8 In short, many. believed free speech entailed basic principles
more important than short term partisan advantage, and their belief was an important
491 See id
499 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 76-77, 272-82.
500 Abraham Lincoln, To Erastus Coming and Others (June 12, 1863), in LINCOLN
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factor in protecting freedom of speech from far more extensive suppression. These
people and the tradition they adhered to were important protectors of free speech at
a time when the courts provided little if any protection.
D. The Legacy of Suppression
From the point of view of a believer in powerful principles of free speech, the
positive significance of the Vallandigham case is that strong public commitment to
broad free speech rights helped to contain and limit repression. Still, the Lincoln
administration's departure from free speech principles had both short and long-term
negative consequences. For example, Lincoln's idea that rebellion justified
suppression of Vallandigham's anti-war speech may have had a considerable
influence on the Supreme Court justices during World War I, including Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. In 1919, Justice Holmes upheld the jailing of Eugene Debs, the
socialist politician and labor leader, for making an anti-war speech. 9 Other anti-war
advocates met a similar fate.5"0 "When a nation is at war," Justice Holmes wrote in
Schenck v. United States, "many things that might be said in time of peace.., will
not be endured... l The principle Lincoln invoked for "rebellion" slid easily into a
principle for wartime generally. Indeed, supporters of the administration often
invoked the war power in general.
Holmes had fought for the Union in the Civil War. The controversy over the
Vallandigham case and Lincoln's reply likely were etched in his memory. In an 1863
oration supporting broad power for the president to combat the rebellion, Holmes'
father announced that "fear of tyranny" was merely "a phantasm conjured up by the
imagination of the weak acted on by the craft of the cunning."5"2 So suppression of
conservative and reactionary anti-war speech during the Civil War may well have
paved the way for suppression of progressive and socialist anti-war speech during
World War I. The Lincoln administration's punishment of anti-war speech was the
first federal criminal prosecution of political speech since the nation repudiated the
Sedition Act.
There was an ugly side to the suppression of anti-war speech in the Civil War.
Treating such speech as illegitimate or treasonous encouraged mob violence. For
example, Union soldiers unsuccessfully attempted to break up the Albany Meeting
held to protest Vallandigham's arrest. They rushed the stage, attempted to drive off
the speakers, and smashed chairs."' Simply put, they attempted to deny free speech
to people meeting to protest a denial of free speech.
509 See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
510 See Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919).
5" Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52; see Dunning, supra note 472, at 625.
512 Williams, supra note 307, at 346-47 (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, ORATION
DELIVERED BEFORE THE CITY AUTHORITIES AT BOSTON 5 (Philadelphia, 1863)).
"' See, e.g., Sympathy for Vallandigham's Treason in Albany: Gov. Seymour Exciting
Citizens Against the Government, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., May 18, 1863, at 5.
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The correspondent of the Cincinnati Commercial reported from the Democratic
convention in Indiana. His report included the following account:
[Y]oung fellows, in soldiers' clothes, but with no arms, and having no
authority to make arrests, . . . perambulated through the crowd, and
whenever they heard any one expressing butternut sentiments, such as
disapproval of Vallandigham's sentence, opposition to the war, etc., they
would say, "We can't allow this; it is in violation of Order No 38." or
something of the kind, and if he uttered another word, of the kind, they
would nab him by the arms or collar, and march him up street, to
headquarters, with an immense crowd following."'
In another incident, convalescent soldiers seized a group of Vallandigham delegates
returning from a state Democratic convention and forced them to kneel and take an
oath of allegiance.5 Other incidents also occurred: "A butternut [a phrase used for
Vallandigham supporters] was hung until almost lifeless, by a crowd of excited
citizens ... for traitorous language. He was allowed to go home alive." '516 Frank
Klement reports that in Ohio in 1864, "[t]he Democratic Press at Wauseon was
destroyed by 'a mob of soldiers."' 17 A few weeks later, soldiers destroyed the
printing plant of the Dayton Empire and threatened to hang the editor. On March 5,
1864, soldiers and civilians mobbed the Greenville Democrat."' Meanwhile
authorities attempted to control excesses produced, in part, by their own actions and
rhetoric." 9
Mark Neely, in his study of civil liberty during the Civil War, concluded that
there were about 14,000 arrests of civilians after February 1862, but he finds most
were not aimed at suppressing political opponents. Instead, they were designed to
advance the war and protect enlistment and conscription. 2 The Vallandigham case,
Neely insists, was simply not representative of most arrests. It is true, however, that
the Ohio papers were full of reports of arrests, under the orders of General Burnside,
for expression of unspecified disloyal sentiments. Both before and after
Vallandigham's arrest, throughout the nation, the administration suppressed
newspapers, banned them from the mails, and arrested editors. 2 ' As a result of
514 Unauthorized Arrests, CIN. COM., May 22, 1863, at 2.
"' See From Columbus, CIN. COM., June 13, 1863, at 3.
516 From Indianapolis, CIN. COM., June 13, 1863, at 3.
7 Klement, Vallandigham, in FOR THE UNION, supra note 1, at 54.
518 See id. For a collection of episodes of suppression of Democratic papers in Ohio,
together with some of the more extreme anti-war rhetoric, see HARPER, supra note 1, at 194-
207. Republican papers sometimes lent their printing establishments to their rivals until the
papers could be rebuilt. See id.
"' See, e.g., Excitement in Columbus, Ohio; Invalid Soldiers Tear Down a Vallandigham
Flag-All the Soldiers Arrested, ATLAS & ARGUS (Albany, N.Y.: Daily), Aug. 6, 1863, at 2.
520 See NEELY, supra note 123, at 233-35. For a detailed review of Neely's book, see Paul
Finkelman, Civil Liberties and Civil War: The Great Emancipator as Civil Libertarian, 91
MICH. L. REV. 1353 (1993).
521 See TENNEY, supra note 1, at 17-28.
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Burnside's orders, an Ohio publisher abandoned publication of a book of
Vallandigham's speeches. Burnside showed an interest in finding the plates so that
he could prevent printing elsewhere."'
The idea that Vallandigham's arrest should be dismissed as atypical overlooks
the chilling effect of the episode on other potential critics and the encouragement it
gave to freelance suppressors. History, however, seems to cut both ways. While
threats of arrest by the military deterred many from speaking, those threats provoked
others to protest.
Of course, there were excesses on all sides. In referring to Lincoln, some
Democratic orators ominously invoked the memory of Charles I of England and of
Julius Caesar. Some Republicans had directed similar rhetoric against
Vallandigham.523
E. Free Speech with a Tough Central Core
The Vallandigham arrest raises questions about free speech doctrine. General
Order No. 38 directly targeted political speech. Hans Linde has suggested that the
First Amendment's command against abridging freedom of speech at least should
prohibit laws directly aimed at the content of speech, laws that expressly target
expression."' The principle would hold at least for speech not within some historic
and well established exception, such as libel of a private person. An order against
expressing "disloyal" sentiments targets political speech. One result of a prosecution
for disloyal sentiments was that while courts justified the arrest on the ground that
Vallandigham was interfering with raising troops, they required no proof of that fact.
Linde suggested that courts should subject laws aimed at conduct (such as ones
interfering with recruiting) and that affect speech to the clear and present danger test
as revised by Justice Brandeis.525
Under such an approach, the conviction of Vallandigham would have failed
because Order No. 38 directly targeted speech. A prosecution for interfering with
recruiting should also fail because of the lack of direct incitement to violate the law
and because the danger was not so imminent that Vallandigham could not be
answered by counter-speech. Of course, the general applicability of a law that targets
protected speech because of its communicative impact (e.g., silencing criticism of the
conduct of a public official because it causes emotional distress or silencing political
criticisms of a war because some who hear them will refuse to serve) should not save
it. Indeed, such a law has much in common with one aimed directly at speech.526
522 See id at 176-77.
523 See KLEMENT, LIMITS OF DISSENT, supra note 1, at 121 (referring to Brutus, Caesar,
and Vallandigham); id. at 180 (quoting the N.Y. HERALD, May 19, 1863).
524 See Hans A. Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the
Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1174 (1970).
525 See id.
526 Professor Eugene Volokh made this point on reading an earlier version of this piece,
and it is one with which 1 agree entirely. See Michael Kent Curtis, "Free Speech" and Its
Discontents: The Rebellion Against General Propositions and the Danger of Discretion, 31
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One might argue that courts should convict Vallandigham because, despite what
he said, his purpose was to aid the South and hurt. the North. To empower
prosecutors or generals to arrest political critics based on the prosecutors'
assumptions about motives is dangerous. Politicians typically suspect the motives
of their opponents. Judges using such a standard are more likely to make decisions
based on the hysteria of the moment.
The Vallandigham case again raises a question asked by Justice Hugo Black.
The question is not whether freedom of speech and of the press are absolute and
apply generally to all speech without limitations. Rather, it is whether there are
discrete areas in which freedom of speech and the press are agreed to apply, that are
simply beyond the power of government to suppress, though it may have very strong
reasons for wanting to do so. 27 Should, for example, the government be permitted
to suppress political speech that advocates changing governmental policy by peaceful
democratic means and that explicitly counsels against breaking the law? Should
political speech be protected even if peaceful discussion of changing course causes
genuine and serious harm to the war effort?
The Vallandigham arrest is also disturbing because it was not based on any
federal law. Such a law would, at least, have gone through debate, both inside and
outside Congress.
F. The Great Emancipator and Free Speech
Finally, what are we to make of Abraham Lincoln, the president who presided
over the suppressions of free speech described in this paper? Lincoln was a great
American president. He saved the Union, though at a very great cost in human life
and suffering. He led the nation to abolish slavery, and moved it closer to the spirit
of the Declaration of Independence. By abolishing slavery, the nation alleviated
much suffering. Lincoln was also the first American president to entertain a black
man, Frederick Douglass, in the White House.52 In doing so, he began to depart
from the deep racism that has scarred American life.
Psychologists suggest a halo effect influences and distorts our evaluation of
another's acts: "If a person has one salient (available) good trait, his other
characteristics are likely to be judged by others as better than they really are." '529 The
same thing happens in reverse of course-a horns and pitchfork effect. So advocacy
of free speech, peaceful change, and democratic decision making by many Democrats
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 419, 426 (1996); Michael Kent Curtis, Reading the First Amendment
by the Light of the Burning Flag, in I THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FLAG: THE FLAG SALUTE
CASES lii-liii (Michael Curtis ed., 1993) [hereinafter Curtis, Burning Flag].
527 See Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 867 (1960); Curtis,
Burning Flag, supra note 526, at xxiii-xxIV; Laurent Frantz, The First Amendment in the
Balance, 71 YALE L. J. 1424, 1430-32 (1962). For an extended and thoughtful discussion,
see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417 (1996); Volokh, supra note 414, at 223.
528 See Finkelman, supra note 520, at 1356.
529 STUART SUTHERLAND, IRRATIONALITY: THE ENEMY WITHIN 28 (1992).
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outraged over the Vallandigham arrest tends to disappear because many of those
individuals were racists who opposed emancipation.
Real life heroes, unlike those of fiction, are human beings. Good people in
difficult circumstances can make dreadful mistakes. Franklin Roosevelt, another
great president, having listened to his generals after the bombing of Pearl Harbor,
approved a military plan to incarcerate Americans of Japanese descent. 3 ° The war
power theory generated to support suppression of speech by the Lincoln
administration would also support the constitutionality of the Japanese internment.
Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was also based on the war power, and if
it was justified by the war power, one might ask why punishment of Vallandigham
was not justified. Lincoln aimed the Emancipation Proclamation at parts of the
nation which were in rebellion and where the federal government was not in control.
It struck directly at the labor supply necessary to sustain the Confederate war effort
and, with one bold stroke, converted former slaves and many of those who were
working for the enemy into soldiers fighting for freedom."' The question is not
whether the war power provides vast sources of power which would otherwise not
exist; rather, it is whether this vast power may be used to suspend free speech and the
democratic process in areas outside of the theater of war.
The nation has recognized its mistake in the Sedition Act cases. 32 It has
recognized its mistake in the Japanese internment."' It would be wise to recognize
that Lincoln was wrong in his justification of Vallandigham's arrest and to recognize
that he seriously departed from the better free speech tradition. Apologists for the
administration's action left a legacy of a limitless war power that supported the
suppression of free speech in World War I.
Suppression of political speech did not begin with the Lincoln administration's
suppression of anti-war speech. Lincoln confronted a grave crisis unique in
American history. Still, one fact is worth repeating. The administration justified the
first criminal punishment of speech by the federal government since the Sedition Act.
Support for free political speech by Vallandigham and his followers would have
been more inspiring if so many Americans of African descent were not omitted from
their political calculus. It would have been more inspiring if more Vallandigham
partisans had supported free speech for abolitionists and opponents of slavery. But
many Americans-Democrats, Republicans, and Abolitionists -- supported both free
speech for opponents of slavery and for Vallandigham. These people helped to
preserve our free speech tradition for future generations.
530 See, e.g., JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE SOLDIER OF FREEDOM 213-217
(1970).
53! See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 693 (1863). The justices who dissented from the
decision holding Lincoln, rather than Congress, had the power to blockade Southern ports,
said that the laws of war, including civil wars, "convert every citizen of the hostile State into
a public enemy." Id.
532 See CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 410-414, 478 (1840) (discussing a decision
to refund a fine imposed on Matthew Lyon).
133 See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 904 (codified at 50
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